Editing Wilhelm Canaris (section)

==Interwar years==
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-088-40, Bedienstete des Marinekommandoamtes.jpg|thumb|Canaris (second row, second from right) with other officers of the ''Marinekommandoamt'' (Naval Command Office), 1923]]

During the [[German Revolution of 1918–19]], Canaris helped organise the formation of ''[[Freikorps]]'' paramilitary units to suppress the [[communist]] revolutionary movements, whose members were attempting to spread the ideals of the [[Russian Revolution]] into Germany. Canaris was also a member of the military court that tried and in many cases acquitted those involved in the murders of the leftist revolutionaries [[Karl Liebknecht]] and [[Rosa Luxemburg]] for their involvement in the [[Spartacist uprising]]. He helped one of those convicted in the murders, Kurt Vogel, escape from prison and although Canaris was imprisoned for four days over this, he was never prosecuted.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=56–87}} Despite these actions, Canaris was eventually appointed to the adjutancy of Defence Minister [[Gustav Noske]].{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=58–59}}

In 1919, he married Erika Waag, the child of an industrialist, with whom he had two children.{{sfn|Wichmann|2014}}

On 20 July 1920, Canaris became admiral's staff officer at the [[Marinestation der Ostsee]] (Baltic Naval Station) command.{{sfn|Suhr|2020|p=216}} 

In the spring of 1924, Canaris was sent to [[Osaka]], [[Japan]], to supervise a secret U-boat construction program in direct violation of the [[Treaty of Versailles]].{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=83}} When that project was shelved by Vice Admiral Adolf Zenker in favour of a more co-operative relationship with the British, Canaris began making deals. Aided by Captain [[Walter Lohmann]], the son of a powerful German shipping magnate, they negotiated with Spanish merchants, German industrialists, some Argentinian venture capitalists and the Spanish Navy so the Germans could continue their clandestine naval activities.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|pp=83–88}} Canaris made some enemies within Germany during the course of his secret business and intelligence negotiations, partially as a consequence of the bankruptcy incurred by the film-maker [[Phoebus Film]] in his dealings with Lohmann (the '[[Lohmann Affair]]'). Suddenly, the former involvement with the "Liebknecht affair" re-emerged and placed Canaris in an unfavourable light, which ended up costing him his position in Spain. Instead, he was sent to [[Wilhelmshaven]]. From his new post, Canaris haplessly discovered that Lohmann's "investments" had cost upwards of 26 million marks in total losses.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=89}} 

At some point in 1928, Canaris was removed from his intelligence post and began two years of conventional naval service aboard the [[pre-dreadnought battleship|pre-Dreadnought battleship]] {{SMS|Schlesien||2}}{{sfn|Wichmann|2014}} and became captain of the vessel on 1 December 1932.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=89}} Just two months later, [[Adolf Hitler]] became Germany's new chancellor.{{sfn|Evans|2006|p=11}} Canaris was enthused by that development and was known to give lectures about the virtues of Nazism to his crew aboard the ''Schlesien''.{{sfn|Kahn|1978|p=229}}

Detached from the previous government of Weimar, whose republican principles never appealed to Canaris, he looked to the Nazi Party to shape the future. Two things stood out for Canaris about the Nazis; they represented a return to state-centered authoritarian government led by a charismatic leader, which he supported, and they were determined to throw off the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler proselytised a return to world-power status, which for Canaris implied constructing a super-fleet, by the preservation of a virtuous soldier-based society, a "community under arms".{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=130–131}} It is worth recalling that in the turmoil after the First World War in Germany, while the Weimar government was fledgling, Canaris helped establish home guard units in contravention of the treaty, sympathised with the ''Freikorps'' movement and participated in the [[Kapp Putsch]].{{sfn|Wistrich|1995|p=29}}

Another aspect of the Nazis that attracted Canaris was their anticommunism. Many of his friends joined the Nazi crusade, and Canaris "likewise came to be regarded as an enthusiastic National Socialist".{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=131–132}} A former SS general, [[Werner Best]], once described Canaris as an "inveterate nationalist" and correspondingly asserted that Canaris felt the Nazis were much better "than anything that had gone before". Even after the [[Night of the Long Knives]], Canaris "preached wholehearted cooperation with the new regime".{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=132}} Canaris once said, "we officers... should always recognize that without the Führer and his NSDAP, the restoration of German military greatness and military strength would not have been possible... the officer's duty is to be a living example of National Socialism and make the German [[Wehrmacht]] (Army) reflect the fulfillment of National Socialist ideology. That must be our grand design".{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=134}}

