Editing Battle of the Bulge (section)

==Strategy and leadership==

===Hitler's chosen few===
The plan and timing for the Ardennes attack sprang from the mind of Adolf Hitler. He believed a critical fault line existed between the British and American military commands, and that a heavy blow on the Western Front would shatter this alliance. Planning for the "Watch on the Rhine" offensive emphasized secrecy and the commitment of overwhelming force. Due to the use of landline communications within Germany, motorized runners carrying orders, and draconian threats from Hitler, the timing and mass of the attack was not detected by Ultra codebreakers and achieved complete surprise.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=77–79}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-J28477, Ardennenoffensive, Lagebesprechnung.jpg|thumb|German field commanders plan the advance]]

After officers of the regular German Army attempted to assassinate him, Hitler had increasingly trusted only the Nazi Party SS and its armed branch, the Waffen-SS. He entrusted them with carrying out his decisive counterattack.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=21–22}} But following the Allied Normandy invasion, the SS armored units had suffered significant leadership casualties. This included SS-{{lang|de|Brigadeführer}} (Brigadier general) [[Kurt Meyer]], commander of the 12th SS Panzer (Armor) Division, captured by Belgian partisans on 6 September 1944.{{sfn|Mitcham|2006|p=10}}{{sfn|Meyer|2005|p=308}} Thus Hitler gave responsibility for the key right flank of the assault to the best SS troops and a few {{lang|de|Volksgrenadier}} units under the command of "Sepp" (Joseph) Dietrich, a fanatical political disciple of Hitler, and a loyal follower from the early days of the rise of [[National Socialism]] in Germany. The leadership composition of the Sixth Panzer Army had a distinctly political nature.{{sfn|Cole|1964|pp=1–64}}

Despite their loyalty, none of the German field commanders entrusted with planning and executing the offensive believed it was possible to capture Antwerp. Even Dietrich believed the Ardennes was a poor area for armored warfare and that the inexperienced and badly equipped {{lang|de|Volksgrenadier}} soldiers would clog the roads the tanks needed for their rapid advance. In fact, their horse-drawn artillery and rocket units became a significant obstacle to the armored units.{{sfn|Astor|1992|p=113}} Other than making futile objections to Hitler in private, Dietrich generally stayed out of planning the offensive. Model and Manteuffel, technical experts from the eastern front, told Hitler that a limited offensive with the goal of surrounding and crushing the American 1st Army would be the best goal their offensive could hope to achieve. Their ideas shared the same fate as Dietrich's objections.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=224}}

The German staff planning and organization of the attack was well done. Most of the units committed to the offensive reached their jump off points undetected. They were for the most part well organized and supplied for the attack, although they were counting on capturing American gasoline dumps to fuel their vehicles. As the battle ensued, on the northern shoulder of the offensive, Dietrich stopped the armored assault on the twin villages after two days and changed the axis of their advance southward through the hamlet of Domäne Bütgenbach. The headlong drive on Elsenborn Ridge lacked needed support from German units that had already bypassed the ridge.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=224}} Dietrich's decision unknowingly played into American hands, as Robertson had already decided to abandon the villages.

===Allied high-command controversy===
{{Main|Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II}}
[[File:Bernard Law Montgomery.jpg|thumb|upright|Field Marshal [[Bernard Montgomery|Montgomery]]]]
[[File:Dwight D. Eisenhower as General of the Army crop.jpg|thumb|upright|General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]], the [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force|Supreme Allied Commander]]]]
[[File:General Bradley.jpg|thumb|upright|General [[Omar Bradley|Bradley]]]]

One of the fault lines between the British and American high commands was Eisenhower's commitment to a broad front advance. This view was opposed by the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal [[Alan Brooke]], as well as Field Marshal Montgomery, who promoted a rapid advance on a narrow front under his command, with the other allied armies in reserve.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=91}}

Eisenhower based his decision on various military and political realities. The [[Allied-occupied Germany|Allied occupation zones]] in Germany had been agreed upon in February 1944, and a faster Allied advance in the autumn of 1944 would not have altered this.{{sfn|Weigley|1995|pp=32–43}} The Soviet Union would have also benefited from a rapid German collapse, and its participation in the war against Japan was greatly desired. There were reservations about whether the Allied logistical system possessed the required flexibility to support the narrow-front strategy,{{sfn|Van Creveld|1977|p=230}} the reality of terrain and logistics argued strongly against it, and the consequences if the narrow front advance had failed would have been very severe.{{sfn|Andidora|2002|p=177}}

Montgomery's Chief of Staff, Major-General Francis de Guingand, stated in his post-war account that he had opposed Montgomery's narrow front strategy on political and administrative grounds.{{sfn|De Guingand|1947|pp=410–413}}

===Montgomery's actions===
Montgomery differed from the U.S. command in how to respond to the German attack and his public statements to that effect caused tension in the American high command. Major-General [[Freddie de Guingand]], Chief of Staff of Montgomery's 21st Army Group, rose to the occasion, and personally smoothed over the disagreements on 30 December.{{sfn|Larrabee|1987|pp=489–490}}

