Editing Jimmy Carter (section)

===== Soviet invasion of Afghanistan =====
Communists under the leadership of [[Nur Muhammad Taraki]] [[Saur Revolution|seized power in Afghanistan]] on April 27, 1978.<ref name="Kaplan">{{cite book |last=Kaplan |first=Robert D. |title=Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-307-54698-2 |pages=115–117}}</ref> Due to the regime's improvement of secular education and redistribution of land coinciding with mass executions and political oppression, Taraki was deposed by rival [[Hafizullah Amin]] in September.<ref name="Kaplan" /><ref name="Kepel">{{cite book |last=Kepel |first=Gilles |title=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam |publisher=I.B. Tauris |year=2006 |isbn=978-1-84511-257-8 |pages=138–139, 142–144}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Blight |first1=James G. |title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |year=2012 |isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 |pages=69–70}}</ref> Amin was considered a "brutal psychopath" by foreign observers and had lost control of much of the country, prompting the Soviet Union to [[Soviet–Afghan War|invade Afghanistan]] on December 24, 1979, execute Amin, and install [[Babrak Karmal]] as president.<ref name="Kaplan" /><ref name="Kepel" />

[[File:Carter and Begin, September 5, 1978 (10729514294).jpg|thumb|alt=Carter, Begin, and Brzezinski walking together outside.|Carter, Begin, and [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] in September 1978]]In the West, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered a threat to global security and the oil supplies of the [[Persian Gulf]], as well as the existence of Pakistan.<ref name="Kepel" /><ref name="Riedel">{{cite book |author-link=Bruce Riedel |last=Riedel |first=Bruce |title=What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] Press |year=2014 |isbn=978-0-8157-2595-4 |pages=ix–xi, 21–22, 93, 98–99, 105}}</ref> These concerns led Carter to expand collaboration between the CIA and Pakistan's [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] (ISI), which had begun in July 1979, when the CIA started providing $695,000 worth of non-lethal assistance to the [[Afghan mujahideen]].<ref name="Tobin 2020" /> The modest scope of this early collaboration was likely influenced by the understanding, later recounted by CIA official [[Robert Gates]], "that a substantial U.S. covert aid program" might have "raise[d] the stakes", thereby causing "the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended."<ref name="Riedel" /><ref name="Gates">{{cite book |last=Gates |first=Bob |title=From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War |publisher=Simon and Schuster |year=2007 |isbn=978-1-4165-4336-7 |pages=145–147}} When asked whether he expected that the revelations in his memoir would inspire the conspiracy theories surrounding the U.S. aid program, Gates replied: "No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily." See Gates, email communication with John Bernell White Jr., October 15, 2011, as cited in {{cite thesis |last=White |first=John Bernell |url=https://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04252012-175722/unrestricted/WHITE_THESIS.pdf |title=The Strategic Mind Of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How A Native Pole Used Afghanistan To Protect His Homeland |date=May 2012 |pages=45–46, 82 |access-date=September 11, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304022857/https://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04252012-175722/unrestricted/WHITE_THESIS.pdf |archive-date=March 4, 2016}} cf. {{cite book |author-link=Steve Coll |last=Coll |first=Steve |title=Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 |url=https://archive.org/details/ghostwarssecreth00coll |url-access=registration |publisher=Penguin |year=2004 |isbn=978-1-59420-007-6 |page=[https://archive.org/details/ghostwarssecreth00coll/page/581 581] |quote=Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail.{{spaces}}... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.}}</ref>[[File:King Khaled (10168117694).jpg|thumb|alt=Carter standing next to King Khalid|King [[Khalid of Saudi Arabia]] and Carter in October 1978|left]]

According to a 2020 review of declassified U.S. documents by Conor Tobin in the journal ''[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]'': <blockquote>The primary significance of this small-scale aid was in creating constructive links with dissidents through Pakistan's ISI that could be utilized in the case of an overt Soviet intervention ... The small-scale covert program that developed ''in response'' to the increasing Soviet influence was part of a contingency plan ''if'' the Soviets did intervene militarily, as Washington would be in a better position to make it difficult for them to consolidate their position, but not designed to induce an intervention.<ref name="Tobin 2020">{{cite journal|last=Tobin|first=Conor|title=The Myth of the 'Afghan Trap': Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979|journal=[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|volume=44|issue=2|date=April 2020|pages=237–264|doi=10.1093/dh/dhz065|doi-access=free}}</ref></blockquote>

