Editing Confederate States of America (section)

===Transportation systems===
{{Main|Confederate railroads in the American Civil War}}
[[File:Railroad of Confederacy-1861.jpg|thumb|upright=1.78|Main railroads of Confederacy, 1861; colors show the different gauges (track width); the top railroad shown in the upper right is the Baltimore and Ohio, which was at all times a Union railroad]]
[[File:Hensie-fry-hanging-brownlow-1861.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Passers-by abused the bodies of Union supporters near [[Knoxville, Tennessee]]. The two were hanged by Confederate authorities near the railroad tracks so passing train passengers could see them.]]

In peacetime, the South's extensive and connected systems of navigable rivers and coastal access allowed for cheap and easy transportation of agricultural products. The railroad system in the South had developed as a supplement to the navigable rivers to enhance the all-weather shipment of cash crops to market. Railroads tied plantation areas to the nearest river or seaport and so made supply more dependable, lowered costs and increased profits. In the event of invasion, the vast geography of the Confederacy made logistics difficult for the Union. Wherever Union armies invaded, they assigned many of their soldiers to garrison captured areas and to protect rail lines.

At the onset of the Civil War the South had a rail network disjointed and plagued by changes in [[track gauge]] as well as lack of interchange. Locomotives and freight cars had fixed axles and could not use tracks of different gauges (widths). Railroads of different gauges leading to the same city required all freight to be off-loaded onto wagons for transport to the connecting railroad station, where it had to await freight cars and a [[locomotive#Motive power|locomotive]] before proceeding. Centers requiring off-loading included Vicksburg, New Orleans, Montgomery, Wilmington and Richmond.<ref name="Trains1">{{cite journal|last1= Hankey|first1= John P.|year= 2011|title= The Railroad War|journal= Trains|publisher= Kalmbach Publishing Company|volume= 71|issue= 3|pages= 24–35 }}</ref> In addition, most rail lines led from coastal or river ports to inland cities, with few lateral railroads. Because of this design limitation, the relatively primitive railroads of the Confederacy were unable to overcome the Union naval blockade of the South's crucial intra-coastal and river routes.

The Confederacy had no plan to expand, protect or encourage its railroads. Southerners' refusal to export the cotton crop in 1861 left railroads bereft of their main source of income.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 1836241|doi = 10.2307/1836241|title = The Confederate Government and the Railroads|url = https://archive.org/details/sim_american-historical-review_1917-07_22_4/page/794|journal = The American Historical Review|volume = 22|issue = 4|pages = 794–810|year = 1917|last1 = Ramsdell|first1 = Charles W.}}</ref> Many lines had to lay off employees; many critical skilled technicians and engineers were permanently lost to military service. In the early years of the war the Confederate government had a hands-off approach to the railroads. Only in mid-1863 did the Confederate government initiate a national policy, and it was confined solely to aiding the war effort.<ref name="Ersatz">Mary Elizabeth Massey. ''Ersatz in the Confederacy'' (1952) p. 128.</ref> Railroads came under the ''de facto'' control of the military. In contrast, the U.S. Congress had authorized military administration of Union-controlled railroad and telegraph systems in January 1862, imposed a standard gauge, and built railroads into the South using that gauge. Confederate armies successfully reoccupying territory could not be resupplied directly by rail as they advanced. The C.S. Congress formally authorized military administration of railroads in February 1865.

In the last year before the end of the war, the Confederate railroad system stood permanently on the verge of collapse. There was no new equipment and raids on both sides systematically destroyed key bridges, as well as locomotives and freight cars. Spare parts were cannibalized; feeder lines were torn up to get replacement rails for trunk lines, and rolling stock wore out through heavy use.<ref>Ramsdell, "The Confederate Government and the Railroads", pp. 809–810.</ref>

====Horses and mules====
The Confederate army experienced a persistent shortage of horses and mules and requisitioned them with dubious promissory notes given to local farmers and breeders. Union forces paid in real money and found ready sellers in the South. Both armies needed horses for cavalry and for artillery.<ref>Spencer Jones, "The Influence of Horse Supply Upon Field Artillery in the American Civil War", ''Journal of Military History'', (April 2010), 74#2 pp. 357–377</ref> Mules pulled the wagons. The supply was undermined by an unprecedented epidemic of [[glanders]], a fatal disease that baffled veterinarians.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 3744026|title = The Great Glanders Epizootic, 1861–1866: A Civil War Legacy|url = https://archive.org/details/sim_agricultural-history_winter-1995_69_1/page/79|journal = Agricultural History|volume = 69|issue = 1|pages = 79–97|last1 = Sharrer|first1 = G. Terry|year = 1995|pmid = 11639801}}</ref> After 1863 the invading Union forces had a policy of shooting all the local horses and mules that they did not need, in order to keep them out of Confederate hands. The Confederate armies and farmers experienced a growing shortage of horses and mules, which hurt the Southern economy and the war effort. The South lost half of its 2.5&nbsp;million horses and mules; many farmers ended the war with none left. Army horses were used up by hard work, malnourishment, disease and battle wounds; they had a life expectancy of about seven months.<ref>
Keith Miller, "Southern Horse", ''Civil War Times'', (February 2006) 45#1 pp. 30–36 [https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=19359914&site=eds-live&scope=site online]
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