Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

== Historiography and motivations ==
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Lloyd George and Balfour remained in government until [[Carlton Club meeting|the collapse of the coalition in October 1922]].{{sfn|Defries|2014|pp=88–90}} Under [[Conservative Government 1922–24|the new Conservative government]], attempts were made to identify the background to and motivations for the declaration.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=61–64}} A private Cabinet memorandum was produced in January 1923, providing a summary of the then-known Foreign Office and War Cabinet records leading up to the declaration. An accompanying Foreign Office note asserted that the primary authors of the declaration were Balfour, Sykes, Weizmann, and Sokolow, with "perhaps Lord Rothschild as a figure in the background", and that "negotiations seem to have been mainly oral and by means of private notes and memoranda of which only the scantiest records seem to be available."{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=61–64}}{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=256}}

Following the 1936 [[Arab general strike (Mandatory Palestine)|general strike]] that was to degenerate into the [[1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine]], the most significant outbreak of violence since the Mandate began, a British [[Royal Commission]]&nbsp;– a high-profile public inquiry – was appointed to investigate the causes of the unrest.{{sfn|Caplan|2011|p=94}} The Palestine Royal Commission, appointed with significantly broader [[terms of reference]] than the previous British inquiries into Palestine,{{sfn|Caplan|2011|p=94}} completed its 404-page report after six&nbsp;months of work in June 1937, publishing it a month later.{{sfn|Caplan|2011|p=94}} The report began by describing the history of the problem, including a detailed summary of the origins of the Balfour Declaration. Much of this summary relied on Lloyd-George's personal testimony;{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|pp=22–28}} Balfour had died in 1930 and Sykes in 1919.{{sfn|Kattan|2009|pp=388–394}} He told the commission that the declaration was made "due to propagandist reasons&nbsp;... In particular Jewish sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry, and would make it more difficult for Germany to reduce her military commitments and improve her economic position on the eastern front".{{efn|group=qt|name=PeelLG|The Palestine Royal Commission described Lloyd George's evidence as follows: "In the evidence he gave before us Mr.&nbsp;Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at the time, stated that, while the Zionist cause had been widely supported in Britain and America before November, 1917, the launching of the Balfour Declaration at that time was "due to propagandist reasons"; and, he outlined the serious position in which the Allied and Associated Powers then were. The Roumanians had been crushed. The Russian Army was demoralized. The French Army was unable at the moment to take the offensive on a large scale. The Italians had sustained a great defeat at Caporetto. Millions of tons of British shipping had been sunk by German submarines. No American divisions were yet available in the trenches. In this critical situation it was believed that Jewish sympathy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one way or the other to the Allied cause. In particular Jewish sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry, and would make it more difficult for Germany to reduce her military commitments and improve her economic position on the eastern front&nbsp;... The Zionist leaders [Mr.&nbsp;Lloyd George informed us] gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word."<ref name="Peel23">{{harvnb|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|pp=23–24}}</ref>}} Two years later, in his ''Memoirs of the Peace Conference'',{{efn|group=qt|Per Lloyd George's ''Memoirs of the Peace Conference'': "The Balfour Declaration represented the convinced policy of all parties in our country and also in America, but the launching of it in 1917 was due, as I have said, to propagandist reasons&nbsp;... The Zionist Movement was exceptionally strong in Russia and America&nbsp;... It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a special value when the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities available for American purchases. Such were the chief considerations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry."{{sfn|Lloyd George|1939|pp=724–734}}}} Lloyd George described a total of nine factors motivating his decision as Prime Minister to release the declaration,{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} including the additional reasons that a Jewish presence in Palestine would strengthen Britain's position on the [[Suez Canal]] and reinforce the route to their imperial dominion in India.{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}}