[[File:Wilhelm Canaris.jpg|thumb|left|Canaris as a [[Korvettenkapitän]], 1924–31]]

Taking a position as the fortress commander at [[Swinemünde]] on 29 September 1934, Canaris seemed to be near the end of his career as he settled into a sort of "provincial exile" with his family.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=135–136}} Then, in short order, Canaris caught wind of the dispute in the Reichswehr Ministry over the impending successor to the ''[[Abwehr]]'' chief Captain {{ill|Conrad Patzig|de}}, who was forced to resign. Patzig recommended Canaris as his replacement because of his outstanding service record and because he considered him best suited for the position from his previous experience in intelligence operations.{{sfn|Kahn|1978|pp=228–229}} His aspirations were quickly being realized, and in his zeal for his new job, Canaris paid "little heed" to the warnings from Patzig about the "fiendish" machinations of the party and its police organs.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=136}} The admonitions principally concerned [[Reinhard Heydrich]], the head of the SS intelligence service known as the ''[[Sicherheitsdienst]]'' (SD) who was not well-disposed towards the ''Abwehr'' since he believed that Germany's defeat during the First World War was attributable to military intelligence failures by the organization. Moreover, Heydrich had aspirations to oversee all aspects of political intelligence-gathering for Germany.{{sfn|Gerwarth|2012|pp=84–85}}

On 1 January 1935, a little less than two years after Hitler had taken control of the German government, Canaris was made head of the ''Abwehr'', Germany's official military intelligence agency.{{sfn|Zentner|Bedürftig|1991|p=125}} Records suggest that Canaris was approved in his role as ''Abwehr'' chief as a compromise candidate since the commander-in-chief of the German Navy, Admiral [[Erich Raeder]], a staunch navy man, was initially opposed to his appointment but caved when Patzig manipulated the situation by suggesting an army officer for the post if Canaris was rejected.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|pp=97–98}}

With the seemingly-amicable relationship between Heydrich and Canaris that then existed, according to former ''Abwehr'' Secretary Inge Haag, it is possible that Heydrich supported the installment of Canaris as head of the ''Abwehr'' at least based on their behaviour toward each other.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=98}} The two remained "friendly" rivals, but Canaris considered Heydrich a "brutal fanatic" and was likewise aware that Heydrich's SD constantly monitored the telephone traffic of the ''Abwehr''. Heydrich was suspicious of Canaris, referred to him as a "wily old fox", and cautioned his colleagues never to underestimate the man.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=99}}

Just a few weeks into his role as head of the ''Abwehr'', Canaris met with Heydrich and some of his officials to parcel out intelligence operations between the ''Abwehr'', [[Gestapo]], and SD.{{sfn|Kahn|1978|p=231}} It is clear from sources that Canaris was then a true devotee to Hitler according to a former Gestapo officer, Gerhard Fischer, who claimed that the Führer's gentlemanly relationship with Canaris converted the latter into "an extreme exponent of Hitlerism."{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=213}}

In May 1935, Canaris first donned the uniform of a rear admiral, a promotion that coincided with his responsibility for shielding Germany's burgeoning rearmament program from enemy counterintelligence agents, which meant a significant expansion of the ''Abwehr''.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=186–187}} The enlargement of the ''Abwehr'' mission brought Canaris into contact with "counterespionage virtuoso" Major [[Rudolf Bamler]], who assisted him in establishing an extensive surveillance web over munitions factories, seaports, the armed forces and the media.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=187}} Between 1935 and 1937, Canaris expanded the ''Abwehr'' staff from a mere 150 people to nearly 1,000.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=114}} He met Heydrich again on 21 December 1936, and the two men signed a document, which came to be known in their orbit as the "Ten Commandments". The agreement clarified the respective areas of counterespionage responsibilities between the Gestapo and the ''Abwehr''.{{sfn|Kahn|1978|pp=231–232}}

According to the biographer [[Heinz Höhne]], Canaris subscribed to most of Hitler's views{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=215}} since Hitler's nationalism, his social-Darwinist beliefs, his opposition to the Versailles Treaty, his belief in rebuilding a Greater German Reich, and his anti-Semitic ideology appealed to the ''Abwehr'' chief.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|p=216}} Prompted by anti-Semitism, Canaris first suggested the use of the [[Star of David]] to identify Jews in 1935 to 1936, which was later used to set them apart from German citizens within the Reich, and eventually heralded their isolation, presaged their compulsory resettlement, and ultimately led to their physical annihilation.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=216–217}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H15527, Berlin, Minister Pirow aus Südafrika, Verabschiedung.jpg|thumb|South African Minister of Defence [[Oswald Pirow]] walking in front of an honor guard during his visit to Berlin, to his left is Canaris, November 1938]]