On December 28, 1979, Carter signed a presidential finding explicitly allowing the CIA to transfer "lethal military equipment either directly or through third countries to the Afghan opponents of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan" and to arrange "selective training, conducted outside of Afghanistan, in the use of such equipment either directly or via third country intermediation."<ref name="Tobin 2020" /> His finding defined the CIA's mission as "harassment" of Soviet troops; at the time, "this was not a war the CIA expected to win outright on the battlefield," in the words of [[Steve Coll]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=[[Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001]]|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2004|isbn=978-1-59420-007-6|page=[https://archive.org/details/ghostwarssecreth00coll/page/58 58]|author-link=Steve Coll}}</ref>

Carter was determined to respond harshly to what he considered a dangerous provocation. In a televised speech on January 23, 1980, he announced sanctions on the Soviet Union, promised renewed aid and registration to Pakistan and the [[Selective Service System]], and [[Carter Doctrine|committed the U.S. to the Persian Gulf's defense]].<ref name="Riedel" /><ref name="Gates" /><ref>{{cite web |last1=Carter |first1=James |title=Jimmy Carter State of the Union Address 1980 (23 January 1980) |url=https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041015134701/https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml |archive-date=October 15, 2004 |website=Selected Speeches of Jimmy Carter |publisher=Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum |access-date=May 30, 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Jimmy Carter: The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress |url=https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33079 |website=The American Presidency Project |last1=Peters |first1=Gerhard |last2=Woolley |first2=John T. |access-date=January 7, 2018 |archive-date=December 14, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161214111712/https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33079 |url-status=live}}</ref> Carter imposed an embargo on grain shipments to the USSR, tabled SALT II, requested a 5% annual increase in defense spending,{{sfn|Zelizer|2010|p=103}}<ref>{{cite book |last1=Leuchtenburg |first1=William E. |title=The American President |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |isbn=978-0-19-517616-2 |page=577 |chapter=Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter}}</ref> and called for a boycott of the [[1980 Summer Olympics]] in Moscow, which was ultimately joined by 65 other nations.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Eaton|first1=Joseph|date=November 2016|title=Reconsidering the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott: American Sports Diplomacy in East Asian Perspective|journal=Diplomatic History|volume=40|issue=5|pages=845–864|doi=10.1093/dh/dhw026|jstor=26376807}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Treadaway |first=Dan |date=August 5, 1996 |title=Carter stresses role of Olympics in promoting global harmony |url=https://www.emory.edu/EMORY_REPORT/erarchive/1996/August/ERaug.5/8_5_96carter.html |journal=Emory Report |volume=48 |issue=37 |access-date=April 12, 2023 |archive-date=June 22, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230622182355/https://www.emory.edu/EMORY_REPORT/erarchive/1996/August/ERaug.5/8_5_96carter.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Toohey |first=Kristine |title=The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ywy9aslk3M8C&pg=PA100 |date=November 8, 2007 |publisher=CABI |isbn=978-1-84593-355-5 |page=100 |access-date=March 21, 2022 |archive-date=July 5, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230705120119/https://books.google.com/books?id=ywy9aslk3M8C&pg=PA100 |url-status=live}}</ref>

In early 1980, Carter determined the thrust of U.S. policy for the duration of the war: he initiated [[Operation Cyclone|a program to arm the mujahideen through Pakistan's ISI]] and secured a pledge from Saudi Arabia to match U.S. funding for this purpose. Despite huge expenditure, the Soviet Union was unable to quell the insurgency and [[Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan|withdrew from Afghanistan]] in 1989.<ref>{{cite book | last = Gaddis|first = John Lewis | title = We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History | date = 1997 | publisher = Oxford University Press | isbn = 978-0-19-878070-0}}</ref><ref name="Riedel" /> The routing of U.S. aid through Pakistan led to some controversy, as weapons sent to [[Karachi]] were frequently controlled by Pakistan, whose government influenced which rebels received assistance. Despite this, Carter has expressed no regret over his decision to support what he considered the Afghan freedom fighters.<ref name="Riedel" />