Editing Douglas MacArthur (section)

==Occupation of Japan==
{{further|Occupation of Japan}}

===Protecting the Emperor===
On 29 August 1945, MacArthur was ordered to exercise authority through the Japanese government machinery, including the [[Emperor of Japan|Emperor]] [[Hirohito]].{{sfn|James|1975|pp=782–783}} MacArthur's headquarters was located in the [[DN Tower 21|Dai Ichi Life Insurance Building]] in Tokyo. Unlike in Germany, where the Allies had in May 1945 abolished the German state, the Americans chose to allow the Japanese state to continue to exist, albeit under their ultimate control.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=541}} Unlike Germany, there was a certain partnership between the occupiers and occupied as MacArthur decided to rule Japan via the Emperor and most of the rest of the Japanese elite.{{sfn|Bix|2000|pp=544–545}} The Emperor was a living god to the Japanese people, and MacArthur found that ruling via the Emperor made his job in running Japan much easier than it otherwise would have been.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=545}}

[[File:Emperor Hirohito and General MacArthur.jpg|thumb|MacArthur and the [[Emperor of Japan]], [[Hirohito]], at their first meeting, September 1945 |alt=A tall Caucasian male (MacArthur), without hat and wearing open-necked shirt and trousers, standing beside a much shorter Asian man (Hirohito) in a dark suit.]]
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, there was a large amount of pressure that came from both Allied countries and Japanese leftists that demanded the emperor step down and be indicted as a war criminal.{{sfn|He|2015|pp=125–126}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Select Documents on Japanese War crimes and Japanese Biological Warfare, 1934–2006 |editor-first=William H. |editor-last=Cunliffe |publisher=US National Archives |url=https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/select-documents.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017045531/https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/select-documents.pdf |archive-date=17 October 2016 |url-status=live |access-date=6 July 2022}}</ref> MacArthur disagreed, as he thought that an ostensibly cooperating emperor would help establish a peaceful allied occupation regime in Japan.<ref name="The Diplomat">{{cite magazine |magazine=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/should-the-united-states-be-blamed-for-japans-historical-revisionism/ | title=Should the United States be Blamed for Japan's Historical Revisionism? |first=Franz-Stefan |last=Gady |date=15 August 2015 |access-date=6 July 2022 }}</ref> Since retaining the emperor was crucial to ensuring control over the population, the allied forces shielded him from war responsibility and avoided undermining his authority.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=545}} Evidence that would incriminate the emperor and his family was excluded from the [[International Military Tribunal for the Far East]].<ref name="The Diplomat"/>

Code-named Operation Blacklist, MacArthur created a plan that separated the emperor from the militarists, retained the emperor as a constitutional monarch but only as a figurehead, and used the emperor to retain control over Japan and help the U.S. achieve their objectives.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=545}} The American historian [[Herbert P. Bix]] described the relationship between the general and the Emperor as: "the Allied commander would use the Emperor, and the Emperor would cooperate in being used. Their relationship became one of expediency and mutual protection, of more political benefit to Hirohito than to MacArthur because Hirohito had more to lose—the entire panoply of symbolic, legitimizing properties of the imperial throne".{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=549}}

At the same time, MacArthur undermined the imperial mystique when his staff released a picture of his first meeting with the Emperor, the impact of which on the Japanese public was electric as the Japanese people for the first time saw the Emperor as a mere man overshadowed by the much taller MacArthur instead of the living god he had always been portrayed as. Up to 1945, the Emperor had been a remote, mysterious figure to his people, rarely seen in public and always silent, whose photographs were always taken from a certain angle to make him look taller and more impressive than he really was. No Japanese photographer would have taken such a photo of the Emperor being overshadowed by MacArthur. The Japanese government immediately banned the photo of the Emperor with MacArthur on the grounds that it damaged the imperial mystique, but MacArthur rescinded the ban and ordered all of the Japanese newspapers to print it. The photo was intended as a message to the Emperor about who was going to be the senior partner in their relationship.{{sfn|Bix|2000|pp=550–551}}

