Editing Wang Jingwei (section)

==Rivalry with Chiang Kai-shek==
[[File:Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek.jpg|thumb|Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-Shek in 1926]]

===Leader of the Wuhan Government===
During the [[Northern Expedition (1926–1927)|Northern Expedition]], Wang was the leading figure in the left-leaning faction of the KMT that called for continued cooperation with the [[Chinese Communist Party]]. Although Wang collaborated closely with Chinese communists in Wuhan, he was philosophically opposed to communism and regarded the KMT's Comintern advisors with suspicion.<ref>Dongyoun Hwang. Wang Jingwei, The National Government, and the Problem of Collaboration. PhD Dissertation, Duke University. UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 2000, p. 118.</ref> He did not believe that Communists could be true patriots or true Chinese nationalists.<ref>Dongyoun Hwang. Wang Jingwei, The National Government, and the Problem of Collaboration. PhD Dissertation, Duke University. UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 2000, p. 148.</ref>

In early 1927, shortly before Chiang captured the Chinese sections of Shanghai and moved the capital to Nanjing, Wang's faction declared the capital of the Republic to be [[Wuhan]]. While attempting to direct the [[Government of the Republic of China in Wuhan|government from Wuhan]], Wang was notable for his close collaboration with leading communist figures, including [[Mao Zedong]], [[Chen Duxiu]], and [[Mikhail Borodin|Borodin]], and for his faction's provocative land reform policies. Wang later blamed the failure of his Wuhan government on its excessive adoption of communist agendas. Wang's regime was opposed by Chiang Kai-shek, who was in the midst of a bloody purge of communists in Shanghai and was calling for a push farther north. The separation between the governments of Wang and Chiang are known as the "[[Nanjing-Wuhan Split|Ninghan Separation]]" ({{zh|t=寧漢分裂|s=宁汉分裂|p=Nínghàn Fenlìe|first=t}}).<ref>Spence, Jonathan D. (1999) ''The Search for Modern China'', W.W. Norton and Company. pp. 338–339. {{ISBN|0-393-97351-4}}.</ref>

Chiang Kai-shek occupied the Chinese sections of Shanghai in April 1927, and began a bloody suppression of suspected communists known as the "[[Shanghai massacre of 1927|Shanghai Massacre]]". Within several weeks of Chiang's suppression of communists in Shanghai, Wang's leftist government was attacked by a KMT-aligned warlord and promptly disintegrated, leaving Chiang as the sole legitimate leader of the Republic. KMT troops occupying territories formerly controlled by Wang conducted massacres of suspected Communists in many areas: around [[Changsha]] alone, over ten thousand people were killed in a single twenty-day period. Fearing retribution as a communist sympathizer, Wang publicly claimed allegiance to Chiang before fleeing to Europe.<ref name="Barnouin38">Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. ''Zhou Enlai: A Political Life.'' Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. p. 38. Retrieved 12 March 2011.</ref>

===Political activities in Chiang's government===
Between 1929 and 1930, Wang collaborated with [[Feng Yuxiang]] and [[Yan Xishan]] to form a central government in opposition to the one headed by Chiang. Wang took part in a conference hosted by Yan to draft a new constitution, and was to serve as the Prime Minister under Yan, who would be president. Wang's attempts to aid Yan's government ended when Chiang defeated the alliance in the [[Central Plains War]].<ref>Gillin, Donald G. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2943488 "Portrait of a Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1930"] ''The Journal of Asian Studies''. Vol. 19, No. 3, May, 1960. p. 293. Retrieved 23 February 2011.</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,740400,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110130040834/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,740400,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=30 January 2011 |title=CHINA: President Resigns |work=TIME Magazine |date=29 September 1930 |access-date=24 February 2011}}</ref>

[[File:Wang Jinwei Chan pitqun in Malaya.jpg|thumb|left|Wang Jingwei (second from left) and Chen Bijun (far left) in [[British Malaya]], 1935]]

