Editing Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (section)

===Interim developments===
[[File:Boris Yeltsin 21 February 1989-1.jpg|thumb|[[Boris Yeltsin]]]]
Hans Ephraimson-Abt, whose daughter Alice Ephraimson-Abt had died on the flight, chaired the ''American Association for Families of KAL&nbsp;007 Victims''. He single-handedly pursued three U.S. administrations for answers about the flight, flying to Washington 250 times and meeting with 149 [[United States Department of State|State Department]] officials. Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Ephraimson-Abt persuaded U.S. Senators [[Ted Kennedy]], [[Sam Nunn]], [[Carl Levin]], and [[Bill Bradley]] to write to the Soviet President, [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] requesting information about the flight.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Witkin |first1=Richard |title=Soviets Raise Hopes on Answers to Korean Crash |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/07/world/soviets-raise-hopes-on-answers-to-korean-crash.html |access-date=June 21, 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=January 7, 1991}}</ref>

''[[Glasnost]]'' reforms in the same year brought about a relaxation of [[Media freedom in Russia|press censorship]]; consequently reports started to appear in the Soviet press suggesting that the Soviet military knew the location of the wreckage and had possession of the flight recorders.<ref name="Illesh-Eng"/><ref>Charles, p. 16</ref> On December 10, 1991, Senator [[Jesse Helms]] of the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Committee on Foreign Relations]], wrote to Boris Yeltsin requesting information concerning the survival of passengers and crew of KAL&nbsp;007 including the fate of Congressman Larry McDonald.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rescue007.org/helms_letter.htm |title=Helms' letter to Yeltsin |publisher=Rescue007.org |date=October 25, 2008 |access-date=April 5, 2010}}</ref>

On June 17, 1992, President Yeltsin revealed that after the [[1991 Soviet coup attempt|1991 failed coup attempt]], concerted attempts were made to locate Soviet-era documents relating to KAL&nbsp;007. He mentioned the discovery of "a memorandum from K.G.B. to the Central Committee of the Communist Party," stating that a tragedy had taken place and adding that there are documents "which would clarify the entire picture." Yeltsin said the memo continued to say that "these documents are so well concealed that it is doubtful that our children will be able to find them."<ref name="NYT1992">{{cite news |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE6D61138F93BA25755C0A964958260 |work=[[The New York Times]] |title=Summit In Washington: Reporter's Notebook; The 'Burly' Yeltsin Acquires a New Kind of Stature: Major World Figure |author=Wines, Michael |date=June 18, 1992 |access-date=January 30, 2009}}</ref> On September 11, 1992, Yeltsin officially acknowledged the existence of the recorders and promised to give the South Korean government a transcript of the flight recorder contents as found in KGB files.

In October 1992, Hans Ephraimson-Abt led a delegation of families and U.S. State Department officials to Moscow at the invitation of President Yeltsin.<ref name="Hoffman"/> During a state ceremony at St. Catherine's Hall in the [[Kremlin]], the KAL family delegation was handed a portfolio containing partial transcripts of the KAL&nbsp;007 cockpit voice recorder, translated into Russian, and documents of the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]] pertaining to the tragedy.

During an official visit to Seoul in November 1992 to improve bilateral relations, President Yeltsin handed the two recorder containers to Korean President [[Roh Tae-woo]], but not the tapes themselves. The following month, the ICAO voted to reopen the KAL&nbsp;007 investigations in order to take the newly released information into account. The tapes were handed to ICAO in Paris on January 8, 1993.<ref name="tapes">{{cite press release |url=http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |title=KAL Tapes To Be Handed Over To ICAO |date=January 1993 |publisher=[[International Civil Aviation Organization]] |access-date=January 31, 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121209114516/http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |archive-date=December 9, 2012}}</ref> Also handed over at the same time were tapes of the ground-to-air communications of the Soviet military.<ref name="Sayle"/> The tapes were transcribed by the [[Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety]] (BEA) in Paris in the presence of representatives from Japan, The Russian Federation, South Korea, and the United States.<ref name="Sayle">{{cite news |title=Closing The File On Flight 007 |url=https://www.newyorker.com/archive/1993/12/13/1993_12_13_090_TNY_CARDS_000368996 |date=December 13, 1993 |access-date=January 31, 2009 |author=Sayle, Murray |magazine=The New Yorker}}</ref>

A 1993 official enquiry by the Russian Federation absolved the Soviet hierarchy of blame, determining that the incident was a case of mistaken identity.<ref name="Pry">Pry, pp. 27–32</ref> On May 28, 1993, the ICAO presented its second report to the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]].