As he needed the Emperor, MacArthur protected him from any effort to hold him accountable for his actions and allowed him to issue statements that incorrectly portrayed the emerging democratic post-war era as a continuation of the Meiji era reforms.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=562}} MacArthur did not allow any investigations of the Emperor, and instead in October 1945 ordered his staff "in the interests of peaceful occupation and rehabilitation of Japan, prevention of revolution and communism, all facts surrounding the execution of the declaration of war and subsequent position of the Emperor which tend to show fraud, menace or duress be marshalled".{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=567}} In January 1946, MacArthur reported to Washington that the Emperor could not be indicted for war crimes on the grounds:

{{blockquote|His indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate...It is quite possible that a million troops would be required which would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of years.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=568}}}}

To protect the Emperor from being indicted, MacArthur had one of his staff, Brigadier General [[Bonner Fellers]], tell the ''genrō'' Admiral [[Mitsumasa Yonai]] on 6 March 1946:

{{blockquote|To counter this situation, it would be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that the Emperor is completely blameless. I think the forthcoming trials offer the best opportunity to do that. Tojo, in particular should be made to bear all responsibility at his trial. I want you to have Tojo say as follows: "At the imperial conference prior to the start of the war, I already decided to push for war even if his majesty the emperor was against going to war with the United States."{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=584}}}}

From the viewpoint of both sides, having one especially evil figure in the form of General [[Hideki Tojo]], on whom everything that went wrong could be blamed, was most politically convenient.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=584}} At a second meeting on 22 March 1946, Fellers told Yonai: {{blockquote|The most influential advocate of un-American thought in the United States is [Benjamin V.] [[Benjamin V. Cohen|Cohen]] (a Jew and a Communist), the top adviser to Secretary of State [[James F. Byrnes|Byrnes]]. As I told Yonai... it is extremely disadvantageous to MacArthur's standing in the United States to put on trial the very Emperor who is cooperating with him and facilitating the smooth administration of the occupation. This is the reason for my request... "I wonder whether what I said to Admiral Yonai the other day has already been conveyed to Tojo?"{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=585}}<ref>{{harvnb|Neary|2014|p=202}} Benjamin V. Cohen, then one of the top advisors to Secretary of State Byrnes, was demanding that the Emperor be tried as a war criminal.</ref>}}

MacArthur's attempts to shield the Emperor from indictment and to have all the blame taken by Tojo were successful, which as Bix commented, "had a lasting and profoundly distorting impact on the Japanese understanding of the lost war".{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=585}}

===War crimes trials===
[[File:IMTFE defendants.jpg|thumb|right|The defendants at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials|alt=Three rows of benches with a dozen or so men standing behind each. Behind them stand five men in uniform.]]
MacArthur was responsible for confirming and enforcing the sentences for war crimes handed down by the [[International Military Tribunal for the Far East]].{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=318–319}} In late 1945, Allied military commissions in various cities in Asia tried 5,700 Japanese, Taiwanese and Koreans for war crimes. About 4,300 were convicted, almost 1,000 sentenced to death, and hundreds given life imprisonment. The charges arose from incidents that included the [[Rape of Nanking]], the [[Bataan Death March]] and the [[Manila massacre]].{{sfn|Drea|Bradsher|Hanyok|Lide|2006|p=7}} The trial in Manila of Yamashita was criticized because he was hanged for Iwabuchi's Manila massacre, which he had not ordered and of which he was probably unaware.{{sfn|Connaughton|Pimlott|Anderson|1995|pp=72–73}} Iwabuchi had killed himself as the battle for Manila was ending.{{sfn|Manchester|1978|p=487}}