During the [[Spanish Civil War]] (1936–1939), Germany [[Foreign involvement in the Spanish Civil War|signed an international agreement]] to embargo arms to the warring factions, the [[Nationalist faction (Spanish Civil War)|Nationalists]], led by [[Francisco Franco]], and the [[Republican faction (Spanish Civil War)|Republicans]].{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=82}} In fact, Germany provided aid to Franco's side, with Canaris using his contacts at England's [[Vickers-Armstrongs|Vickers]] armaments manufacturing company to help supply the Nationalists with weapons.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=149}}

One month before Hitler's annexation of Austria, known as the [[Anschluss]], Canaris put the ''Abwehr'' into action and personally oversaw deception operations, which were designed to give the Austrians the impression of what appeared to be substantial German military preparations for an impending act of aggression.{{sfn|Kahn|1978|p=234}} However, the sham action did not move Austrian Chancellor [[Kurt Schuschnigg|Schuschnigg]], who was forced to resign when German troops marched into Austria, which was followed by its official annexation into Greater Germany (''Grossdeutschland'') on 13 March 1938.{{sfn|Evans|2006|pp=646–653}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H28859, Berlin, Empfang im Hotel Kaiserhof.jpg|thumb|Canaris (left) at the reception for Hitler's 50th birthday, 21 April 1939]]

At that development, however, Canaris began spending more and more time in the company of [[Hans Oster]] and also began formulating ways to forestall or prevent a European war.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=148}} Among the first to arrive in Vienna, Canaris had a special team seize records from the Austrian archives since he feared possible references to his Spanish Civil War arms supplier connections in London. He also absorbed as much of the Austrian intelligence service as he could into the ''Abwehr'' while he avoided those who were already Nazi converts.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=149}}

Canaris was disturbed by Hitler's intention to absorb [[Czechoslovakia]] as were others, who feared another European war. That resulted in the formation of a conspiratorial group consisting of members of the German Foreign Office and ranking members of the military. The assemblage included General [[Ludwig Beck]], the Foreign Office's state secretary [[Ernst von Weizsäcker]], General [[Erwin von Witzleben]] and Admiral Canaris.{{sfn|Hildebrand|1973|pp=70–71}}

===Munich Agreement and intrigue===
Canaris and his associates were not necessarily committed to the overthrow of Hitler's regime, but they were loosely allied to another more radical group: the "anti-Nazi" faction, led by Colonel [[Hans Oster]] and [[Hans Bernd Gisevius]], which wanted to use the crisis as an excuse for executing a ''putsch'' to overthrow the Nazi regime.{{sfn|Müller|1985|pp=162–163, 166–167}} The most audacious plan contemplated by Canaris, in collaboration with [[Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin]], was to capture and to unseat Hitler and the entire Nazi Party before the invasion of [[Czechoslovakia]]. At that particular moment, Kleist visited Britain secretly and discussed the situation with British [[MI6]] and some high-ranking politicians.{{sfn|Hoffmann|1977|pp=60–63}}

The high-ranking German military leaders believed that if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia or any other country, Britain would declare war on Germany.{{sfn|Evans|2006|pp=668–670}} MI6 was of the same opinion. The British declaration of war would have given the General Staff, it thought, both the pretext and the support for an overthrow of Hitler, which many of them were planning because of the prevailing "anti-war sentiment of the German people".{{sfn|Bassett|2011|p=159}}

The reaction of the British government to Hitler's demands on the [[Sudetenland]] was more cautious. At a meeting with Hitler in Munich, British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]] and French Prime Minister [[Édouard Daladier]] chose diplomacy over war.{{sfn|Waller|1996|pp=56–58}} The [[Munich Agreement]] was thus a severe disappointment for Kleist and Canaris.{{sfn|Bassett|2011|pp=160–162}} It gave Hitler's reputation an important boost and his popularity soared, as he appeared to have brought peace. However, Hitler was scornful of his generals for resisting his plans since he had wanted war. [[Hermann Göring]] fell out of favour with him for negotiating peace, but Hitler's drive for war remained unabated although the Western powers had granted him concessions.{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|pp=123–126}} Canaris was relieved that war was averted and sought to re-establish contact with Hitler since many of the ''Abwehr'' reports submitted on the Sudeten crisis had proven to be grossly inaccurate. To Hans Oster and his circle, Canaris suddenly appeared recommitted to Hitler.{{sfn|Höhne|1979|pp=311–312}}