====Soviet memoranda====
[[File:Mikhail Merchink.jpg|thumb|''Mikhail Merchink'', lead Soviet vessel in simulated search]]

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin disclosed five top-secret memos dating from a few weeks after the downing of KAL&nbsp;007 in 1983.<ref group="note">These memos were published in the Soviet news magazine, [[Izvestia]] #228, October 15, 1992, shortly after being made public by Yeltsin.</ref> The memos contained Soviet communications (from KGB Chief [[Viktor Chebrikov]] and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to General Secretary Yuri Andropov) that indicated that they knew the location of KAL&nbsp;007's wreckage while they were simulating a search and harassing the American Navy; they had found the sought-after [[cockpit voice recorder]] on October 20, 1983 (50 days after the incident),<ref name="Bohlen">{{cite news |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D91030F935A25753C1A964958260 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=October 16, 1992 |title=Tape Displays the Anguish On Jet the Soviets Downed |author=Bohlen, Celestine |access-date=February 1, 2009}}</ref> and had decided to keep this knowledge secret, the reason being that the tapes could not unequivocally support their firmly held view that KAL&nbsp;007's flight to Soviet territory was a deliberately planned intelligence mission.<ref>Daniloff, p. 303</ref><ref>Andrew, p. 60</ref>

{{quote box|align=right|width=33%|quote=Simulated search efforts in the Sea of Japan are being performed by our vessels at present in order to dis-inform the U.S. and Japan. These activities will be discontinued in accordance with a specific plan...

Therefore, if the flight recorders shall be transferred to western countries their objective data can equally be used by the U.S.S.R. and the western countries in proving the opposite viewpoints on the nature of the flight of the South Korean airplane. In such circumstances, a new phase in anti-Soviet hysteria cannot be excluded.

In connection with all mentioned above, it seems highly preferable not to transfer the flight recorders to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or any third party willing to decipher their contents. The fact that the recorders are in possession of the U.S.S.R. shall be kept secret...

As far as we are aware neither the U.S. nor Japan has any information on the flight recorders. We have made necessary efforts in order to prevent any disclosure of the information in the future.

Looking to your approval.|author=D. Ustinov, V. Chebrikov (photo)<ref group="note">{{cite web |url=http://www.airliners.net/articles/graphics/chebrikov.jpg |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060623025748/http://www.airliners.net/articles/graphics/chebrikov.jpg |archive-date=2006-06-23 |title=Photo of Chebrikov |publisher=Airliners.net |access-date=5 April 2010}}</ref> December 1983}}

The third memo acknowledges that analysis of the recorder tapes showed no evidence of the Soviet interceptor attempting to contact KAL&nbsp;007 via radio nor any indication that the KAL&nbsp;007 had been given warning shots.

<blockquote>However in case the flight recorders shall become available to the western countries their data may be used for Confirmation of no attempt by the intercepting aircraft to establish radio contact with the intruder plane on 121.5&nbsp;MHz and no tracers warning shots in the last section of the flight<ref>Conclusions by the Group of Experts of the Defense Ministry, KGB of the U.S.S.R. and Ministry of Aerospace Industry, Head of the Group Lieutenant-General of Aviation Makarov
The staff of the Group
Lieutenant-General Engineer Tichomirov
Major-General Engineer Didenko
Major-General of Aviation Stepanov
Major-General of Aviation Kovtun
Corresponding Member of Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Fedosov
November 28, 1983</ref>
</blockquote>

That the Soviet search was simulated (while they knew the wreckage lay elsewhere) also is suggested by the article of Mikhail Prozumentshchikov, Deputy Director of the [[Russian State Archives of Recent History]], commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the airplane's shoot-down. Commenting on the Soviet and American searches: "Since the U.S.S.R., for natural reasons, knew better where the Boeing had been downed...it was very problematical to retrieve anything, especially as the U.S.S.R. was not particularly interested".<ref>{{cite web |author=Prozumentshchikov |first=Mikhail |date=September 1, 2003 |title=Commentary: 20th Anniversary of Flight 007 |url=http://www.jamesoberg.com/09012003commentarymikhailkal.html |access-date=January 13, 2009 |work=jamesoberg.com |publisher=[[RIA Novosti]]}}</ref>