MacArthur recommended that [[Shirō Ishii]] and other members of [[Unit 731]] be granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for germ warfare data based on human experimentation.{{sfn|Gold|1996|pp=108–110}} He also exempted the Emperor and all members of the imperial family implicated in war crimes, including princes such as [[Yasuhito, Prince Chichibu|Chichibu]], [[Prince Yasuhiko Asaka|Asaka]], [[Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda|Takeda]], [[Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni|Higashikuni]] and [[Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu|Fushimi]], from criminal prosecutions. MacArthur said that the emperor's [[abdication]] would not be necessary. In doing so, he ignored the advice of many members of the imperial family and Japanese intellectuals who publicly called for the abdication of the Emperor and the implementation of a regency.{{sfn|Dower|1999|pp=321–323}} His reasoning was if the emperor were executed or sentenced to life imprisonment there would be a violent backlash and revolution from the Japanese from all social classes and this would interfere with his primary goal to change Japan from a militarist, feudal society to a pro-Western modern democracy. In a cable sent to General Dwight Eisenhower in February 1946, MacArthur said executing or imprisoning the emperor would require the use of one million occupation soldiers to keep the peace.{{sfn|Sebestyen|2015|pp=96–100}}

===Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers===
As [[Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers]] (SCAP) in Japan, MacArthur and his staff helped Japan rebuild itself, eradicate militarism and ultra-nationalism, promote political civil liberties, institute democratic government, and chart a new course that ultimately made Japan one of the world's leading industrial powers. The U.S. was firmly in control of Japan to oversee its reconstruction, and MacArthur was effectively the interim leader of Japan from 1945 until 1948.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=39–43}} In 1946, MacArthur's staff drafted a new [[Constitution of Japan|constitution]] that renounced war and stripped the Emperor of his military authority. The constitution—which became effective on 3 May 1947—instituted a [[parliamentary system]] of government, under which the Emperor acted only on the advice of his ministers. It included [[Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution|Article 9]], which outlawed belligerency as an instrument of state policy and the maintenance of a standing army. The constitution also enfranchised women, guaranteed fundamental human rights, outlawed racial discrimination, strengthened the powers of Parliament and the Cabinet, and decentralized the police and local government.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=119–139}}

A major [[land reform]] was also conducted, led by [[Wolf Ladejinsky]] of MacArthur's SCAP staff. Between 1947 and 1949, approximately {{convert|4700000|acre|sigfig=3|abbr=on}}, or 38% of Japan's cultivated land, was purchased from the landlords under the government's reform program, and {{convert|4600000|acre|sigfig=3|abbr=on}} was resold to the farmers who worked them. By 1950, 89% of all agricultural land was owner-operated and only 11% was tenant-operated.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=183–192}} MacArthur's efforts to encourage trade union membership met with phenomenal success, and by 1947, 48% of the non-agricultural workforce was unionized. Some of MacArthur's reforms were rescinded in 1948 when his unilateral control of Japan was ended by the increased involvement of the State Department.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=174–183}} During the Occupation, SCAP successfully, if not entirely, abolished many of the financial coalitions known as the [[Zaibatsu]], which had previously monopolized industry.{{sfn|Schaller|1985|p=25}} Eventually, looser industrial groupings known as ''[[Keiretsu]]'' evolved. The reforms alarmed many in the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, who believed they conflicted with the prospect of Japan and its industrial capacity as a bulwark against the spread of communism in Asia.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=222–224, 252–254}}

In 1947, MacArthur invited the founder and first executive director of the [[American Civil Liberties Union]] (ACLU), [[Roger Nash Baldwin]], to teach the Japanese government and people about civil rights and civil liberties. MacArthur also asked him to do the same for southern Korea, which MacArthur was responsible for when it was under U.S. Army occupation. MacArthur ignored members of the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] and the FBI who believed that Baldwin was a Soviet-loving communist. He wanted a civil liberties expert to quickly introduce western-style civil rights to the Japanese and thought conservatives would take too long. Baldwin helped found the [[Japan Civil Liberties Union]]. In a confidential letter to ACLU leaders the anti-militarist and very liberal Baldwin said about MacArthur, "His observation on civil liberties and democracy rank with the best I ever heard from any civilian — and they were incredible from a general."<ref>{{cite web |last= Cottrell |first= Robert C. |date= 16 August 2019 |title= Mr. ACLU and the General |publisher= [[American Civil Liberties Union]] |url= https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/mr-aclu-and-general |access-date= 23 April 2021 |archive-date= 24 April 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210424202543/https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/mr-aclu-and-general |url-status= live }}</ref>