These geopolitical calculations were debated and discussed in the following years.{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} Historians agree that the British believed that expressing support would appeal to Jews in Germany and the United States, given two of Woodrow Wilson's closest advisors were known to be avid Zionists;{{efn|group=lower-roman|Gelvin noted that "The British did not know quite what to make of President Woodrow Wilson and his conviction (before America's entrance into the war) that the way to end hostilities was for both sides to accept "peace without victory." Two of Wilson's closest advisors, [[Louis Brandeis]] and [[Felix Frankfurter]], were avid Zionists. How better to shore up an uncertain ally than by endorsing Zionist aims? The British adopted similar thinking when it came to the [[Russia]]ns, who were in the midst of their revolution. Several of the most prominent revolutionaries, including [[Leon Trotsky]], were of [[Jews|Jewish]] descent. Why not see if they could be persuaded to keep Russia in the war by appealing to their latent Jewishness and giving them another reason to continue the fight? ... These include not only those already mentioned but also Britain's desire to attract Jewish financial resources."{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|pp=82–83}}}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Schneer described this as follows: "Thus the view from [[Whitehall]] early in 1916: If defeat was not imminent, neither was victory; and the outcome of the war of attrition on the Western Front could not be predicted. The colossal forces in a death-grip across Europe and in Eurasia appeared to have canceled each other out. Only the addition of significant new forces on one side or the other seemed likely to tip the scale. Britain's willingness, beginning early in 1916, to explore seriously some kind of arrangement with "world Jewry" or "Great Jewry" must be understood in this context."{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=152}}}}<ref>{{cite news|first=Martin|last=Rubin|date=2010|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703545604575407364169729910|title=The Great Promise, review of Jonathan Schneer's ''Balfour Declaration''|newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|quote=As Mr. Schneer documents, the declaration was, among much else, part of a campaign to foster world-wide Jewish support for the Allied war effort, not least in the U.S.|access-date=8 October 2017}}</ref> they also hoped to encourage support from the large Jewish population in Russia.{{sfn|Ingrams|2009|p=16}} In addition, the British intended to pre-empt the expected French pressure for an international administration in Palestine.{{efn|group=lower-roman|Grainger writes: "It was later lauded as a great humanitarian gesture and condemned as a wicked plot, but the preceding Cabinet discussions about it show that it was the product of hard-headed political calculation… It was argued that such a declaration would encourage support for the Allies in the United States and in Russia, the two countries in the world which had very large Jewish populations. But behind it all was the knowledge that, if Britain promoted such a policy, it would necessarily be up to her to implement it, and this would in turn mean that she would have to exercise political control over Palestine. One aim of the Balfour Declaration was thus to freeze out France (and anyone else) from any post-war presence in Palestine."{{sfn|Grainger|2006|p=178}} and [[James Barr (author)|James Barr]] writes: "To ward off the inevitable French pressure for an international administration once Palestine had been conquered, the British government now made its support for Zionism public."{{sfn|Barr|2011|p=60}}}}

Some historians argue that the British government's decision reflected what [[James L. Gelvin|James Gelvin]], Professor of Middle Eastern History at [[University of California, Los Angeles|UCLA]], calls 'patrician anti-Semitism' in the overestimation of Jewish power in both the United States and Russia.{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} American Zionism was still in its infancy; in 1914 the Zionist Federation had a small budget of about $5,000 and only 12,000 members, despite an American Jewish population of three million{{efn|group=lower-roman|Brysac and Meyer wrote: "As the lawyer and historian [[David Fromkin]] has shrewdly noted, out of an estimated three million Jews living in the United States in 1914, a mere twelve thousand belonged to an amateurishly led Zionist Federation, which claimed but five hundred members in New York. Its annual budget prior to 1914 never exceeded $5,200, and the largest single gift it received totalled $200."{{sfn|Brysac|Meyer|2009|p=115}}}} but the Zionist organizations had recently succeeded, following a show of force within the American Jewish community, in arranging a Jewish congress to debate the Jewish problem as a whole.{{efn|group=lower-roman|Reinharz described this as follows: "At the Zionist Emergency Conference in August 1914, Poalei-Zion demanded the convening of a Jewish congress which would debate the Jewish problem as a whole&nbsp;... During a year of fruitless discussions, the AJC would only agree only to a limited convention of specific organizations, rather than a congress based on democratic elections. In March 1916, therefore, the Zionists invited a number of other organizations to set up a congress. The internal strife among American Jewry, which had been so widely feared, broke out in full force&nbsp;... The elections were held in June, two months after the United States had entered the war; 325,000 voted, 75,000 of whom were from the Zionist workers' camp. This was an impressive demonstration of the ability of the immigrant Zionists to rally massive support. Immediately after came President Wilson's suggestion to Wise not to hold the congress while the war was on, and the opening session was thus postponed from 2 September 1917, until "peace negotiations will be in prospect". The PZCs acceptance of the deferment again aroused the ire of supporters of the congress, who described it as a degrading surrender."{{sfn|Reinharz|1988|pp=131–145}}}} This impacted British and French government estimates of the balance of power within the American Jewish public.{{efn|group=lower-roman|name=Reinharz2|Reinharz wrote: "British and French estimates of the balance of power in the American Jewish public were greatly affected by this success in the struggle for a congress. It was a victory for Zionists under the leadership of close advisers to the Wilson Administration, such as Brandeis and Frankfurter, against the desires of the bankers from Wall Street, the AJC, and the National Workers' Committee. It spurred an impressive growth in organized membership: from 7,500 in 200 Zionist societies in 1914 to 30,000 in 600 societies in 1918. One year later, the number of members reached 149,000. In addition, the FAZ and the PZC collected millions of dollars during the war years. This demonstration of support for Zionism among the masses of American Jews played a vital role in the British considerations which led to the Balfour Declaration. The American Government (or, at least, the State Department), which did not particularly want to support the Declaration, did so almost in spite of itself&nbsp;– apparently because of the growing strength of Zionists in the United States."{{sfn|Reinharz|1988|pp=131–145}}}}

