Editing Somali Armed Forces (section)

=== 1960 to 1978 ===
{{See also|Ogaden War}}
Just prior to independence in 1960, the [[Trust Territory of Somalia]] established a national army to defend the nascent Somali Republic's borders. A law to that effect was passed on 6 April 1960. Thus the [[Somali Police Force]]'s Mobile Group (Darawishta Poliska or Darawishta) was formed. 12 April 1960 has since been marked as ''Armed Forces Day''.{{sfn|Robinson|2016|p=239}} British Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960 as the [[State of Somaliland]], and the [[Trust Territory of Somalia]] (the former Italian Somaliland) followed suit five days later. On 1 July 1960, the two territories united to form the Somali Republic.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=26}} After independence, the Darawishta merged with the former British [[Somaliland Scouts]] to form the 5,000 strong Somali National Army. The new military's first commander was Colonel [[Daud Abdulle Hirsi]], a former officer in the British military administration's police force, the Somalia Gendarmerie.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=200}} Officers were trained in the United Kingdom, [[Egypt]] and Italy. Despite the social and economic benefits associated with military service, the armed forces began to suffer chronic manpower shortages only a few years after independence.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=206}}

Merging British and Italian Somaliland caused significant controversy. The distribution of power between the two regions and among the major clans in both areas was a bone of contention. In December 1961, a group of British-trained northern non-commissioned [[1961 revolt in Somalia|officers in Hargeisa revolted]] after southern officers took command of their units.<ref>Michael Walls and Steve Kibble, "Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland", Africa Spectrum, 2010.</ref> The rebellion was put down by other northern [[Noncommissioned officer]]s (NCOs), although dissatisfaction in the north lingered.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=27}} Adam notes that in the aftermath of this mutiny, first armed forces commander General [[Daud Abdulle Hirsi]] (Hawiye/Abgaal) placed the most senior northerner, Colonel Mohamed Haji Ainashe, as head of the army in the north.{{sfn|Robinson|2019b|p=424}}

By October 1962 British officials were reporting that there was a Northern Military Zone with its headquarters in Hargeisa, supervising two battalions in Hargisa and [[Burao]], while in the south, Army HQ in Mogadishu supervised four battalions, at Mogadishu, Beletweyne, Galkayo, and [[Baidoa]].{{sfn|Robinson|2019b|p=424-425}} These four battalions plus smaller units were to come under control of a planned Southern Military Zone.

The force was expanded and modernized after the rebellion with the assistance of [[Soviet]] and Cuban advisors. The [[Library of Congress]] wrote in the early 1990s that '[i]n 1962 the Soviet Union agreed to grant a US$32&nbsp;million loan to modernise the Somali army, and expand it to 14,000 personnel. Moscow later increased the amount to US$55&nbsp;million. The Soviet Union, seeking to counter United States influence in the Horn of Africa, made an unconditional loan' and set a 'generous twenty-year repayment schedule.'{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=208}} However other sources date the Somali-Soviet discussions to October 1963 or later, and discuss how the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy tried and failed to get Somalia to accept a Western counteroffer through 1962 and 1963.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Jeffrey Lefebvre|title=The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali–Soviet Arms Deal: Containment and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa|journal=[[Journal of Modern African Studies]]|volume=36|number=4|date=December 1998|pages=632–33}}</ref>{{sfn|Mohamoud|2006|p=109}}

[[File:Somalia Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Somalia's [[Tomb of the Unknown Soldier]]]]
The army was tested in 1964 when the conflict with [[Ethiopian National Defence Forces|Ethiopia]] over the Somali-inhabited [[Ogaden]] erupted into warfare. On 16 June 1963, Somali guerrillas started an insurgency at Hodayo, in eastern Ethiopia, a watering place north of [[Werder, Ethiopia|Werder]], after Ethiopian Emperor [[Haile Selassie]] rejected their demand for self-government in the Ogaden. The Somali government initially refused to support the guerrilla forces, which eventually numbered about 3,000. However, in January 1964, after Ethiopia sent reinforcements to the Ogaden, Somali forces launched ground and air attacks across the border and started providing assistance to the guerrillas. The [[Ethiopian Air Force]] responded with punitive strikes across its southwestern frontier against [[Feerfeer]], northeast of [[Beledweyne]], and [[Galkayo]]. On 6 March 1964, [[Somalia]] and [[Ethiopia]] agreed to a cease-fire. At the end of the month, the two sides signed an accord in [[Khartoum]], [[Sudan]], agreeing to withdraw their troops from the border, cease hostile propaganda, and start peace negotiations. Somalia also terminated its support of the guerrillas.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=201}}