In 1931, Wang joined another anti-Chiang government in Guangzhou. After Chiang defeated this regime, Wang reconciled with Chiang's Nanjing government and held prominent posts for most of the decade. Wang was appointed [[Premier of the Republic of China|premier]] just as the [[Battle of Shanghai (1932)]] began. He had frequent disputes with Chiang and would resign in protest several times only to have his resignation rescinded. As a result of these power struggles within the KMT, Wang was forced to spend much of his time in exile. He traveled to Germany, and maintained some contact with [[Adolf Hitler]]. As the leader of the Kuomintang's left-wing faction and a man who had been closely associated with Dr. Sun, Chiang wanted Wang as premier both to protect the "progressive" reputation of his government which was waging a civil war with the Communists and a shield for protecting his government from widespread public criticism of Chiang's policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" (i.e. first defeat the Communists, then confront Japan). Despite the fact that Wang and Chiang disliked and distrusted each other, Chiang was prepared to make compromises to keep Wang on as premier.<ref name="So">{{cite journal|last1=So|first1=Wai Chor|title=The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei|journal=Modern China|date=April 2002|volume=28|issue=2|pages=213–251|doi=10.1177/009770040202800203|s2cid=143785141}}</ref>{{rp|214–215}} In regards to Japan, Wang and Chiang differed in that Wang was extremely pessimistic about China's ability to win the coming war with Japan (which almost everyone in 1930s China regarded as inevitable) and was opposed to alliances with any foreign powers should the war come.<ref name="So" />{{rp|215}}
[[File:Wang Jingwei Time Cover.jpg|left|thumb|Wang Jingwei on a 1935 cover of [[Time (magazine)|Time]] magazine]]
While being opposed to any effort at this time to subordinate China to Japan, Wang also saw the "white powers" like the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States as equal if not greater dangers to China, insisting that China had to defeat Japan solely by its own efforts if the Chinese were to hope to maintain their independence.<ref name="So" />{{rp|234–235}} But at the same time, Wang's belief that China was too economically backward at present to win a war against a Japan which had been aggressively modernizing since the Meiji Restoration of 1867 made him the advocate of avoiding war with Japan at almost any cost and trying to negotiate some sort of an agreement with Japan which would preserve China's independence.<ref name="So" />{{rp|236}} Chiang by contrast believed that if his modernization program was given enough time, China would win the coming war and that if the war came before his modernization plans were complete, he was willing to ally with any foreign power to defeat Japan, even including the Soviet Union, which was supporting the Chinese Communists in the civil war. Chiang was much more of a hardline anti-Communist than was Wang, but Chiang was also a self-proclaimed "realist" who was willing if necessary to have an alliance with the Soviet Union.<ref name="So" />{{rp|215}} Though in the short-run, Wang and Chiang agreed on the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance", in the long-run they differed as Wang was more of an appeaser while Chiang just wanted to buy time to modernize China for the coming war.<ref name="So" />{{rp|237}} The effectiveness of the KMT was constantly hindered by leadership and personal struggles, such as that between Wang and Chiang. In December 1935, Wang permanently left the premiership after being seriously wounded during an assassination attempt engineered a month earlier by [[Wang Yaqiao]].

In 1936, Wang clashed with Chiang over foreign policy. In an ironic role reversal, the left-wing "progressive" Wang argued for accepting the German-Japanese offer of having China sign the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]] while the right-wing "reactionary" Chiang wanted a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.<ref name="So" />{{rp|237–238}} During the 1936 [[Xi'an Incident]], in which Chiang was taken prisoner by his own general, [[Zhang Xueliang]], Wang favored sending a "punitive expedition" to attack Zhang. He was apparently ready to march on Zhang, but Chiang's wife, [[Soong Mei-ling]], and brother-in-law, [[T. V. Soong]], feared that such an action would lead to Chiang's death and his replacement by Wang, so they successfully opposed this action.<ref>Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. ''Zhou Enlai: A Political Life.'' Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. p. 66. Retrieved 12 March 2011.</ref>

Wang accompanied the government on its retreat to [[Chongqing]] during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] (1937–1945). During this time, he organized some right-wing groups along European fascist lines inside the KMT. Wang was originally part of the pro-war group; but, after the Japanese were successful in occupying large areas of coastal China, Wang became known for his pessimistic view on China's chances in the war against Japan.<ref name="Wang1">Cheng, Pei-Kai, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan D. Spence (Eds.) ''The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection'', W.W. Norton and Company. (1999) pp. 330–331. {{ISBN|0-393-97372-7}}.</ref> He often voiced defeatist opinions in KMT staff meetings, and continued to express his view that Western imperialism was the greater danger to China, much to the chagrin of his associates. Wang believed that China needed to reach a negotiated settlement with Japan so that Asia could resist Western Powers.