Editing Belief (section)

==Psychology==
{{More citations needed|section|date=May 2021}}
Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bering|first=Jesse|date=2006|title=The Cognitive Psychology of Belief in the Supernatural|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1511/2006.58.142|journal=American Scientist|volume=94|issue=2|pages=142|doi=10.1511/2006.58.142|issn=0003-0996}}</ref> Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Barnett|first=Zach|date=2019-01-01|title=Philosophy Without Belief|url=https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/128/509/109/3897540|journal=Mind|language=en|volume=128|issue=509|pages=109–138|doi=10.1093/mind/fzw076|issn=0026-4423}}</ref>

The concept of belief presumes a subject (the believer) and an object of belief (the proposition). Like other [[propositional attitude]]s, belief implies the existence of [[mental state]]s and [[intentionality]], both of which are hotly debated topics in the [[philosophy of mind]], whose foundations and relation to brain states are still controversial.

Beliefs are sometimes divided into [[core beliefs]] (that are actively thought about) and [[dispositional belief]]s (that may be ascribed to someone who has not thought about the issue). For example, if asked "do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas?" a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bell |first1=V. |last2=Halligan |first2=P.W. |last3=Ellis |first3=H.D. |year=2006 |chapter=A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief |editor1-first=Peter W. |editor1-last=Halligan |editor2-first=Mansel |editor2-last=Aylward |title=The Power of Belief: Psychological Influence on Illness, Disability, and Medicine |location=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0198530107 }}</ref>

Philosopher [[Lynne Rudder Baker]] has outlined four main contemporary approaches to belief in her book ''Saving Belief'':<ref>{{cite book |first=Lynne Rudder |last=Baker |title=Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1989 |isbn=978-0691073200 }}</ref>
* Our common-sense understanding of belief is correct – Sometimes called the "mental sentence theory," in this conception, beliefs exist as coherent entities, and the way we talk about them in everyday life is a valid basis for scientific endeavor. [[Jerry Fodor]] was one of the principal defenders of this point of view.
* Our common-sense understanding of belief may not be entirely correct, but it is close enough to make some useful predictions – This view argues that we will eventually reject the idea of belief as we know it now, but that there may be a correlation between what we take to be a belief when someone says "I believe that snow is white" and how a future theory of psychology will explain this behavior. Philosopher [[Stephen Stich]] has argued for this particular understanding of belief.
* Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it – Known as [[eliminativism]], this view (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]) argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science has not provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchland argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
* Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy – The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both eliminativists in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they do not go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level.
Strategic approaches make a distinction between rules, norms and beliefs as follows:
* Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines, or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the imposing entity's ability to enforce them.
* Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent upon law or regulation.
* Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior. The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e., security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and norms.<ref>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army (2012). Information Operations. Joint Publication 3–13. Joint Doctrine Support Division, Suffolk, VA. p. 22.</ref>

===Belief formation and revision===
{{See also|Belief revision}}
Belief revision is a term commonly used to refer to the modification of beliefs. An extensive amount of scientific research and philosophical discussion exists around belief revision. Generally speaking, the process of belief revision entails the believer weighing the set of truths and/or evidence, and the dominance of a set of truths or evidence on an alternative to a held belief can lead to revision. One process of belief revision is [[Bayesian inference|Bayesian updating]] (or [[Bayesian inference]]) and is often referenced for its mathematical basis and conceptual simplicity.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Parr |first1=Thomas |last2=Rees |first2=Geraint |last3=Friston |first3=Karl J. |date=2018 |title=Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference |journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |volume=12 |page=61 |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2018.00061 |pmid=29527157 |pmc=5829460 |issn=1662-5161 |doi-access=free }}</ref> However, such a process may not be representative for individuals whose beliefs are not easily characterized as probabilistic.

There are several techniques for individuals or groups to change the beliefs of others; these methods generally fall under the umbrella of [[persuasion]]. Persuasion can take on more specific forms such as [[consciousness raising]] when considered in an activist or political context. Belief modification may also occur as a result of the experience of outcomes. Because [[goal]]s are based, in part on beliefs, the success or failure at a particular goal may contribute to modification of beliefs that supported the original goal.