As the Ardennes crisis developed, the U.S. First Army ([[Courtney Hodges|Hodges]]) and U.S. Ninth Army ([[William Hood Simpson|Simpson]]) on the northern shoulder of the German penetration lost communications with adjacent armies, as well as with Bradley's headquarters in Luxembourg City to the south of the "bulge".{{sfn|Urban|2005|p=194}} Consequently, at 10:30&nbsp;a.m. on 20 December, Eisenhower transferred the command of the U.S. First and Ninth Armies temporarily from Bradley to Montgomery.{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=276–277}} Command of the U.S. First Army reverted to the U.S. 12th Army Group on 17 January 1945,{{sfn|Pogue|1954|pp=378–395}} and command of the U.S. Ninth Army reverted to the U.S. 12th Army Group on 4 April 1945.

Montgomery wrote about the situation he found on 20 December:

{{blockquote|The First Army was fighting desperately. Having given orders to [[Miles Dempsey|Dempsey]] and [[Harry Crerar|Crerar]], who arrived for a conference at 11&nbsp;am, I left at noon for the H.Q. of the First Army, where I had instructed Simpson to meet me. I found the northern flank of the bulge was very disorganized. Ninth Army had two corps and three divisions; First Army had three corps and fifteen divisions. Neither Army Commander had seen Bradley or any senior member of his staff since the battle began, and they had no directive on which to work. The first thing to do was to see the battle on the northern flank ''as one whole'', to ensure the vital areas were held securely, and to create reserves for counter-attack. I embarked on these measures: I put British troops under command of the Ninth Army to fight alongside American soldiers, and made that Army take over some of the First Army Front. I positioned British troops as reserves behind the First and Ninth Armies until such time as American reserves could be created. Slowly but surely the situation was held, and then finally restored. Similar action was taken on the southern flank of the bulge by Bradley, with the Third Army.{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|p=276}}}}

Due to the news blackout imposed on the 16th, the change of leadership to Montgomery did not become public information until SHAEF announced that the change in command had "absolutely nothing to do with failure on the part of the three American generals".{{sfn|Whiting|2007|p=198}} The announcement resulted in headlines in British newspapers and ''Stars and Stripes'', which for the first time mentioned British contributions to the fighting.

Montgomery requested permission from Churchill to give a press conference to explain the situation. Though some of his staff were concerned at how the press conference would affect Montgomery's image, it was cleared by [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff|CIGS]] Alan Brooke, who was possibly the only person from whom Montgomery would accept advice.

On the same day as Hitler's withdrawal order of 7 January, Montgomery held his press conference at Zonhoven.{{sfn|Gallagher|1945}} Montgomery started with giving credit to the "courage and good fighting quality" of the American troops, characterizing a typical American as a "very brave fighting man who has that tenacity in battle which makes a great soldier", and went on to talk about the necessity of Allied teamwork, and praised Eisenhower, stating, "Teamwork wins battles and battle victories win wars. On our team, the captain is General Ike."

Then Montgomery described the course of the battle for a half-hour. Coming to the end of his speech he said he had "employed the whole available power of the British Group of Armies; this power was brought into play very gradually&nbsp;... Finally it was put into battle with a bang&nbsp;... you thus have the picture of British troops fighting on both sides of the Americans who have suffered a hard blow." He stated that he (i.e., the German) was "headed off&nbsp;... seen off&nbsp;... and&nbsp;... written off&nbsp;... The battle has been the most interesting, I think possibly one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled."{{sfn|Bradley|1951|p=58}}{{sfn|Ryan|1995|pp=204–205}}{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=311–314}}

Despite his positive remarks about American soldiers, the overall impression given by Montgomery, at least in the ears of the American military leadership, was that he had taken the lion's share of credit for the success of the campaign and had been responsible for rescuing the besieged Americans.<ref name=thisday>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/monty-holds-a-press-conference |title=This Day in History: Monty holds a press conference |publisher=History.com |access-date=21 September 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140705054757/http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/monty-holds-a-press-conference |archive-date=5 July 2014 |url-status = dead}}</ref>

His comments were interpreted as self-promoting, particularly his claim that when the situation "began to deteriorate," Eisenhower had placed him in command in the north. Patton and Eisenhower both felt this was a misrepresentation of the relative share of the fighting played by the British and Americans in the Ardennes (for every British soldier there were thirty to forty Americans in the fight), and that it belittled the part played by Bradley, Patton and other American commanders. In the context of Patton's and Montgomery's well-known antipathy, Montgomery's failure to mention the contribution of any American general besides Eisenhower was seen as insulting. Indeed, Bradley and his American commanders were already starting their counterattack by the time Montgomery was given command of 1st and 9th U.S. Armies.{{sfn|Bradley|1983|pp=382–385}}