Soviet advisors, among them General [[Vasily Shakhnovich]], began to arrive in 1969. The Institute for Strategic Studies listed Somalia for the first time in its green-covered Military Balance 1970-71, estimating total armed forces at 12,000, of which 10,000 were in the Army and 1,750 in the Air Force.<ref>ISS Military Balance 1970-71, p.51.</ref> General Shakhnovich built a close relationship with Barre, and stayed until 1971. General [[Grigory Borisov]] ([[:ru:Борисов, Григорий Григорьевич]]) served in the same position in 1973–76, writing a book about his experiences.

During the power vacuum that followed the assassination of Somalia's second president, [[Abdirashid Ali Shermarke]], the military staged a coup d'état on 21 October 1969 (the day after Shermarke's funeral) and took over office.<ref>Mohamed Haji Ingiriis (2017) Who Assassinated the Somali President in October 1969? The Cold War, the Clan Connection, or the Coup d’État, African Security, 10:2, 131–154, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2017.1305861</ref> [[Major General]] [[Mohamed Siad Barre]], who had succeeded Hersi as Chief of Army in 1965, was installed as President of the [[Supreme Revolutionary Council (Somalia)|Supreme Revolutionary Council]], the new junta of Somalia.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=36, 200}} The country was renamed the [[Somali Democratic Republic]].

In 1972, the National Security Court, headed by Admiral [[Mohamed Gelle Yusuf]], ordered the execution of Siad Barre's fellow coup instigators, Major General [[Mohamed Aynanshe Guleid]] (who had become the Vice President), Brigadier General [[Salaad Gabeyre Kediye]] and Lieutenant Colonel [[Abdulkadir Dheel]] Abdulle.<ref>{{Cite web |title=SOMALIA: From Finest to Failed State (PART III) |url=http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2010/dec/17095/somalia_from_finest_to_failed_state_part_iii.aspx |access-date=2024-07-10 |website=www.hiiraan.com |language=en-US}}</ref>

Kaplan wrote in 1976:{{sfn|Kaplan|1977|p=315}}
<blockquote>In mid-1976 the military command structure was simple and direct. Major General [[Mohammad Ali Samatar]] was not only commander of the National Army – and therefore commander of the organizationally subordinated navy and air force- but also secretary of state for defence and a vice president of SRC and thus a member of the major decision-making body of the government. Holding the two highest.. posts, he stood alone in the command structure between the army and President Siad, the head of state. When in July 1976 the SRC relinquished its power to the newly appointed SSRP, Samantar retained the portfolio of the Ministry of Defense. The country's real power appeared to be in the SSRP's Politburo, of which Samantar became a vice president. Before the military coup, command channels ran directly from the commander of the National Army to army sector commanders who exercised authority over military forces.. in the field, and [later] combat units had been reorganized along Soviet lines. There is no indication that either the chain of command to lower echelons or the organisation of combat units has changed significantly since the coup.</blockquote>

In July 1976, the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] estimated the army consisted of 22,000 personnel, 6 tank battalions, 9 mechanised infantry battalions, 5 infantry battalions, 2 commando battalions, and 11 artillery battalions (5 anti-aircraft).<ref>IISS Military Balance 1976–77, p.44</ref> Two hundred T-34 and 50 T-54/55 main battle tanks had been estimated to have been delivered. The IISS emphasised that 'spares are short and not all equipment is serviceable.' The U.S. Army ''Area Handbook for Somalia'', 1977 edition, agreed that the army comprised six tank and nine mechanised infantry battalions, but listed no infantry battalions, the two commando battalions, five field artillery, and five anti-aircraft battalions.{{sfn|Kaplan|1977|p=315}}

Three divisions ([[Division 21 (Somalia)|Division 21]], [[Division 54 (Somalia)|Division 54]], and [[Division 60 (Somalia)|Division 60]]) were formed, and later took part in the [[Ogaden War]]. There is evidence that the divisions were formed as early as 1970; [[Mohamud Muse Hersi]] has been listed by somaliaonline.com as commander of the 21st Division from 1970 to 1972,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/showthread.php/41100-Profile-of-new-leaders.Garad-Abdiqani-voices-his-support-Rep-of.-SOOL-SANAG-amp-CAYN |title=Profile of new leaders. Garad Abdiqani voices his support:Rep of. SOOL,SANAG& CAYN |website=Somalia online |access-date=19 March 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130411202933/http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/showthread.php/41100-Profile-of-new-leaders.Garad-Abdiqani-voices-his-support-Rep-of.-SOOL-SANAG-amp-CAYN |archive-date=11 April 2013}}</ref> and [[Muse Hassan Sheikh Sayid Abdulle]] as commander [[26th Division (Somalia)|26th Division]] in 1970–71.