[[Avi Shlaim]], emeritus Professor of International Relations in the [[University of Oxford]], asserts that two main schools of thought have been developed on the question of the primary driving force behind the declaration,{{sfn|Shlaim|2005|pp=251–270}} one presented in 1961 by Leonard Stein,{{sfn|Stein|1961}} a lawyer and former political secretary to the [[World Zionist Organization]], and the other in 1970 by Mayir Vereté, then Professor of Israeli History at the [[Hebrew University of Jerusalem]].{{sfn|Vereté|1970}} Shlaim states that Stein does not reach any clear cut conclusions, but that implicit in his narrative is that the declaration resulted primarily from the activity and skill of the Zionists, whereas according to Vereté, it was the work of hard-headed pragmatists motivated by British imperial interests in the Middle East.{{sfn|Shlaim|2005|pp=251–270}} Much of modern scholarship on the decision to issue the declaration focuses on the Zionist movement and rivalries within it,{{sfn|Smith|2011|pp=50–51}} with a key debate being whether the role of Weizmann was decisive or whether the British were likely to have issued a similar declaration in any event.{{sfn|Smith|2011|pp=50–51}} Danny Gutwein, Professor of Jewish History at the [[University of Haifa]], proposes a twist on an old idea, asserting that Sykes's February 1917 approach to the Zionists was the defining moment, and that it was consistent with the pursuit of the government's wider agenda to [[Partition of the Ottoman Empire|partition the Ottoman Empire]].{{efn|group=lower-roman|Gutwein described the impact as follows: "Sykes's approach to the Zionist-radical leadership in early 1917 led to a major transformation in Weizmann's political standing. From the outbreak of the war until Asquith's fall, it was Weizmann who sought paths to British statesmen and officials to request their aid, but his efforts were blocked due to his radical positions. Now, it was Sykes who approached Weizmann and Sokolow and requested their assistance to advance radical aims. The co-opting of Weizmann and the Zionist-radicals into Lloyd George's administration transformed them from lobbyists into partners, and Sykes used their help to promote three major goals of the radical policy: the fight against Wilson's "peace without victory" policy; the establishment of "Greater Armenia" as a Russian protectorate that included Turkish Armenia; and the replacement of joint British-French rule in Palestine, in the spirit of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, with an exclusive British protectorate."{{sfn|Gutwein|2016|pp=117–152}}}} Historian [[J. C. Hurewitz]] has written that British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine was part of an effort to secure a land bridge between Egypt and the Persian Gulf by annexing territory from the Ottoman Empire.{{sfn|Hurewitz|1979|p=}}{{page needed|date=September 2020}}