Whether or not belief modification actually occurs is dependent not only on the extent of truths or evidence for the alternative belief, but also characteristics outside the specific truths or evidence. This includes, but is not limited to: the source characteristics of the message, such as [[Source credibility|credibility]]; [[Peer pressure|social pressures]]; the anticipated consequences of a modification; or the ability of the individual or group to act on the modification. Therefore, individuals seeking to achieve belief modification in themselves or others need to consider all possible forms of resistance to belief revision.

Glover maintains that any person can continue to hold any belief if they would really like to<ref name=BitesGlover/> (for example, with help from [[ad hoc hypotheses|''ad hoc'' hypotheses]]). One belief can be held fixed, and other beliefs will be altered around it. Glover warns that some beliefs may not be entirely [[Explicit memory|explicitly]] believed (for example, some people may not realize they have racist belief-systems adopted from their environment as a child). Glover believes that people tend to first realize that beliefs can change, and may be contingent on their upbringing, around age 12 or 15.<ref name=BitesGlover/>

[[File:Snipa.JPG|thumb|right|240px| Philosopher Jonathan Glover warns that belief systems are like whole boats in the water; it is extremely difficult to alter them all at once (for example, it may be too stressful, or people may maintain their biases without realizing it).<ref name=BitesGlover/>]] Glover emphasizes that beliefs are difficult to change. He says that one may try to rebuild one's beliefs on more secure foundations ([[axioms]]), like building a new house, but warns that this may not be possible. Glover offers the example of [[René Descartes]], saying: "[Descartes] starts off with the characteristic beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman; he then junks the lot, he rebuilds the system, and somehow it looks a lot like the beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman." To Glover, belief systems are not like houses but are instead like boats. As Glover puts it: "Maybe the whole thing needs rebuilding, but inevitably at any point you have to keep enough of it intact to keep floating."<ref name=BitesGlover/>

====Models of belief formation====
[[File:Ripples of influence.jpg|thumb|We are influenced by many factors that ripple through our minds as our beliefs form, evolve, and may eventually change.]]
Psychologists study belief formation and the relationship between beliefs and actions. Three types of ''models of belief formation'' and change have been proposed: conditional inference process models, linear models and information processing models.

'''Conditional inference process models''' emphasize the role of inference for belief formation. When asked to estimate the likelihood that a statement is true, people allegedly search their memory for information that has implications for the validity of this statement. Once this information has been identified, they estimate the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were true, and the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were false. If their estimates for these two [[Probability|probabilities]] differ, people average them, weighting each by the likelihood that the information is true and false. Thus, information bears directly on beliefs of another, related statement.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 2005">Wyer, R.S., & Albarracin, D. (2005). "Belief formation, organization, and change: Cognitive and motivational influences". In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P. Zanna, ''The Handbook of Attitudes'' (273–322). New York: Psychology Press.</ref>

Unlike the previous model, '''linear models''' take into consideration the possibility of multiple factors influencing belief formation. Using regression procedures, these models predict belief formation on the basis of several different pieces of information, with weights assigned to each piece on the basis of their relative importance.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 2005" />

'''Information processing models''' address the fact that the responses people have to belief-relevant information is unlikely to be predicted from the objective basis of the information that they can recall at the time their beliefs are reported. Instead, these responses reflect the number and meaning of the thoughts that people have about the message at the time that they encounter it.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 2005" />

