Editing Timor-Leste Defence Force (section)

=== Pre-independence ===

The F-FDTL was formed from the national liberation movement [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla army]] known as [[FALINTIL]] ([[Portuguese language|Portuguese]] [[acronym]] for ''Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor-Leste'' or Armed Forces for the Liberation of Timor-Leste). During the period before 1999 some East Timorese leaders, including the current President [[José Ramos-Horta]], proposed that a future East Timorese state would not have a military. The widespread violence and destruction that followed the independence referendum in 1999 and the need to provide employment to FALINTIL veterans led to a change in policy.<ref name=Wainwright23>Wainwright (2002), p. 23</ref> The inadequate number of police officers who were deployed to East Timor as part of the United Nations-led peacekeeping force contributed to high rates of crime. The presence of 1,300 armed and increasingly dissatisfied FALINTIL personnel in [[cantonment]]s during late 1999 and most of 2000 also posed a threat to security.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|pp=131–132}} Following the end of Indonesian rule, FALINTIL proposed the establishment of a large military of about 5,000 personnel.<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraph 205.</ref>

In mid-2000 the [[United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor]] (UNTAET) contracted a team from [[King's College London]] to conduct a study of East Timor's security force options and options to demobilise the former guerrilla forces.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=132}} The team's report identified three options for an East Timorese military. Option&nbsp;1 was based on FALINTIL's preference for a relatively large and heavily armed military of 3,000–5,000 personnel, option&nbsp;2 was a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 conscripts and option&nbsp;3 was for a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 volunteer reservists.<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.2 to 7.4</ref> The study team recommended option&nbsp;3 as being best suited to East Timor's security needs and economic situation. This recommendation was accepted by UNTAET in September 2000 and formed the basis of East Timor's defence planning.<ref name=Wainwright23/>{{refn | group = Note | The King's College report estimated that a military of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 reservists would cost approximately one per cent of East Timor's GDP and that this was the highest level of military expenditure the country could sustain.<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.4 and 158.</ref>}} The plan was also accepted by all the countries that had contributed peacekeeping forces to East Timor.<ref>Fawthrop and Harris (2001), p. 37</ref> The King's College report was criticised by [[Greg Sheridan]], foreign editor of ''[[The Australian]]'', on the grounds that it led East Timor to establish a large police force and a large Army when its security needs might have been better met by a single smaller paramilitary force.<ref>{{cite news |first=Greg |last=Sheridan |author-link=Greg Sheridan |title=Fretilin still a stranger to democracy |url=http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/fretilin_still_a_stranger_to_democracy/ |newspaper=[[The Australian]] |date=9 August 2007 |access-date=9 August 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070828232523/http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/fretilin_still_a_stranger_to_democracy |archive-date=28 August 2007  }}</ref>

While East Timor's decision to form a military has been criticised by some commentators,<ref name=Sedra_2010a_5 /> the East Timorese government has consistently believed that the force is necessary for political and security reasons. Critics of the F-FDTL's establishment argue that as East Timor does not face any external threats the government's limited resources would be better spent on strengthening the PNTL. While East Timor's political leadership recognised that the country does not currently face an external threat, they believed that it is necessary to maintain a military capacity to deter future aggression. The establishment of the F-FDTL was also seen as an effective means of integrating FALINTIL into an independent East Timor.<ref>Smith (2005), pp. 31–32</ref>