[[File:Damagedsomalitank.jgp.jpg|thumb|left|Somali engineers repair a captured Ethiopian [[T-34 tank|T-34/85 Model 1969 tank]] for use by the [[Western Somali Liberation Front]] in the Ogaden region, March 1978.]]
Under the leadership of General [[Abdullah Mohamed Fadil]], [[Abdullahi Ahmed Irro]] and other senior Somali military officials formulated a plan of attack for what was to become the [[Ogaden War]] in Ethiopia.<ref name="Ahmed">{{cite web |last=Ahmed III |first=Abdul |title=Brothers in Arms Part I |url=http://wardheernews.com/Articles_2011/Oct/29_Brothers_in_Army_abdul.pdf |publisher=WardheerNews |access-date=28 February 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120503221634/http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_2011/Oct/29_Brothers_in_Army_abdul.pdf |archive-date=3 May 2012}}</ref> This was part of a broader effort to unite all of the Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn region into a [[Greater Somalia]] (''Soomaaliweyn'').<ref name="Lewisofssn">{{cite journal |last=Lewis |first=I.M. |author2=The Royal African Society |title=The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism |journal=African Affairs |date=October 1989 |volume=88 |issue=353 |pages=573–579 |jstor=723037 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098217 }}</ref> At the start of the offensive, the SNA consisted of 35,000 soldiers,<ref name="EthSom638">Gebru Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War", p. 638.</ref> and was vastly outnumbered by the Ethiopian forces. Somali national army troops seized the Godey Front on 24 July 1977, after [[Division 60 (Somalia)|Division 60]] defeated the Ethiopian [[4th Infantry Division (Ethiopia)|4th Infantry Division]].<ref name="Urban">{{cite journal |title=Soviet intervention and the Ogaden counter-offensive of 1978 |author=Urban, Mark |journal=The RUSI Journal |year=1983 |volume=128 |issue=2 |pages=42–46 |doi=10.1080/03071848308523524}}</ref> Godey's capture allowed the Somali side to consolidate its hold on the Ogaden, concentrate its forces, and advance further to other regions of Ethiopia.<ref name="Tareke2">Gebru Tareke, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876045 "From Lash to Red Star: The Pitfalls of Counter-Insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980–82", ''Journal of Modern African Studies''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305224928/http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876045 |date=5 March 2016 }}, 40 (2002), p. 471</ref> The invasion reached an abrupt end with the Soviet Union's sudden shift of support to Ethiopia, followed by almost the entire [[Communism|communist]] [[Second World]] siding with the latter. The Soviets halted supplies to Barre's regime and instead increased the distribution of aid, weapons, and training to Ethiopia's newly communist [[Derg]] regime. General [[Vasily Petrov (marshal)|Vasily Petrov]] was assigned to restructure the [[Ethiopian Army]].<ref>{{cite web |last=Lockyer |first=Adam |title=Opposing Foreign Intervention's Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian-Ogaden Civil War, 1976–1980 |url=http://info.newcastle.edu.au/Resources/Schools/Economics%20Politics%20and%20Tourism/APSA%202006/INTLREL/Lockyer,%20Adam.pdf |access-date=28 December 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203040124/http://info.newcastle.edu.au/Resources/Schools/Economics%20Politics%20and%20Tourism/APSA%202006/INTLREL/Lockyer,%20Adam.pdf |archive-date=3 February 2014}}</ref> The Soviets also brought in around 15,000 Cuban troops to assist the Ethiopian military. By 1978, the Somali forces were pushed out of most of the Ogaden, although it would take nearly three more years for the Ethiopian Army to gain full control of Godey.<ref name="Tareke2" />

During the war battalions were succeeded by brigades. "During the war the standard infantry and mechanized infantry unit became the brigade, [numbering] two to four battalions and having a total strength of 1,200 to 2,000."<ref>Nelson, Country Study 1982, 245.</ref> Also following the war, [[Abudwak]] became the base for [[Division 21 (Somalia)|Division 21]].<ref>[http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_51399a.html IRIN Special Report on Central Somalia] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101204083116/http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_51399a.html |date=4 December 2010 }}, 13 May 1999.</ref>