Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

===Lead up to the war===
[[File:Anwar Sadat cropped.jpg|thumb|upright|Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]]]]
Four months before the war broke out, Kissinger made an offer to Ismail, Sadat's emissary. Kissinger proposed returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai, except for some strategic points. Ismail said he would return with Sadat's reply, but he never did. Sadat was already determined to go to war. Only an American guarantee that the United States would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded Sadat.<ref name="Kissinger2011p254"/>

Sadat declared that Egypt was prepared to "sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory.{{sfnp|Morris|2001|p=390}} From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]] jet fighters, [[SA-2 Guideline|SA-2]], [[SA-3 Goa|SA-3]], [[SA-6 Gainful|SA-6]] and [[SA-7 Grail|SA-7]] antiaircraft missiles, [[T-55]] and [[T-62]] tanks, [[RPG-7]] antitank weapons, and the [[9M14 Malyutka|AT-3 Sagger]] [[anti-tank guided missile]] from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.{{sfnp|Heikal|1975|p=22}}

The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez Canal would incur massive losses. Both the Soviets and Americans were at that time pursuing [[détente]] and had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting with American President [[Richard Nixon]], Soviet leader [[Leonid Brezhnev]] had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=39}}

Between May and August 1973, the Egyptian Army conducted military exercises near the border, and [[Ashraf Marwan]] inaccurately warned that Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack in the middle of May. The Israeli Army mobilized with their Blue-White Alert, in response to both the warnings and exercises, at considerable cost. These exercises led some Israelis to dismiss the actual war preparations—and Marwan's warning right before the attack was launched—as another exercise.<ref name="Uri">{{cite book |last1=Bar-Joseph |first1=Uri |title=The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel |date=2016 |publisher=HarperCollins |location=New York |isbn=978-0-06-242013-8 |pages=166–176, 221–222}}</ref>

In the week leading up to [[Yom Kippur]], the Egyptian Army staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were also detected, as were the cancellation of leaves and a call-up of reserves in the Syrian army. These activities were considered puzzling but not a threat because Israeli intelligence suggested they would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt would not attack until the weaponry they wanted arrived. Despite this belief, Israel sent reinforcements to the Golan Heights. These forces were to prove critical during the early days of the war.<ref name=Uri/>{{rp|190–191, 208}}

On 27 to 30 September, two batches of reservists were called up by the Egyptian Army to participate in these exercises. Two days before the outbreak of the war, on 4 October, the Egyptian command publicly announced the demobilization of part of the reservists called up during 27 September to lull Israeli suspicions. Around 20,000 troops were demobilized, and subsequently some of these men were given leave to perform the ''[[Umrah]]'' (pilgrimage) to Mecca.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=207|Gawrych|1996|2p=24}}

According to Egyptian General El-Gamasy, "On the initiative of the operations staff, we reviewed the situation on the ground and developed a framework for the planned offensive operation. We studied the technical characteristics of the Suez Canal, the ebb and the flow of the tides, the speed of the currents and their direction, hours of darkness and of moonlight, weather conditions, and related conditions in the Mediterranean and Red sea."{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} He explained further by saying: "Saturday 6 October 1973 (10 Ramadan 1393) was the day chosen for the September–October option. Conditions for a crossing were good, it was a fast day in Israel, and the moon on that day, 10 Ramadan, shone from sunset until midnight."{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} The war coincided that year with the Muslim month of [[Ramadan]], when many Muslim soldiers [[Fasting|fast]]. On the other hand, the fact that the attack was launched on Yom Kippur may have ''helped'' Israel to more easily marshal reserves from their homes and synagogues because roads and communication lines were largely open, easing the mobilization and transportation of the military.{{sfnp|Schiff|2013|p=12}}

Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=51}}

On the night of 25 September, Hussein secretly flew to [[Tel Aviv]] to warn Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would cooperate.{{'"}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=50}} This warning was ignored, and Israeli intelligence indicated that Hussein had not said anything that was not already known. Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, [[Mossad]] Director-General [[Zvi Zamir]] continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after Hussein's warning.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=57}} Zamir would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of war]."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=57}}

Several days before the war began, Lieutenant Colonel Aviezer Ya'ari, head of the Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq desk of Israeli military intelligence, suggested that the Egyptian and Syrian military exercises which were underway might be preparations for a combined attack. He was reprimanded and later told the [[Agranat Commission]] that he subsequently became more cautious in his estimates.<ref name=tomatoes>[https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sadat-is-not-worth-tomatoes-graphologist-assured-israels-military-intelligence-before-1973-war/ Egypt's Sadat is 'not worth tomatoes,' reservist professor assured Israel's military intelligence before 1973 war]</ref>

On the day before the war, General [[Ariel Sharon]] was shown aerial photographs and other intelligence by [[Yehoshua Sagi|Yehoshua Saguy]], his divisional intelligence officer. Sharon noticed that the concentration of Egyptian forces along the canal was far beyond anything observed during the training exercises, and that the Egyptians had amassed all of their crossing equipment along the canal. He then called General [[Shmuel Gonen]], who had replaced him as head of Southern Command, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent.{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

Zamir's concern grew on 4–5 October, as additional signs of an impending attack were detected. Soviet advisers and their families left Egypt and Syria, transport aircraft thought to be laden with military equipment landed in [[Cairo]] and [[Damascus]], and aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were at an unprecedented high. According to declassified documents from the Agranat Commission, Brigadier General Yisrael Lior (Meir's military secretary/attaché) claimed that Mossad knew from Marwan that an attack was going to occur under the guise of a military drill a week before it occurred, but the process of passing along the information to the prime minister's office failed.<ref name=mishandle>{{cite web |url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/newly-released-papers-detail-depth-of-mishandling-of-yom-kippur-war-warnings/ |title=Mossad's tip-off ahead of Yom Kippur War did not reach prime minister, newly released papers show |first=Mitch |last=Ginsburg |website=The Times of Israel}}</ref>

On the night of 5–6 October, Marwan incorrectly informed Zamir that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack would take place at sunset.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/opinion/13iht-edblum.1.6645021.html |work=The New York Times |first=Howard |last=Blum |title=Who killed Ashraf Marwan? |date=13 July 2007}}</ref> It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli High Command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli [[Military reserves|reserves]].<ref name="Agranat">{{cite web|publisher=The Jewish Agency for Israel|url=http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html|date=27 November 2005|title=Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973|author=Doron Geller|series=Inside the Israeli Secret Service|access-date=14 November 2016|archive-date=13 May 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080513121838/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>