Editing Guadalcanal campaign (section)

==Significance==

===Resources===
[[File:Guadalcanal cemetery 1945.jpg|thumb|Military cemetery on Guadalcanal, 1945]] 
[[File:Henderson1944.jpg|thumb|Henderson Field in August 1944]]

The Battle of Guadalcanal was one of the first prolonged campaigns in the Pacific Ocean theater of World War II. It strained logistical capabilities of the combatant nations. For the U.S., this need prompted the development of effective combat air transport for the first time. A failure to achieve [[air supremacy]] forced Japan to rely on reinforcement by barges, destroyers, and submarines, with very uneven results. Early in the campaign, the Americans were hindered by a lack of resources, as they suffered heavy losses in cruisers and carriers, with replacements from ramped-up shipbuilding programs still months away from materializing.<ref>Murray, p. 215; Hough, p. 372.</ref>

The U.S. Navy suffered such high personnel losses during the campaign that it refused to publicly release total casualty figures for years. However, as the campaign continued, and the American public became more and more aware of the plight and perceived heroism of the American forces on Guadalcanal, more forces were dispatched to the area. This spelled trouble for Japan as its [[military-industrial complex]] was unable to match the output of American industry and manpower. Thus, as the campaign wore on the Japanese were losing irreplaceable units while the Americans were rapidly replacing and even augmenting their forces.<ref>Murray, p. 215, Hough, p. 372</ref>

The Guadalcanal campaign was costly to Japan strategically and in material losses and manpower. Roughly 30,000 personnel, including 25,000 experienced ground troops, died during the campaign. As many as three-quarters of the deaths were from non-combat causes such as starvation and various tropical diseases.<ref>{{cite news |last=Kuwahara |first=Masatoshi |title=Ex-soldier recalls Guadalcanal as 'island of death' |date=26 May 2015 |newspaper=[[Japan Times]] |url=http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/26/national/history/ex-soldier-recalls-guadalcanal-island-death |access-date=26 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150529011349/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/26/national/history/ex-soldier-recalls-guadalcanal-island-death |archive-date=29 May 2015 |url-status=dead}}</ref> The drain on resources directly contributed to Japan's failure to achieve its objectives in the New Guinea campaign. Japan also lost control of the southern Solomons and the ability to interdict Allied shipping to Australia. Japan's major base at Rabaul became further directly threatened by Allied air power. Most importantly, scarce Japanese land, air, and naval forces had disappeared forever into the Guadalcanal jungle and surrounding sea. The Japanese could not replace the aircraft destroyed and ships sunk in this campaign, as well as their highly trained and veteran crews, especially the naval aircrews, nearly as quickly as the Allies.<ref>Hough p. 350</ref>

===Strategy===
While the Battle of Midway is viewed as a turning point in the Pacific War, Japan remained on the offensive, as shown by its advances down the Solomon Islands. Only after the Allied victories in Guadalcanal and New Guinea (at [[Battle of Milne Bay|Milne Bay]] and Buna–Gona)<ref>Dean 2013, p. 236; Keogh 1965, p. 249; James 2012, p. 213.</ref> were these large-scale Japanese offensive actions stopped. Strategic initiative passed to the Allies, as it proved, permanently. The Guadalcanal campaign ended all Japanese expansion attempts in the Pacific and placed the Allies in a position of clear supremacy.<ref>Willmott, ''Barrier and the Javelin'', pp. 522–523; Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 416–430.</ref> The Allied victory at Guadalcanal was the first step in a long string of successes that eventually led [[surrender of Japan|to the surrender]] and [[occupation of Japan]].<ref>Hough, p. 350</ref><ref>Hough, p. 372; Miller, p. 350; Zimmerman, p. 166.</ref>

The "[[Europe first]]" policy agreed to by the Allies had initially only allowed for defensive actions against Japanese expansion in order to focus resources on defeating Germany. However, Admiral King's argument for the Guadalcanal invasion, as well as its successful implementation, convinced Roosevelt that the Pacific Theater could be pursued offensively as well.<ref>Hornfischer, Neptune's Inferno, pp. 11–15</ref> By the end of 1942, it was clear that Japan had lost the Guadalcanal campaign, a serious blow to Japan's strategic plans for the defense of their empire and an unanticipated defeat at the hands of the Americans.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Willmott |first1=H. P. |first2=Robin |last2=Cross |first3=Charles |last3=Messenger |editor-first=Dennis |editor-last=Cowe |title=World War II |orig-year=2004 |year=2006 |publisher=Dorling Kindersley |location=London |isbn=1-4053-1262-9 |pages=208 |chapter=American Offensives in the Pacific}}; Miller, p. 350; Shaw, p. 52; Alexander, p. 81.</ref>

Perhaps as important as the military victory for the Allies was the psychological victory. On a level playing field, the Allies had beaten Japan's best land, air, and naval forces. After Guadalcanal, Allied personnel regarded the Japanese military with much less fear and awe than previously. In addition, the Allies viewed the eventual outcome of the Pacific War with greatly increased optimism.<ref>Murray p. 215</ref>

<blockquote>Tokyo Express no longer has terminus on Guadalcanal.
: —Major General [[Alexander Patch]], USA, Commander, U.S. Forces on Guadalcanal<br /></blockquote>

<blockquote>Guadalcanal is no longer merely a name of an island in Japanese military history. It is the name of the graveyard of the Japanese army.
:— Major General [[Kiyotake Kawaguchi]], IJA, Commander, 35th Infantry Brigade at Guadalcanal<ref>Quoted in Leckie (1999) p. 9 and others</ref></blockquote>

Beyond Kawaguchi, several Japanese political and military leaders, including [[Naoki Hoshino]], Nagano, and [[Torashirō Kawabe]], stated shortly after the war that Guadalcanal was the decisive turning point in the conflict. Said Kawabe, "As for the turning point [of the war], when the positive action ceased or even became negative, it was, I feel, at Guadalcanal."<ref>Zimmerman p. 167</ref>