Editing Speech act (section)

===Illocutionary acts===
The concept of an [[illocutionary act]] is central to the concept of a speech act. Although there are several scholarly opinions regarding how to define 'illocutionary acts', there are some kinds of acts that are widely accepted as illocutionary. Examples of these widely accepted acts are commands or promises.

The first of these opinions is the one held by [[John L. Austin]] who coined the term "speech act" in his book ''[[How to Do Things with Words]]'' published posthumously in 1962.<ref name=":0" />  According to Austin's preliminary informal description, the idea of an "illocutionary act" can be captured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we ''do'' something", as when someone issues an order to someone to go by saying "Go!", or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife." (Austin would eventually define the "illocutionary act" in a more exact manner.)

[[John R. Searle]] gave an alternative to Austin's explanation of the illocutionary act saying, a "speech act" is often meant to refer to exactly the same thing as the term illocutionary act. Searle's work on speech acts is understood to further refine Austin's conception. However, some philosophers have pointed out a significant difference between the two conceptions: whereas Austin emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech acts, Searle emphasized a psychological interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.).<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/consciousness-and-language/C57EB3F8CA2E04CB15256B3E8DCE8D79|title=Consciousness and Language by John R. Searle|last=Searle|first=John R.|date=July 2002|publisher=Cambridge Core|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511606366|access-date=2019-03-04|isbn=9780511606366}}</ref>