Editing Erwin Rommel (section)

== Reputation as a military commander ==
{{See also|Rommel myth#Operational and strategic level commander}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1974-132-28A, Atlantikwall, Erwin Rommel mit Admiral Ruge.jpg|thumb|upright|Rommel and Vice Admiral [[Friedrich Ruge]] visiting the [[U-boat]] base in [[La Rochelle]], France, February 1944]]
Rommel was famous in his lifetime, including among his adversaries. His tactical prowess and decency in the treatment of Allied prisoners earned him the respect of opponents including [[Claude Auchinleck]], [[Archibald Wavell]], [[George S. Patton]], and [[Bernard Montgomery]].{{sfn|Brighton|2008|p=xvii}}

Rommel's military reputation has been controversial. While nearly all military practitioners acknowledge Rommel's excellent tactical skills and personal bravery, some, such as U.S. major general and military historian [[David T. Zabecki]] of the [[United States Naval Institute]], consider Rommel's performance as an [[Operational art|operational level]] commander to be highly overstated and that other officers share this belief.{{sfn|Zabecki|2016}}{{refn|group=N|According to Zabecki, Rommel's insubordination also played a role, leading to a calamitous misuse of resources when Rommel went over the head of his superior, Field Marshal [[Albert Kesselring]], to appeal directly to Hitler to approve an assault on Egypt instead of occupying Malta, as Kesselring and OKW were planning.{{sfn|Zabecki|2016}}}} General [[Klaus Naumann]], who served as [[Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr|Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr]], agrees with the military historian Charles Messenger that Rommel had challenges at the operational level, and states that Rommel's violation of the [[unity of command]] principle, bypassing the chain of command in Africa, was unacceptable and contributed to the eventual operational and strategic failure in North Africa.{{sfn|Naumann|2009|pp=189–190}}{{refn|group=N|Naumann: "Rommel's way out in Africa—bypassing the chain of command by seeking direct access to Hitler—must never be taken as an example to be followed." This allowed him to achieve some tactical victories, but this contributed to eventual operational and strategic failure in North Africa.{{sfn|Naumann|2009|pp=189–190}}}} The German biographer [[Wolf Heckmann]] describes Rommel as "the most overrated commander of an army in world history".{{sfn|Watson|1999|p=118}}

Nevertheless, there is also a notable number of officers who admire his methods, like [[Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.|Norman Schwarzkopf]] who described Rommel as a genius at battles of movement saying "Look at Rommel. Look at North Africa, the Arab-Israeli wars, and all the rest of them. A war in the desert is a war of mobility and lethality. It's not a war where straight lines are drawn in the sand and [you] say, 'I will defend here or die."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Schwarzkopf|first1=Norman|last2=Pyle|first2=Richard|title=Schwarzkopf: the man, the mission, the triumph|date=1991|publisher=Signet|page=113}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Blais|first1=Jan David|title=Twentieth Century Limited: Book Two, Age of Reckoning |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Kka8bdjvRo0C&pg=PT241|isbn=978-1-62346-356-4|date= 2012|publisher=eBookIt.com }}</ref> [[Ariel Sharon]] deemed the German military model used by Rommel to be superior to the British model used by Montgomery.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kimmerling|first1=Baruch|title=Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians|publisher=Verso|url=https://archive.org/details/politicideariels00kimm_0|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/politicideariels00kimm_0/page/n65 56]|isbn=978-1-85984-517-2|year=2003}}</ref> His compatriot [[Moshe Dayan]] likewise considered Rommel a model and icon.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Balwant Sidhu Galib|title=Rear View Mirror|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QkURCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT420|isbn=978-1-5049-1686-8|date= 2015|publisher=AuthorHouse }}</ref> [[Wesley Clark]] states that "Rommel's military reputation, though, has lived on, and still sets the standard for a style of daring, charismatic leadership to which most officers aspire."{{sfn|Messenger|2009|p=x}} During the recent desert wars, Rommel's military theories and experiences attracted great interest from policymakers and military instructors.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Leroux|first1=Charles|title=Rommel May Guide U.S. In Desert Warfare|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/1991/02/19/rommel-may-guide-us-in-desert-warfare/}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Knigge|first1=Jobst|title=Paris stürzt sich auf Rommels Erinnerungen|url=http://www.sz-online.de/nachrichten/paris-stuerzt-sich-auf-rommels-erinnerungen-850890.html|archive-date=5 November 2018|access-date=27 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181105224011/https://www.sz-online.de/nachrichten/paris-stuerzt-sich-auf-rommels-erinnerungen-850890.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Chinese military leader [[Sun Li-jen]] had the laudatory nickname "Rommel of the East".<ref>{{cite book|last1=罗|first1=学蓬|title=东方隆美尔: 解密蒋介石为何欲置孙立人于死地|isbn=978-7-5153-0597-4|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y_qGMwEACAAJ|year=2012|publisher=中国青年出版社 }}</ref>
Certain modern military historians, such as Larry T. Addington, Niall Barr, [[Douglas Porch]] and [[Robert Citino]], are sceptical of Rommel as an operational, let alone strategic level commander. They point to Rommel's lack of appreciation for Germany's strategic situation, his misunderstanding of the relative importance of his theatre to the German High Command, his poor grasp of logistical realities, and, according to the historian Ian Beckett, his "penchant for glory hunting".{{sfn|Beckett|2014|loc=I.F.W. Beckett, Introduction|pp=4–6}}{{sfn|Citino|2012}} Citino credits Rommel's limitations as an operational level commander as "materially contributing" to the eventual demise of the Axis forces in North Africa,{{sfn|Citino|2012}}{{refn|group=N|[[Robert Citino]]: "[Rommel's] disinterest in the dreary science of logistics, his love of action, his tendency to fly off to wherever the fighting was hottest—all of these qualities (...) are problems in a commander under modern conditions, and they all contributed materially to the disaster that ultimately befell him and his army in the desert."{{sfn|Citino|2012}}}} while Addington focuses on the struggle over strategy, whereby Rommel's initial brilliant success resulted in "catastrophic effects" for Germany in North Africa.{{sfn|Addington|1967}} Porch highlights Rommel's "offensive mentality", symptomatic of the Wehrmacht commanders as a whole in the belief that the tactical and operational victories would lead to strategic success. Compounding the problem was the Wehrmacht's institutional tendency to discount logistics, industrial output and their opponents' capacity to learn from past mistakes.{{sfn|Porch|2004|p=206}}

