Editing Soul (section)

===Buddhism===
[[File:The wheel of life, Buddhism Bhavachakra.jpg|thumb|right|[[Bhavachakra]] describing the cycle of ''saṃsāra''; the wheel of life caused by craving to a self, thus giving raise to rebirths in one of the [[Saṃsāra (Buddhism)#Realms of rebirth|six realms of existence]].]]
The concepts of {{tlit|sa|[[anatman]]}} (not-self) is fundamental to [[Buddhism]]. Early Buddhists were suspicious about the spiritual value of a soul. They wanted to clearly reject the notion of a mortal body and eternal soul dualism that [[Jainism]] posited and that lead to ascetics starving themselves to death to free the soul from the mortal prison.<ref>McClelland, N. C. (2018). Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. Ukraine: McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers. p. 17.</ref> From a historical perspective, the doctrine of {{tlit|sa|[[anatman]]}} evolved out of two main philosopico-religious beliefs: eternalism (sassata-''vada'') and annihilationism (''anuyoga'').<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 55.</ref> The eternalists assert the eternity of the soul; ritual purity, [[Deva (Buddhism)|celestial beings]], [[Svarga|heaven]] and [[Naraka|hell]], mortification of the body, etc.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 58.</ref> In contrast, the annihilationists deny the immortality of the soul and believe that the soul only exists as long as the body does.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 58.</ref> Since they believe that the soul dies with the body, they prescribe practising self-indulgence ({{tlit|sa|kamasukhallikanuyoga}}) in order to enjoy pleasures experienced through the senses.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 58.</ref> The Buddha rejects both views and identifies their origins to be caused by two cravings: Desire for immortality drags people to eternalism, when life is pleassurable, while when unpleasant states lead to annihiliation because of the craving for self-discontinuity. Buddha identifies both views as soul-theories, as both identify a self through craving.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. pp. 63–64.</ref>

The idea of an unchanging soul conflicts with the principles of dependent origination and cessation of all of the five aggregates.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 170.</ref> Due to their impermanence, they are considered "empty" or "without essence".<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 170.</ref> Through the lens of impermanence, Buddhists recognize that all phenomena—whether physical or mental—are in a continuous cycle of arising and dissolving, with nothing being permanent, including the perception of a self or soul.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 69.</ref> In Buddhism, the only absolute is ''[[Sunyata|Śūnyatā]]''.<ref>Buddhist Text and Anthropological Society ''Journal of the Buddhist Text and Anthropological Society, Band 5, Teil 1'' The Society, 1897 digitalized: 21. May 2014. p. 1.</ref> The self is a retrospective evaluation of sensual experience. This sensory experience then leads to craving and the formation of the thought "this is mine", whereby creating the notion of a self. <ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 169.</ref> It is this continuity of craving to a self, which gives raise to a new birth. <ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 303.</ref> Buddhists regard the identification of an independent soul with perception as mistaken, since our perception of the world depends on the sense organs.<ref>McClelland, N. C. (2018). Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. McFarland. pp. 16–17.</ref> In the Cetana-sutta, the flow of consciousness maintains the connection between one birth to another,<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 303.</ref> and also determines the conditions of the conceptions into the mother's womb, where they forget about their previous lives.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. pp. 305–308.</ref> The {{tlit|sa|Mahavedalla-sutta}} mentions three modes of self-continuity: sensual self-continuity ({{tlit|sa|kama-bhava}}), fine-material mode ({{tlit|sa|rupa-bhava}}), and immaterial self-continuity ({{tlit|sa|arupa-bhava}}), the latter two take place among those who practise absorption meditations ({{tlit|sa|jhana}}) and become {{tlit|sa|[[Brahmā (Buddhism)|brahmas]]}}.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 295.</ref> 

However, even this transmission consciousness cannot be identified with a soul, for the very possibility of losing consciousness would be inexplicable. Were there a soul, Buddhists would associate it with something entirely devoid of sensibility—yet such an entity would lack any basis for being identified as "me".<ref>McClelland, N. C. (2018). Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. Ukraine: McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers. p. 17.</ref> Another argument against an autonomous soul is that it could will itself to never die or get sick, however, death and sickness happen against the will of inviduals.<ref>Gethin, R. (1998). ''The foundations of Buddhism''. Oxford University Press. p. 137.</ref> The final argument is that, within Buddhist thought, nothing has been identified as unchanging or permanent.<ref>McClelland, N. C. (2018). Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. Ukraine: McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers. p. 17.</ref> Since consciousness too is impermanent, an unchanging soul cannot exist.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 302.</ref><ref>McClelland, N. C. (2018). Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. McFarland. p. 16.</ref> Thus, every individual is a complex interplay of physical and mental phenomena, all dependent on countless conditions; once these phenomena and conditions are removed, no enduring self can be found.<ref>Gethin, R. (1998). ''The foundations of Buddhism''. Oxford University Press. p. 139.</ref>

