Editing Schlieffen Plan (section)

====Terence Holmes====
In 2013, Holmes published a summary of his thinking about the Schlieffen Plan and the debates about it in ''Not the Schlieffen Plan''. He wrote that people believed that the Schlieffen Plan was for a grand offensive against France to gain a decisive victory in six weeks. The Russians would be held back and then defeated with reinforcements rushed by rail from the west. Holmes wrote that no-one had produced a source showing that Schlieffen intended a huge right-wing flanking move into France, ''in a two-front war''. The 1905 Memorandum was for ''War against France'', in which Russia would be unable to participate. Schlieffen had thought about such an attack on two general staff rides ({{lang|de|Generalstabsreisen}}) in 1904, on the staff ride of 1905 and in the deployment plan {{lang|de|Aufmarsch West}} I, for 1905–06 and 1906–07, in which all of the German army fought the French. In none of these plans was a two-front war contemplated; the common view that Schlieffen thought that such an offensive would guarantee victory in a two-front war was wrong. In his last exercise critique in December 1905, Schlieffen wrote that the Germans would be so outnumbered against France and Russia, that the Germans must rely on a counter-offensive strategy against both enemies, to eliminate one as quickly as possible.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|pp=55–57}}

In 1914, Moltke the Younger attacked Belgium and France with {{nowrap|34 corps,}} rather than the {{frac|48|1|2}} corps specified in the Schlieffen Memorandum, Moltke had insufficient troops to advance around the west side of Paris and six weeks later, the Germans were digging-in on the [[Aisne (river)|Aisne]]. The post-war idea of a six-week timetable, derived from discussions in May 1914, when Moltke had said that he wanted to defeat the French "in six weeks from the start of operations". The deadline did not appear in the Schlieffen Memorandum and Holmes wrote that Schlieffen would have considered six weeks to be far too long to wait in a war against France ''and'' Russia. Schlieffen wrote that the Germans must "wait for the enemy to emerge from behind his defensive ramparts" and intended to defeat the French army by a counter-offensive, tested in the general staff ride west of 1901. The Germans concentrated in the west and the main body of the French advanced through Belgium into Germany. The Germans then made a devastating counter-attack on the left bank of the Rhine near the Belgian border. The hypothetical victory was achieved by the 23rd day of mobilisation; nine active corps had been rushed to the eastern front by the 33rd day for a counter-attack against the Russian armies. Even in 1905, Schlieffen thought the Russians capable of mobilising in {{nowrap|28 days}} and that the Germans had only three weeks to defeat the French, which could not be achieved by a promenade through France.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|pp=57–58}}

The French were required by the treaty with Russia, to attack Germany as swiftly as possible but could advance into Belgium only ''after'' German troops had infringed Belgian sovereignty. Joffre had to devise a plan for an offensive that avoided Belgian territory, which would have been followed in 1914, had the Germans not invaded Belgium first. For this contingency, Joffre planned for three of the five French armies (about {{nowrap|60 per cent}} of the French first-line troops) to invade Lorraine on 14 August, to reach the river Saar from Sarrebourg to Saarbrücken, flanked by the German fortress zones around Metz and Strasbourg. The Germans would defend against the French, who would be enveloped on three sides then the Germans would attempt an encircling manoeuvre from the fortress zones to annihilate the French force. Joffre understood the risks but would have had no choice, had the Germans used a defensive strategy. Joffre would have had to run the risk of an encirclement battle against the French First, Second and Fourth armies. In 1904, Schlieffen had emphasised that the German fortress zones were not havens but jumping-off points for a surprise counter-offensive. In 1914, it was the French who made a surprise attack from the {{lang|fr|Région Fortifiée de Paris}} (Paris fortified zone) against a weakened German army.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|p=59}}

Holmes wrote that Schlieffen never intended to invade France through Belgium, in a war against France ''and'' Russia,

{{quote|If we want to visualize Schlieffen's stated principles for the conduct of a two front war coming to fruition under the circumstances of 1914, what we get in the first place is the image of a gigantic {{lang|de|Kesselschlacht}}  to pulverise the French army on German soil, the very antithesis of Moltke's disastrous lunge deep into France. That radical break with Schlieffen's strategic thinking ruined the chance of an early victory in the west on which the Germans had pinned all their hopes of prevailing in a two-front war.{{sfn|Holmes|2014a|pp=60–61}}}}