The historian [[Geoffrey P. Megargee]] points out Rommel's playing the German and Italian command structures against each other to his advantage. Rommel used the confused structure—the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|High command of the armed forces]], the OKH ([[OKH|Supreme High Command of the Army]]) and the ''[[Comando Supremo]]'' (Italian Supreme Command)—to disregard orders that he disagreed with or to appeal to whatever authority he felt would be most sympathetic to his requests.{{sfn|Megargee|2000|p=97}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-263-1598-04, Frankreich, Rommel, "Indische Legion".jpg|thumb|Inspecting the soldiers of the anti-British [[Indische Legion|Free India Legion]], France, 1944]]
Some historians take issue with Rommel's absence from Normandy on the day of the Allied invasion, 6 June 1944. He had left France on 5 June and was at home on the 6th celebrating his wife's birthday. (According to Rommel, he planned to proceed to see Hitler the next day to discuss the situation in Normandy).{{sfn|Zabecki March|2016}}{{sfn|Lieb|2014}} Zabecki calls his decision to leave the theatre in view of an imminent invasion "an incredible lapse of command responsibility".{{sfn|Zabecki March|2016}} Lieb remarks that Rommel displayed real mental agility, but the lack of an energetic commander, together with other problems, caused the battle largely not to be conducted in his concept (which is the opposite of the German doctrine), although the result was still better than Geyr's plan.{{sfn|Lieb|2014|pp=131–132}} Lieb also opines that while his harshest critics (who mostly came from the General Staff) often said that Rommel was overrated or not suitable for higher commands, envy was a big factor here.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Wiederschein |first1=Harald |title=Der Mythos vom Wüstenfuchs: Wie "ritterlich" kämpften Deutsche und Briten wirklich? |url=https://www.focus.de/wissen/mensch/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/neues-buch-zum-zweiten-weltkrieg-krieg-in-nordafrika-kaempften-deutsche-und-briten-wirklich-ritterlich-in-der-wueste_id_8712846.html |agency=FOCUS |date=22 June 2018 |archive-date=10 December 2021 |access-date=16 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210090101/https://www.focus.de/wissen/mensch/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/neues-buch-zum-zweiten-weltkrieg-krieg-in-nordafrika-kaempften-deutsche-und-briten-wirklich-ritterlich-in-der-wueste_id_8712846.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

T.L. McMahon argues that while Rommel no doubt possessed operational vision, he did not have the strategic resources to effect his operational choices while his forces provided the tactical ability to accomplish his goals, and the German staff and system of staff command were designed for commanders who led from the front, and in some cases he might have chosen the same options as Montgomery (a reputedly strategy-oriented commander) had he been put in the same conditions.<ref>{{cite book |last=McMahon |first=T.L. |date=2014 |title=Operational Principles: The Operational Art of Erwin Rommel And Bernard Montgomery |publisher=Pickle Partners |isbn=978-1-78289-742-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bBpwCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT97}}</ref> According to [[Steven Zaloga]], tactical flexibility was a great advantage of the German system, but in the final years of the war, Hitler and his cronies like Himmler and Goering had usurped more and more authority at the strategic level, leaving professionals like Rommel increasing constraints on their actions.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Zaloga|first1=Steven J.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KDfDCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT9|title=D-Day 1944 (2): Utah Beach & the US Airborne Landings|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2012|isbn=978-1-78200-147-8|series=Campaign 104}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=September 2021}} [[Martin Blumenson]] considers Rommel a general with a compelling view of strategy and logistics, which was demonstrated through his many arguments with his superiors over such matters, although Blumenson also thinks that what distinguished Rommel was his boldness, his intuitive feel for the battlefield.<ref name="Barnett"/>(Upon which Schwarzkopf also comments "Rommel had a feel for the battlefield like no other man."<ref name=Norman>{{cite book|last1=Marshall|first1=Charles F.|title=Discovering the Rommel Murder|isbn=978-0-8117-4278-8|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=diF6jjpgpfgC&pg=PT210|date= 2017|publisher=Stackpole Books }}</ref>)