Some influences on people's belief formation include:
* Internalization of beliefs during childhood, which can form and shape humans' beliefs in different domains. [[Albert Einstein]] is often quoted as having said that "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen." Political beliefs depend most strongly on the political beliefs most common in the community where one lives.<ref>{{cite book |author-link= Andrew Gelman |first1= Andrew |last1= Gelman |first2= David |last2= Park |first3= Boris |last3=Shor |first4= Joseph |last4= Bafumi |first5= Jeronimo |last5= Cortina |title=Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2008 |isbn=978-0691139272 |url= https://archive.org/details/redstatebluestat00gelm }}</ref> Most individuals believe the [[religion]] they were taught in childhood.<ref>{{cite book |first=Michael |last=Argyle |title=The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience |location=London |publisher=Routledge |year=1997 |isbn=978-0415123303 |page=25 |quote=Religion, in most cultures, is ascribed, not chosen. }}</ref>
* [[Charismatic leader]]s can form or modify beliefs (even if those beliefs fly in the face of all previous beliefs).<ref>{{cite book |first=Eric |last=Hoffer |title=The True Believer |location=New York |publisher=Harper Perennial Modern Classics |year=2002 |isbn=978-0060505912 }}</ref> Rational individuals need to reconcile their direct reality with any said belief; therefore, if belief is not present or possible, it reflects the fact that contradictions were necessarily overcome using [[cognitive dissonance]].
* [[Advertising]] can form or change beliefs through repetition, shock, or association with images of sex, love, beauty, and other strong positive emotions.<ref>{{cite book |first1= Jane |last1= Kilbourne |first2= Mary |last2= Pipher |title= Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel |publisher=Free Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0684866000 |url= https://archive.org/details/cantbuymylovehow00kilb }}</ref> Contrary to [[intuition]], a delay, known as the [[sleeper effect]], instead of immediate succession may increase an advertisement's ability to persuade viewer's beliefs if a discounting cue is present.<ref>See Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004.</ref>
* Physical trauma, especially to the head, can radically alter a person's beliefs.<ref>{{cite book |first=Babette |last= Rothschild |title=The Body Remembers: The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment |publisher=W.W. Norton & Company |location=New York |year=2000 |isbn=978-0393703276 }}</ref>

However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In her book ''Leadership Therapy'', Anna Rowley states: "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This view implies that peoples' beliefs may evolve as they gain new experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowley |first=Anna |title=Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft |location=Basingstoke |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2007 |page=[https://archive.org/details/leadershiptherap0000rowl/page/69 69] |isbn=978-1403984036 |url= https://archive.org/details/leadershiptherap0000rowl/page/69 }}</ref>

===Prediction===
Different psychological models have tried to predict people's beliefs and some of them try to estimate the exact probabilities of beliefs. For example, [[Robert S. Wyer|Robert Wyer]] developed a model of subjective probabilities.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 1970">{{cite journal |last=Wyer |first=R.S. |year=1970 |title=Quantitative prediction of belief and opinion change: A further test of a subjective probability model |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=559–570 |doi=10.1037/h0030064 }}</ref><ref name="WyerGoldberg">{{cite journal |last1=Wyer |first1=R.S. |last2=Goldberg |first2=L. |year=1970 |title=A probabilistic analysis of the relationships among beliefs and attitudes |journal=Psychological Review |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=100–120 |doi=10.1037/h0028769 }}</ref> When people rate the likelihood of a certain statement (e.g., "It will rain tomorrow"), this rating can be seen as a subjective probability value. The subjective probability model posits that these subjective probabilities follow the same rules as objective probabilities. For example, the [[law of total probability]] might be applied to predict a subjective probability value. Wyer found that this model produces relatively accurate predictions for probabilities of single events and for changes in these probabilities, but that the probabilities of several beliefs linked by "and" or "or" do not follow the model as well.<ref name="Wyer, R. S. 1970" /><ref name="WyerGoldberg" />

===Delusion===
In the [[DSM-5]], delusions are defined as fixed false beliefs that are not changed even when confronted with conflicting evidence.