MacArthur ruled Japan with a soft-handed approach. He legalized the [[Japanese Communist Party]] despite reservations from the United States government out of a desire for Japan to be truly democratic and invited them to take part in the [[1946 Japanese general election|1946 election]], which was also the first ever election to allow women to vote. He ordered the release of all political prisoners of the Imperial Japanese era, including communist prisoners. The first May Day parade in 11 years in 1946 was greenlit by MacArthur also. On the day before the May Day celebrations, which would involve 300,000 Japanese communists demonstrating with red flags and pro-Marxism chants in front of the [[Tokyo Imperial Palace]] and the [[DN Tower 21|Dai-Ichi Building]], a group of would-be assassins led by Hideo Tokayama who planned to assassinate MacArthur with hand grenades and pistols on May Day were stopped and some of its members were arrested. Despite this plot the May Day demonstrations went on. MacArthur stopped the Communist Party from gaining any popularity in Japan by releasing their members from prison, conducting landmark land reform that made MacArthur more popular than communism for the rural Japanese farmers and peasants, and allowing the communists to freely participate in elections. In the 1946 election they won only 6 seats.{{sfn|Morris|2014|pp=169–173}}<ref>{{cite news |author= <!-- staff writer --> |date= 1 May 1946 |title= M'Arthur Plot Timed for Demonstration; Plotters Still at Large |newspaper= The New York Times |url= https://www.nytimes.com/1946/05/01/archives/macarthur-plot-alarms-japanese-they-see-possible-repercussions.html |url-access= subscription |access-date= 16 April 2021 |archive-date= 16 April 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210416060259/https://www.nytimes.com/1946/05/01/archives/macarthur-plot-alarms-japanese-they-see-possible-repercussions.html |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author= <!-- staff writer --> |date= 30 April 1946 |title= Plot to Kill MacArthur Is Revealed; Seek Fugitive Chief |newspaper= The Gettysburg Times |volume= 44 |issue= 104 |url= https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2202&dat=19460430&id=hlJUAAAAIBAJ&sjid=QzoNAAAAIBAJ&pg=6993,5440992&hl=en |access-date= 16 April 2021 |via= Google Newspapers |archive-date= 16 April 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210416060258/https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2202&dat=19460430&id=hlJUAAAAIBAJ&sjid=QzoNAAAAIBAJ&pg=6993,5440992&hl=en |url-status= live }}</ref>

MacArthur was also in charge of [[United States Army Military Government in Korea|southern Korea]] from 1945 to 1948 due to the lack of clear orders or initiative from Washington, D.C.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=13–14}} There was no plan or guideline given to MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the State Department on how to rule Korea so what resulted was a very tumultuous [[Operation Blacklist Forty|3 year military occupation]] that led to the creation of the U.S.-friendly [[Republic of Korea]] in 1948. He ordered Lieutenant General [[John R. Hodge]], who accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in southern Korea in September 1945, to govern that area on SCAP's behalf and report to him in Tokyo.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|p=13}}{{sfn|Willoughby|1966a}} In an address to Congress on 19 April 1951, MacArthur declared:
{{blockquote|The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have from the ashes left in war's wake erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.{{sfn|Imparato|2000|p=165}}}}

MacArthur handed over power to the Japanese government in 1949 but remained in Japan until relieved by President [[Harry S. Truman]] on 11 April 1951. The [[San Francisco Peace Treaty]], signed on 8 September 1951, marked the end of the Allied occupation, and when it went into effect on 28 April 1952, Japan was once again an independent state.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=336–354}}