Focusing exclusively on his own generalship, Montgomery continued to say he thought the counteroffensive had gone very well but did not explain the reason for his delayed attack on 3 January. He later attributed this to needing more time for preparation on the northern front. According to Churchill, the attack from the south under Patton was steady but slow and involved heavy losses, and Montgomery was trying to avoid this situation. Morelock states that Monty was preoccupied with being allowed to lead a "single thrust offensive" to Berlin as the overall commander of Allied ground forces, and that he accordingly treated the Ardennes counteroffensive "as a sideshow, to be finished with the least possible effort and expenditure of resources."{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=65}}

Many American officers had already grown to dislike Montgomery, who was seen by them as an overly cautious commander, arrogant, and all too willing to say uncharitable things about the Americans. However, on 18 January 1945 Churchill stated to Parliament "the United States troops have done almost all the fighting". He ended with "Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war and will, I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American victory."<ref>{{cite hansard |url=https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1945-01-18/debates/00233599-f07e-400a-b065-36fd46245089/CommonsChamber# |jurisdiction=United Kingdom |house=House of Commons |date=18 January 1945 |title=War Situation And Foreign Policy |column_start=416 |column_end=428 |speaker=Churchill, Winston |speaker-link=Winston Churchill |position=Prime Minister}}</ref>

Montgomery subsequently recognized his error and later wrote: "Not only was it probably a mistake to have held this conference at all in the sensitive state of feeling at the time, but what I said was skillfully distorted by the enemy." [[BBC]] correspondent [[Chester Wilmot]] explained that "my dispatch to the BBC about it was intercepted by the German wireless, re-written to give it an anti-American bias, and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in [[Goebbels]]' hands. Monitored at Bradley's HQ, this broadcast was mistaken for a BBC transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar."{{sfn|Wilmot|1972|p=611|loc=footnote 1}}{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=281}}

Montgomery later said, "Distorted or not, I think now that I should never have held that press conference. So great were the feelings against me on the part of the American generals that whatever I said was bound to be wrong. I should therefore have said nothing." Eisenhower commented in his own memoirs: "I doubt if Montgomery ever came to realize how resentful some American commanders were. They believed he had belittled them—and they were not slow to voice reciprocal scorn and contempt."{{sfn|Wilmot|1972|p=611}}{{sfn|Montgomery|2010|p=296}}

Bradley and Patton both threatened to resign unless Montgomery's command was changed. Eisenhower, encouraged by his British deputy [[Arthur Tedder]], had decided to sack Montgomery. Intervention by Montgomery's and Eisenhower's [[Chief of Staff|Chiefs of Staff]], Guingand, and Walter Smith, moved Eisenhower to reconsider and allowed Montgomery to apologize.{{citation needed|date=September 2014}}

After the war Manteuffel, who commanded the 5th Panzer Army in the Ardennes, was imprisoned awaiting trial for war crimes. During this period he was interviewed by [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], a British author who has since been accused of putting words in the mouths of German generals, and attempting to "rewrite the historical record".<ref>{{cite book |title=In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory |first=Shimon |last=Naveh |pp=108–109 |location=London |publisher=Francass |date=1997|isbn=0-7146-4727-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Liddell Hart and the Weight of History |first=John |last=Mearsheimer |pp=8–9, 203–204 |publisher=Cornell University Press |date=2010 |isbn=978-0-8014-7631-0}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |title=A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945–1953 |first=Alaric |last=Searle |journal=War in History |date=1998 |volume=5 |issue=3 |pp=327–357 |doi=10.1177/096834459800500304 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210924135850/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304 |archive-date=24 September 2021 |issn = 0968-3445 }}</ref><ref>{{citation |title=Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A 'Pupil's' Retrospective |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute |first=Jay |last=Luvaas |date=1990 |pp=12–13}}</ref> After conducting several interviews via an interpreter, Liddell Hart in a subsequent book attributed to Manteuffel the following statement about Montgomery's contribution to the battle in the Ardennes:

{{blockquote|The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.{{sfn|Delaforce|2004|p=318}}}}

However, American historian [[Stephen E. Ambrose|Stephen Ambrose]], writing in 1997, maintained that "Putting Monty in command of the northern flank had no effect on the battle".{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2015|p=644}} Ambrose wrote that: "Far from directing the victory, Montgomery had gotten in everyone's way, and had botched the counter-attack."{{sfn|Baxter|1999|p=111}} Bradley blamed Montgomery's "stagnating conservatism" for his failure to counterattack when ordered to do so by Eisenhower.{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=92}} In contrast, historian Professor John Buckley, writing in 2013, noted how Montgomery "must take considerable credit" for stabilising the position, due to his "efficient and disciplined system of controlling or gripping subordinates".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Buckley |first=John D. |title=Monty's men: the British Army and the liberation of Europe |date=2013 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-20534-3 |location=New Haven (Conn.)}}</ref>