Editing Battle of Britain (section)

===Bomber and Coastal Command contributions===
[[File:RAFBristolBlenheimWWIIColour.jpg|thumb|A [[Bristol Blenheim]] Mk IV of [[No. 21 Squadron RAF|21 Squadron]]]]
[[RAF Bomber Command|Bomber Command]] and [[RAF Coastal Command|Coastal Command]] aircraft flew offensive sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. An hour after the declaration of war, Bomber Command launched raids on warships and naval ports by day, and in night raids dropped leaflets as it was considered illegal to bomb targets which could affect civilians. After the initial disasters of the war, with [[Vickers Wellington]] bombers shot down in large numbers attacking [[Wilhelmshaven]] and the slaughter of the [[Fairey Battle]] squadrons sent to France, it became clear that they would have to operate mainly at night to avoid incurring very high losses.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=90}}</ref> Churchill came to power on 10 May 1940, and the War Cabinet on 12 May agreed that German actions justified "unrestricted warfare", and on 14 May they authorised an attack on the night of 14/15 May against oil and rail targets in Germany. At the urging of [[Clement Attlee]], the Cabinet on 15 May authorised a full bombing strategy against "suitable military objectives", even where there could be civilian casualties. That evening, a night time bomber campaign began against the German oil industry, communications, and forests/crops, mainly in the [[Ruhr|Ruhr area]]. The RAF lacked accurate night navigation and carried small bomb loads.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=241–245}} As the threat mounted, Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry. On 4 July, the Air Ministry gave Bomber Command orders to attack ports and shipping. By September, the build-up of invasion barges in the Channel ports had become a top priority target.<ref name="Halpenny" />

On 7 September, the government issued a warning that the invasion could be expected within the next few days and, that night, Bomber Command attacked the Channel ports and supply dumps. On 13 September, they carried out another large raid on the Channel ports, sinking 80 large barges in the port of [[Ostend]].<ref name="Taylor and Mayer p.74"/> 84 barges were sunk in [[Dunkirk]] after another raid on 17 September and by 19 September, almost 200 barges had been sunk.<ref name="Halpenny"/> The loss of these barges may have contributed to Hitler's decision to postpone Operation Sea Lion indefinitely.<ref name="Halpenny">{{harvnb|Halpenny|1984|pp=8–9}}</ref> The success of these raids was in part because the Germans had few [[Freya radar]] stations set up in France, so that air defences of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air defences over Germany; Bomber Command had directed some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports.

The [[Bristol Blenheim]] units also raided German-occupied airfields throughout July to December 1940, both during daylight hours and at night. Although most of these raids were unproductive, there were some successes; on 1 August, five out of twelve Blenheims sent to attack [[Haamstede]] and [[Haren Airport|Evere]] ([[Brussels]]) were able to destroy or heavily damage three Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and apparently kill a ''[[Staffelkapitän]]'' identified as a ''[[Hauptmann]]'' Albrecht von Ankum-Frank.{{Refn|Albrecht von Ankum-Frank was killed on 2 August 1940 in a [[crash landing]] at [[Leeuwarden Air Base|Leeuwarden Airfield]].{{sfn|Prien|Stemmer|Rodeike|Bock|2002|p=403}}|group=nb}} Two other 109s were claimed by Blenheim gunners.<ref>{{harvnb|Ramsay|1989|p=552}}</ref>{{refn|This account is from ''Warner 2005, p. 253'' Another source, ''Ramsay 1989, p. 555'', lists no aircrew casualties and three 109s in total destroyed or damaged.|group=nb}} Another successful raid on Haamstede was made by a single Blenheim on 7 August which destroyed one 109 of 4./JG 54, heavily damaged another and caused lighter damage to four more.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005|p=253}}</ref>

[[File:BoulogneBarges1940.jpg|thumb|German invasion barges waiting at [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] Harbour, France during the Battle of Britain]]

There were some missions that produced an almost 100% casualty rate amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13 August 1940 against a Luftwaffe airfield near [[Aalborg]] in north-eastern [[Denmark]] by 12 aircraft of [[No. 82 Squadron RAF|82 Squadron]]. One Blenheim returned early (the pilot was later charged and due to appear before a court martial, but was killed on another operation); the other eleven, which reached Denmark, were shot down, five by flak and six by Bf 109s. Of the 33 crewmen who took part in the attack, 20 were killed and 13 captured.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005|pp=255, 266}}</ref>

As well as the bombing operations, Blenheim-equipped units had been formed to carry out long-range strategic reconnaissance missions over Germany and German-occupied territories. In this role, the Blenheims again proved to be too slow and vulnerable against Luftwaffe fighters, and they took constant casualties.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005}}</ref>{{Page needed|date= March 2015}}

Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy-held coast. In all, some 9,180 sorties were flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Although this was much less than the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters, bomber crews suffered about half the total casualties borne by their fighter colleagues. The bomber contribution was, therefore, much more dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=92}}</ref>

Bomber, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine patrol operations continued throughout these months with little respite and none of the publicity accorded to Fighter Command. In his famous 20 August speech about "[[The Few]]", praising Fighter Command, Churchill also made a point of mentioning Bomber Command's contribution, adding that bombers were even then striking back at Germany; this part of the speech is often overlooked, even today.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=237}}</ref><ref name="Speech of 20 August 1940">[http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=420 "Speech of 20 August 1940."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081216155830/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=420 |date=16 December 2008 }} ''Winston Churchill''. Retrieved: 16 April 2008.</ref> The [[Battle of Britain Chapel]] in [[Westminster Abbey]] lists in a roll of honour, 718 Bomber Command crew members, and 280 from Coastal Command who were killed between 10 July and 31 October.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005|p=251}}</ref>

Bomber and Coastal Command attacks against invasion barge concentrations in Channel ports were widely reported by the British media during September and October 1940.<ref>{{harvnb|Campion|2015|pp=65–88}}</ref> In what became known as 'the Battle of the Barges' RAF attacks were claimed in British propaganda to have sunk large numbers of barges, and to have created widespread chaos and disruption to German invasion preparations. Given the volume of British propaganda interest in these bomber attacks during September and earlier October, it is striking how quickly this was overlooked once the Battle of Britain had been concluded. Even by mid-war, the bomber pilots' efforts had been largely eclipsed by a continuing focus on the Few, this a result of the Air Ministry's continuing valorisation of the ″fighter boys″, beginning with the March 1941 Battle of Britain propaganda pamphlet.<ref>{{harvnb|Campion|2015|pp=91–161}}</ref>