===1948 presidential election===

{{main|1948 United States presidential election}}
In 1948, MacArthur made a bid to win the Republican nomination for president, which was the most serious of several efforts he made over the years.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=202}} MacArthur's status as one of America's most popular war heroes together with his reputation as the statesman who had "transformed" Japan gave him a strong basis for running for president, but MacArthur's lack of connections within the GOP were a major handicap.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=203}} MacArthur's strongest supporters came from the quasi-isolationist, Midwestern wing of the Republicans and embraced men such as Brigadier General [[Hanford MacNider]], [[Philip La Follette]], and Brigadier General [[Robert E. Wood]], a diverse collection of "[[Old Right (United States)|Old Right]]" and [[Progressive Republican]]s only united by a belief that the U.S. was too much involved in Europe for its own good.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|pp=203–204}} MacArthur declined to campaign for the presidency himself, but he privately encouraged his supporters to put his name on the ballot.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=205}} MacArthur had always stated he would retire when a peace treaty was signed with Japan, and his push in the fall of 1947 to have the U.S. sign a peace treaty with Japan was intended to allow him to retire on a high note, and thus campaign for the presidency. For the same reasons, Truman subverted MacArthur's efforts to have a peace treaty signed in 1947, saying that more time was needed before the U.S. could formally make peace with Japan.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=207}} Truman in fact was so worried about MacArthur becoming president that in 1947 he asked General Dwight Eisenhower (who, similar to Truman, did not like MacArthur either) to run for president and Truman would happily be his running mate. In 1951 he asked Eisenhower again to run to stop MacArthur. Eisenhower asked, "What about MacArthur?" Truman said, "I'm going to take care of MacArthur. You'll see what happens to MacArthur."<ref>{{cite news |author= <!-- staff writer --> |date= 11 July 2003 |title= Truman Wrote of '48 Offer to Eisenhower |newspaper= The New York Times |url= https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/11/us/truman-wrote-of-48-offer-to-eisenhower.html |access-date= 23 April 2021 |archive-date= 3 June 2017 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170603084430/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/11/us/truman-wrote-of-48-offer-to-eisenhower.html |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{cite interview |last= Haig | first= Alexander M. Jr. |date= 30 November 2007 |title= Interview with Alexander M. Haig, Jr. |publisher= Richard Nixon Presidential Library |interviewer-last1= Naftali |interviewer-first1= Timothy |interviewer-last2= Powers |interviewer-first2= John |interviewer-last3= Brinkley |interviewer-first3= Douglas |interviewer-last4= Musgrave |interviewer-first4= Paul |url= https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/histories/haig-2006-11-30.pdf |access-date= 23 April 2021 |archive-date= 19 March 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210319130909/https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/histories/haig-2006-11-30.pdf |url-status= live }}</ref>

Without a peace treaty, MacArthur decided not to resign while at the same time writing letters to Wood saying he would be more than happy to accept the Republican nomination if it were offered to him.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|pp=207–208}} In late 1947 and early 1948, MacArthur received several Republican grandees in Tokyo.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=208}} On 9 March 1948 MacArthur issued a press statement declaring his interest in being the Republican nominee for president, saying he would be honored if the Republican Party were to nominate him, but would not resign from the Army to campaign for the presidency.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=213}} The press statement had been forced by Wood, who told MacArthur that it was impossible to campaign for a man who was not officially running for president, and that MacArthur could either declare his candidacy or see Wood cease campaigning for him.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|p=213}} MacArthur's supporters made a major effort to win the Wisconsin Republican primary held on 6 April 1948.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|pp=206–207}} MacArthur's refusal to campaign badly hurt his chances and it was won to everybody's surprise by [[Harold Stassen]].{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|pp=212, 217}} The defeat in Wisconsin followed by defeat in Nebraska effectively ended MacArthur's chances of winning the Republican nomination, but MacArthur refused to withdraw his name until the [[1948 Republican National Convention]], at which Governor [[Thomas Dewey]] of New York was nominated.{{sfn|Schonberger|1974|pp=218–219}}