Editing Peace (section)

===Balance of power===
{{Main|Balance of power (international relations)}}
The classical "realist" position is that the key to promoting order between states, and so of increasing the chances of peace, is the maintenance of a [[Balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] between states – a situation where no state is so dominant that it can "lay down the law to the rest". Exponents of this view have included [[Metternich]], [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]], [[Hans Morgenthau]], and [[Henry Kissinger]]. A related approach – more in the tradition of [[Hugo Grotius]] than [[Thomas Hobbes]] – was articulated by the so-called "[[English school of international relations theory]]" such as [[Martin Wight]] in his book ''Power Politics'' (1946, 1978) and [[Hedley Bull]] in ''The Anarchical Society'' (1977).

As the maintenance of a balance of power could in some circumstances require a willingness to go to war, some critics saw the idea of a balance of power as promoting war rather than promoting peace. This was a radical critique of those supporters of the Allied and Associated Powers who justified entry into World War I on the grounds that it was necessary to preserve the balance of power in Europe from a German bid for [[hegemony]].

In the second half of the 20th century, and especially during the [[Cold War]], a particular form of balance of power – mutual nuclear deterrence – emerged as a widely held doctrine on the key to peace between the great powers. Critics argued that the development of nuclear stockpiles increased the chances of war rather than peace, and that the "nuclear umbrella" made it "safe" for smaller wars (e.g. the [[Vietnam War]] and the Soviet invasion of [[Czechoslovakia]] to end the [[Prague Spring]]), so making such wars more likely.