Joseph Forbes comments that: "The complex, conflict-filled interaction between Rommel and his superiors over logistics, objectives and priorities should not be used to detract from Rommel's reputation as a remarkable military leader", because Rommel was not given powers over logistics, and because if only generals who attain strategic-policy goals are great generals, such highly regarded commanders as Robert E. Lee, Hannibal, Charles XII would have to be excluded from that list.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Forbes|first1=Joseph|title=Rommel Myth – Military Review, Volume 78, Issue 3|date=1998|publisher=Front Cover U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Command and General Staff School (U.S.)|page=2}}</ref> General Siegfried F. Storbeck, Deputy Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (1987–1991), remarks that, Rommel's leadership style and offensive thinking, although carrying inherent risks like losing the overview of the situation and creating overlapping of authority, have been proved effective, and have been analysed and incorporated in the training of officers by "us, our Western allies, the Warsaw Pact, and even the Israel Defense Forces".<ref name=Storbeck041213>{{cite web |last=Storbeck |first=Siegfried F. |date=4 December 2013 |title=Erwin Rommel – Bitte mehr Sachlichkeit! |trans-title=Erwin-Rommel – Please more objectivity! |website=Bundeswehr – IF Zeitschrift für Innere Führung |url=http://www.if-zeitschrift.de/portal/a/ifz/!ut/p/c4/JYvBCsIwEAX_KNsoqPVW0YIXBS-2XiRN1mShSUpcLYgfb4JvYC7DgxtkgnqTVUwxqBE66DVth1kMs8E7PT6CHXoMwuJTO9KOEa7lZVDoGJCLGQNTtk2KYxJTTDyW8kopF0EG-krud3IpF9V_8rteNYfusqnr46k9w-R98wP2WT1k/ |access-date=15 June 2016 |archive-date=28 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160828085715/http://www.if-zeitschrift.de/portal/a/ifz/!ut/p/c4/JYvBCsIwEAX_KNsoqPVW0YIXBS-2XiRN1mShSUpcLYgfb4JvYC7DgxtkgnqTVUwxqBE66DVth1kMs8E7PT6CHXoMwuJTO9KOEa7lZVDoGJCLGQNTtk2KYxJTTDyW8kopF0EG-krud3IpF9V_8rteNYfusqnr46k9w-R98wP2WT1k/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Maurice Remy defends his strategic decision regarding Malta as, although risky, the only logical choice.{{refn|group=N|Remy: Kesselring,&nbsp;... in his memoirs that criticises the five-year younger and much more popular Rommel,&nbsp;... he already knew at least since the war's end about American arms shipment and intention to intervene which would render the strategical value of Malta meaningless, that left Rommel only one choice&nbsp;...{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=107}}}}

Rommel was among the few Axis commanders (the others being [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] and [[Reinhard Heydrich]]) who were targeted for assassination by Allied planners. Two attempts were made, the first being [[Operation Flipper]] in North Africa in 1941, and the second being [[Operation Gaff]] in Normandy in 1944.{{sfn|Moorhouse|2007|pp=157–158}}

Research by [[Norman Ohler]] claims that Rommel's behaviours were heavily influenced by [[Methamphetamine#History, society, and culture|Pervitin]] which he reportedly took in heavy doses, to such an extent that Ohler refers to him as "the Crystal Fox" ("Kristallfuchs")<ref>{{cite news|last1=Bloom|first1=Katharina|title='Der Totale Rausch' – von Crystal bis Kokain hat das Dritte Reich nichts ausgelassen|url=https://www.vice.com/de/article/der-totale-rauschvon-crystal-bis-kokain-hat-das-dritte-reich-nichts-ausgelassen/|agency=vice.com|date=11 September 2015|archive-date=10 December 2021|access-date=24 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210114831/https://www.vice.com/de/article/avqa4g/der-totale-rauschvon-crystal-bis-kokain-hat-das-dritte-reich-nichts-ausgelassen|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Lavitt|first1=John|title=Drug Use in the Third Reich: Q&A with Author Norman Ohler|url=https://www.thefix.com/drug-use-third-reich-qa-author-norman-ohler|agency=The Fix|date=8 March 2017|archive-date=10 December 2021|access-date=24 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210114832/https://www.thefix.com/drug-use-third-reich-qa-author-norman-ohler|url-status=live}}</ref>—playing off the nickname "Desert Fox" famously given to him by the British.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Schindler |first1=John R. |title=Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War |year= 2001 |publisher= Greenwood Publishing Group |isbn=978-0-275-97204-2}}</ref>{{sfn|Zaloga|2013a}}