=== Belief studies ===

[[File:Socio-demographic correlates of witchcraft beliefs.png|thumb|Socio-demographic correlates of witchcraft beliefs<ref name="10.1371/journal.pone.0276872"/>]]
There is research investigating specific beliefs, types of beliefs and patterns of beliefs. For example, a study estimated contemporary prevalence and associations with belief in [[witchcraft]] around the world, which (in its data) varied between 9% and 90% between [[nation]]s and is still a widespread element in [[Reality#World views and theories|worldviews]] globally. It also shows associations such as with lower "innovative activity", higher levels of anxiety, lower [[life expectancy]], and higher [[religiosity]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Witchcraft beliefs are widespread, highly variable around the world |url=https://phys.org/news/2022-11-witchcraft-beliefs-widespread-highly-variable.html |access-date=17 December 2022 |work=Public Library of Science via phys.org |language=en}}</ref><ref name="10.1371/journal.pone.0276872">{{cite journal |last1=Gershman |first1=Boris |title=Witchcraft beliefs around the world: An exploratory analysis |journal=PLOS ONE |date=23 November 2022 |volume=17 |issue=11 |pages=e0276872 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0276872|pmid=36417350 |pmc=9683553 |bibcode=2022PLoSO..1776872G |doi-access=free}}</ref> Other research is investigating beliefs in misinformation and their resistance to correction, including with respect to [[Misinformation#Countermeasures|misinformation countermeasures]]. It describes cognitive, social and affective processes that leave people vulnerable to the formation of false beliefs.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ecker |first1=Ullrich K. H. |last2=Lewandowsky |first2=Stephan |last3=Cook |first3=John |last4=Schmid |first4=Philipp |last5=Fazio |first5=Lisa K. |last6=Brashier |first6=Nadia |last7=Kendeou |first7=Panayiota |last8=Vraga |first8=Emily K. |last9=Amazeen |first9=Michelle A. |title=The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction |journal=Nature Reviews Psychology |date=January 2022 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=13–29 |doi=10.1038/s44159-021-00006-y |s2cid=245916820 |language=en |issn=2731-0574|doi-access=free |hdl=1983/889ddb0f-0d44-44f4-a54f-57c260ae4917 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> A study introduced the concept of ''false social reality'' which refers to widespread perceptions of public opinion that are shown to be false, such as [[Public opinion on climate change|underestimated]] general [[Climate communication|public support]] in the U.S. for [[climate change mitigation]] [[policy|policies]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Clifford |first1=Catherine |title=Americans don't think other Americans care about climate change as much as they do |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/24/americans-underestimate-how-much-their-peers-care-about-climate-change.html |access-date=15 September 2022 |work=CNBC |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sparkman |first1=Gregg |last2=Geiger |first2=Nathan |last3=Weber |first3=Elke U. |title=Americans experience a false social reality by underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half |journal=Nature Communications |date=23 August 2022 |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=4779 |doi=10.1038/s41467-022-32412-y |pmid=35999211 |pmc=9399177 |bibcode=2022NatCo..13.4779S |language=en |issn=2041-1723|doi-access=free}}</ref> Studies also suggested some uses of [[psychedelic]]s can shift beliefs in some humans in certain ways, such as increasing attribution of consciousness to various entities (including plants and inanimate objects) and towards [[panpsychism]] and [[fatalism]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nayak |first1=Sandeep M. |last2=Griffiths |first2=Roland R. |title=A Single Belief-Changing Psychedelic Experience Is Associated With Increased Attribution of Consciousness to Living and Non-living Entities |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=28 March 2022 |volume=13 |page=852248 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2022.852248 |pmid=35418909 |pmc=8995647 |language=English |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Timmermann |first1=Christopher |last2=Kettner |first2=Hannes |last3=Letheby |first3=Chris |last4=Roseman |first4=Leor |last5=Rosas |first5=Fernando E. |last6=Carhart-Harris |first6=Robin L. |author6-link=Robin Carhart-Harris|title=Psychedelics alter metaphysical beliefs |journal=Scientific Reports |date=23 November 2021 |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=22166 |doi=10.1038/s41598-021-01209-2 |pmid=34815421 |pmc=8611059 |bibcode=2021NatSR..1122166T |language=en |issn=2045-2322}}</ref>

=== Emotion and beliefs ===
{{Expand section|date=January 2020}}
Research has indicated that [[emotion]] and cognition act in conjunction to produce beliefs, and more specifically emotion plays a vital role in the formation and maintenance of beliefs.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Emotions and Beliefs|last=Frijda|first=Nico H|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0511659904}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mercer|first=Jonathan|date=January 2010|title=Emotional Beliefs|journal=International Organization|volume=65|pages=1–31|doi=10.1017/S0020818309990221|s2cid=232251086}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Harlé|first1=Katia M.|last2=Shenoy|first2=Pradeep|last3=Paulus|first3=Martin P.|date=2013-09-19|title=The influence of emotions on cognitive control: feelings and beliefs—where do they meet?|journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience|volume=7|pages=508|doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00508|issn=1662-5161|pmc=3776943|pmid=24065901|doi-access=free}}</ref>