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==Spanish–American War== [[File:Joseph Wheeler and William R. Shafter in Cuba.jpg|thumb|right|Generals [[Joseph Wheeler]] (left) and William Rufus Shafter in Cuba, 1898]] Just before the outbreak of the Spanish–American War, Shafter was commander of the Department of [[California]]. Shafter was an unlikely candidate for command of the expedition to Cuba. He was approaching 63, weighed over 300 pounds and suffered from [[gout]]. Nevertheless, he received a promotion to Major General of Volunteers and command of the [[Fifth Army Corps (Spanish-American War)|Fifth Army Corps]] being assembled in Tampa, Florida.{{sfnp|Messenger|2017|p=38}} One possible reason for his being given this command was his lack of political ambitions. Shafter appeared to maintain a very loose control over the expedition to Cuba from the beginning, commencing with a very disorganized landing at Daiquiri on the southern coast of Cuba. Confusion prevailed over landing priorities and the [[command hierarchy|chain of command]]. When [[Samuel S. Sumner|General Sumner]] refused to allow the Army's [[Gatling Gun]] Detachment - which had priority - to disembark from the transport ''Cherokee'' on the grounds that the lieutenant commanding the detachment did not have the rank to enforce his priority, Shafter had to personally intervene, returning to the ship in a steam launch to enforce his demand that the guns come off immediately.{{sfnp|Parker|Weigle|1898|p=}} During the disembarkation, Shafter sent forward Fifth Corps' Cavalry Division under [[Joseph Wheeler]] to reconnoiter the road to [[Santiago de Cuba]]. Apparently disregarding orders, Wheeler brought on a fight which escalated into the [[Battle of Las Guasimas]]. Shafter apparently did not realize the battle was even underway nor did he say anything to Wheeler about it afterward. A plan was finally developed for the attack on Santiago. Shafter would send his 1st Division (at the time, brigade and division numbers were not unique outside their parent formation) to [[Battle of El Caney|attack El Caney]] while his 2nd Division and the Cavalry Division would attack the heights south of El Caney known as San Juan Hill. Originally, Shafter planned to lead his forces from the front, but he suffered greatly from the tropical heat and was confined to his headquarters far to the rear and out of sight of the fighting. Unable to see the battle firsthand, he never developed a coherent chain of command. Shafter's offensive battle plans were both simplistic and extremely vague. He seemed to be unaware or unconcerned about the mass killing effect of modern military weapons technology possessed by the Spanish. Further, his intelligence-gathering efforts on Spanish troop dispositions and equipment was extremely meager, though he had a number of sources available to him, including reconnaissance reports by Cuban rebel forces as well as espionage obtained from indigenous Cubans. During the hurried attack on El Caney and [[Battles of San Juan Hill and Kettle Hill|San Juan Heights]], American forces, who had packed the available roads and were unable maneuver, suffered heavy losses from Spanish troops equipped with modern repeating smokeless powder rifles and breech-loading artillery, while the short-ranged black-powder guns of U.S. artillery units were unable to respond effectively. Additional casualties were incurred in the actual assault, which was marked by a series of brave but disorganized and uncoordinated advances. After suffering some 1,400 casualties, and aided by a single Gatling Gun detachment for fire support, American troops successfully stormed and occupied both El Caney and San Juan Heights. The next task for Shafter was the investment and siege of the city of Santiago and its garrison. However, the extent of the American losses were becoming known at Shafter's headquarters back at Sevilla (his gout, poor physical condition, and huge bulk did not allow him to go to the front). The casualties were delivered not only by messenger report, but also by "meat wagons" delivering the wounded and dying to the hospital. Viewing the carnage, Shafter began to waver in his determination to defeat the Spanish at Santiago. He knew his troops' position was tenuous, but again had little intelligence on the hardships of the Spanish inside beleaguered Santiago. Shafter felt the Navy was doing little to relieve the pressure on his forces. Supplies could not be delivered to the front, leaving his men in want of necessities, particularly food rations. Shafter himself was ill, and very weak. With this view of events, Shafter sent a dramatic message to Washington. He suggested that the army should give up its attack and all its gains for the day, and withdraw to safer ground about five miles away. Fortunately, by the time this message reached Washington, Shafter changed his mind, and instead renewed siege operations after demanding the Spanish surrender the city and garrison of Santiago. With the victory of the U.S. Navy at the [[Battle of Santiago de Cuba]], by Admirals [[William T. Sampson]] and [[Winfield Scott Schley]], the fate of the Spanish position at Santiago was sealed. Shortly afterward, the Spanish commander surrendered the city. 'Campaigning in Cuba' by George Kennan, 1899 (available on Gutenberg) presents a totally damning account of Shafter's command in the Cuba campaign by a gifted correspondent who was with the troops from Tampa to return: {{blockquote|Morbidly obese at 300 lbs with gout and probably diabetes at 63, Shafter should have been in a hospice, not a tropical hellhole where malaria, yellow fever and dysentery annihilated most of the invasion force within three weeks. Shafter himself was a basket case. Complete planning /logistical incompetence in Washington meant troops had virtually no medical supplies, or adequate rations or means to boil drinking water, and were forced to sleep on the wet ground in wet winter-weight uniforms as no shelters of hammocks were available. One of the most shameful events in US armed forces history for the waste of enlisted men.}} [[File:William R. Shafter headstone.JPG|thumb|Shafter's headstone at San Francisco National Cemetery]]
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