=== Dutch War Scare ===
In January 1939, Canaris manufactured the "Dutch War Scare", which gripped the British government. By 23 January 1939, the British government received information that Germany intended to invade the Netherlands in February 1939 with the aim of using Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing offensive intended to achieve a "knock-out" blow against Britain by razing British cities to the ground.{{sfn|Watt|1989|p=101}} All of that information was false but was intended by Canaris to achieve a change in British foreign policy.{{sfn|Watt|1989|pp=103–104}} Canaris was successful, and the "Dutch War Scare" played a major role in causing Chamberlain to make the "continental commitment" by pledging in February 1939 to send a British ground force to the defence of France in the event of war.{{sfn|Watt|1989|pp=102–103}}

===United States===

{{Main|Duquesne Spy Ring}}

[[File:Mug shots of the 33 convicted members of the Duquesne spy ring (cropped).tif|thumb|The 33 convicted members of the Duquesne spy ring. Duquesne is pictured in the top, right; Lang is in the third row, fourth from left. (FBI print)]]

In 1937, Canaris created a new office of air intelligence in the ''Abwehr'' and assigned ''[[Hauptmann]]'' [[Nikolaus Ritter]] of the Luftwaffe to be the chief of I. Luft (Chief of Air Intelligence).{{sfn|Duffy|2014|p=13}} Ritter, who had lived in the United States for twelve years, was given primary authority over ''Abwehr'' agents operating in the Americas and Britain.{{sfn|Duffy|2014|pp=13–15}} Canaris instructed Ritter to contact and reactivate a former German Naval Intelligence [[spymaster]] living in [[New York City]] whom Canaris knew from the First World War, [[Fritz Joubert Duquesne]]. Duquesne was an [[Afrikaner]] who had escaped from a prisoner-of-war camp in the British [[Imperial fortress]] [[British Overseas Territory|colony]] of [[Bermuda]] during the [[Second Boer War]] and had been falsely credited for the death of British Army Field Marshal [[Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener]] in the sinking of {{HMS|Hampshire|1903|6}} during the First World War).{{sfn|Evans|2014}} Back in 1931, Ritter had met Duquesne in New York, and both spies reconnected in New York on 3 December 1937.{{sfn|Evans|2014}} Ritter also met with Herman W. Lang, a spy who operated under the code name PAUL.{{sfn|Duffy|2014|p=26}}

Herman Lang worked as a machinist, draftsman and assembly inspector for the Carl L. Norden Company in New York, which had been contracted to manufacture an advanced top-secret military bomber part, the [[Norden bomb-sight]].{{sfn|Evans|2014}} He provided the ''Abwehr'' a large drawing of the bomb-sight and later went to Germany to work on and finish an improved version. In Germany, Lang debriefed with both Canaris and Göring.{{sfn|Duffy|2014|pp=44–45}} Ritter employed several other successful agents across the United States, but he also made the mistake of recruiting a man who would later become a double agent for the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] (FBI), [[William Sebold]]. On 8 February 1940, Ritter sent Sebold to New York under the alias of Harry Sawyer and instructed him to set up a shortwave radio-transmitting station to establish contact with the German shortwave station abroad. Sebold was also instructed to use the codename TRAMP and to contact a fellow agent, codenamed DUNN, Fritz Duquesne.{{sfn|Evans|2014}}

On 28 June 1941, after a two-year investigation, the FBI arrested Duquesne and 32 other Nazi spies on charges of relaying secret information on US weaponry and shipping movements to Germany. On 2 January 1942, less than a month after the US [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|attacked by Japan at Pearl Harbor]] and Germany had declared war on the United States, the 33 members of the Duquesne Spy Ring were sentenced to serve a total of more than 300 years in prison. They were found guilty in what historian Peter Duffy said in 2014 is "still to this day the largest espionage case in the history of the United States".{{sfn|Duffy|2014|p=2}}

One German spymaster later commented that the ring's roundup delivered "the death blow" to their espionage efforts in the United States. [[J. Edgar Hoover]] called his FBI swoop on Duquesne's ring the greatest spy roundup in US history. In a 1942 memo to his superiors, Canaris reported on the importance of several of his captured spies by noting their valued contributions, and he wrote that Duquesne had "delivered valuable reports and important technical material in the original, including U.S. gas masks, radio-controlled apparatus, leak proof fuel tanks, television instruments, small bombs for airplanes versus airplanes, air separator, and propeller-driving mechanisms. Items delivered were labeled 'valuable', and several 'good' and 'very good'".{{sfn|Duffy|2014|p=224}}