Editing Yemeni Armed Forces (section)

===North Yemeni armed forces===

When the Republican Government took power in a coup much of the stability and any remaining professionalism in the army was destroyed. The new government had to build a new army to fight the royalist insurgents. First training centers and recruitment offices were established in every province. The Egyptians played a remarkable role in the process of building a modern national army through serving as advisers and giving Yemeni officers the chance to study in Egyptian academies. With help from the Egyptians four full infantry brigades were formed. These consist of the Revolution brigade, the Nasr brigade, the Unity brigade and the Al Araba brigade. One problem in the young Yemeni army was a lack of strong leadership. Egyptian advisers needed to form a unified military command, so the following bodies were established:

*Army management authority
*Logistics authority
*General military armament authority
*War operations room led by Captain Abdul Latif Deifallah.<ref name="grounds"/>
[[File:T-34-85 tank on the military parade in Yemen Arab republic.jpg|thumb|306x306px|[[Soviet Union|Soviet]]-made [[T-34|T-34-85]] tanks on the military parade of the North Yemeni army, 1976.]]
[[File:Military parade in Yemen Arab republic (3).jpg|left|thumb|239x239px|North Yemeni soldiers on the parade, 1976.]]
Post-civil war recovery of North Yemen proved extremely problematic. Badly damaged by years of fighting, the economy was in tatters. The military ate up to 50 percent of the national budget, totalling only some £9 million, which was hopelessly insufficient for the circumstances. Controlled by the government, the military's logistical system was not only dependent on Sana'a's trust in the loyalty of local commanders, but also subject to graft and corruption. The Soviets, who wholeheartedly helped during the siege of Sana'a, proved ever more reluctant with the provision of spares and support equipment: Moscow preferred cooperation with the PRY, the government of which was ideologically closer to the USSR, and thus found little incentive in supporting the problematic Northerners. Before long, the lack of Soviet support seriously affected the combat capability of the North Yemeni military. It also had negative impacts upon the morale of the military in general, and began causing rifts between Sunni and Zaidi personnel. In an attempt to improve the situation, the commander-in-chief of the North Yemeni armed forces, colonel Hassan Al-Amri, visited Prague to request military aid. As so often before, the Czechoslovaks denied all such requests because they were certain that Yemen could not pay. Instead, Czech officials offered obsolete arms - including old rifles, sub-machine guns, anti-armour rockets and uniforms. It remains unclear whether Amri accepted this offer. By January 1971, dissent within the 30,000-strong armed forces reached a level where Amri was forced to dismiss several hundred army officers with Sunni backgrounds, apparently because they were in opposition to the government's decision for rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Later the same year, right-wing officers began plotting a coup with the intention of imposing a military regime, while dozens of left-wing officers were arrested and accused of conspiring with possible Soviet and Iraqi support. Fearing another coup attempt, Amri then reorganised the military so that control over combat units was exercised by corps commanders for infantry, armour and artillery - irrespective of their geographic area of responsibility. He also created the General Reserve Force under the command of Colonel Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, and the Republican Guard, both of which consisted of about 7,000 troops of acknowledged loyalty to the government. Personnel-related problems persisted, nevertheless. In January 1971, a plot was uncovered - supposedly organised by Soviet advisers - under which several pilots intended to defect with their aircraft to Aden. In another attempt to improve the situation, President Iryani visited Moscow and requested additional military aid, including deliveries of MiG-17 fighter-bombers, in December 1971. However the Soviets also refused. The only improvement the North Yemeni air force experienced during this period was the expansion of Al-Daylami air base, undertaken during the same year.<ref name="grounds">Mello, Alexandre. Knights, Michael. [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-coalition-operations-in-yemen-part-1-the-ground-war Gulf Coalition Operations in Yemen (Part 1): The Ground War] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161013112419/http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-coalition-operations-in-yemen-part-1-the-ground-war |date=2016-10-13 }}. Published 26 March 2016. Retrieved 24 October 2016.</ref>