====Unanswerable question====
The Buddha left [[The unanswerable questions|ten questions unanswered]], one of which concerned the existence of a soul ("Is the soul one thing and the body another?" and "Who is it that is reborn?").<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 298.</ref><ref>Karunadasa, Y. (2015). ''Early Buddhist teachings'' (New ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 143.</ref> This led some people believe that the Buddha only rejected a soul defined through one (or more) of the [[five aggregates]] (''Skandha'').<ref>The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Vereinigtes Königreich, Taylor & Francis, 2017. p. 294.</ref><ref>McClelland, Norman C. Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. Ukraine, McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers, 2018. p. 18.</ref><ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 168.</ref> Another interpretation holds that he remained silent, because the Buddha considered the question irrelevant to the pursuit of enlightenment. Whether he knew the answer remains a matter of debate.<ref>Karunadasa, Y. (2018). ''Early Buddhist teachings'' (New ed.). Simon and Schuster. pp. 153–154.</ref> Yet another view argues that the Buddha remained silent, because the question itself is invalid.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 298.</ref>

Those who argue that the Buddha affirmed a self, independent from body and mind, as proposed by the eternalists or annihilists, argue that the soul is something transcending the five aggregates.<ref>McClelland, Norman C. Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. Ukraine, McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers, 2018. p. 18.</ref><ref>Gowans, C. (2004). Philosophy of the Buddha: An introduction. Routledge. pp. 56; 67–68.</ref> Some Buddhists of the [[Mahayana]] tradition believe that the soul is not absolute, but immortal; the soul cannot die, although influenced by karma, since the soul is unborn and unconditioned.<ref>Buddhist Text and Anthropological Society. ''Journal of the Buddhist Text and Anthropological Society, Band 5, Teil 1''. The Society, 1897, digitalized: 21 May 2014. p. 1.</ref> In support for that view, Christopher Gowan points at Buddhist texts, implying some sort of self, such as references to personal pronouns,<ref>Gowans, Christopher. Philosophy of the Buddha: An introduction. Routledge, 2004. p. 68.</ref> and the need for a self who suffers in order to aim for release in nirvana.<ref>Gowans, Christopher. Philosophy of the Buddha: An introduction. Routledge, 2004. p. 68.</ref> Due to the implicit references in the Buddhist doctrines, Gowan also rejects the view that they are merely conventions of speech,<ref>Gowans, Christopher. Philosophy of the Buddha: An introduction. Routledge, 2004. p. 68.</ref> rather the best way to understand Buddha's teachings coherently would be to distinguishing between a substantial self and an ever changing self beyond the five aggregates.<ref>Gowans, Christopher. Philosophy of the Buddha: An introduction. Routledge, 2004. pp. 72–73.</ref> The Buddha would have rejected the former, but implicitly affirmed the latter.<ref>Gowans, Christopher. Philosophy of the Buddha: An introduction. Routledge, 2004. pp. 72–73.</ref><ref>McClelland, Norman C. Encyclopedia of Reincarnation and Karma. Ukraine, McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers, 2018. p. 18.</ref>

In contrast, others hold that the Buddha remained silent on this matter, because they are invalid questions.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 298.</ref> When asked such a question ("Who is reborn?") the existence of a self is presupposed.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 58.</ref> However, if souls do not exist, noone can be reborn in the first place, and thus, there is no accurate answer to the question.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. p. 58.</ref> This view also disapproves of later responses within traditional Buddhist schools, such as [[Theravada]], who answered the question on identity in paradoxical terms, yet whereby implicitly affirming some sort of Self or soul.<ref>Somaratne, G. A. The Buddha's Teaching: A Buddhistic Analysis. Singapur, Springer Nature Singapore, 2021. pp. 298–299.</ref>

====Two Truths====
In the early Buddhist text ''[[Milinda Panha|Milinda's Questions]]'', the nature of the enduring self is examined through a dialogue between the Greek king Milinda and the monk Nāgasena. When asked about his identity, Nāgasena explains that in truth, there is no Nāgasena, because his name is merely a label. To illustrate his point, he refers to Milinda's chariot and asks whether its essence lies in the axle, the wheels, or the framework. Milinda concedes that the chariot's essence is not found in any single part, but maintains that the term 'chariot' is still meaningful, as it refers to the combination of all its parts.<ref>Palden Gyal and Owen Flanagan The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Vereinigtes Königreich, Taylor & Francis, 2017. pp. 294–295.</ref><ref>Gethin, R. (1998). ''The Foundations of Buddhism''. Oxford University Press. p. 139.</ref> Nāgasena agrees—and adds that this is precisely his point: there is no Nāgasena beyond the five aggregates that constitute him. Like the chariot, the person is a conventional designation applied to a collection of interdependent components.<ref>Gethin, R. (1998). ''The Foundations of Buddhism''. Oxford University Press. p. 139.</ref>

The example of Milinda's chariot relates to the Buddhist [[Two truths doctrine]].<ref>Palden Gyal and Owen Flanagan The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Vereinigtes Königreich, Taylor & Francis, 2017. pp. 294–295.</ref> Accordingly, the conventional truth refers to phenomenal truths of the perceptive world, including persons, but ultimately, they are devoid of essence and independent existence.<ref>Palden Gyal and Owen Flanagan The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Vereinigtes Königreich, Taylor & Francis, 2017. pp. 294–295.</ref> Upon realization of the self as a mere convention, fear of death and attachment to self-permanence would cease, as there is no self to attach to in the first place.<ref>Palden Gyal and Owen Flanagan The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Vereinigtes Königreich, Taylor & Francis, 2017. pp. 294–295.</ref> This interpretation of ''Milinda's Questions'' was also compared to [[David Hume]]'s [[bundle theory]].<ref>Giles, James. "The no-self theory: Hume, Buddhism, and personal identity". Philosophy East and West 43.2 (1993): 175–200.</ref>