Editing Russo-Japanese War (section)

====A Japanese sphere of influence====
The United States saw Japan as an ally in the U.S.'s quest to control the Pacific and maintain for the U.S. China's "[[Open Door Policy]]." In Autumn 1872, U.S. minister to Japan [[Charles DeLong]] explained to U.S. General [[Charles LeGendre]] that he had been urging the Government of Japan to occupy Taiwan and "civilize" the [[Taiwanese indigenous people]] just as the U.S. had taken over the land of the [[Native Americans in the United States|Native Americans]] and "civilized" them.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 186-188</ref> General LeGendre encouraged the Japanese to declare a Japanese "sphere of influence" modeled on the [[Monroe Doctrine]] that the U.S. had declared for the exclusion of other powers from the [[Western Hemisphere]]. Such a Japanese sphere of influence would be the first time a non-White state would adopt such a policy. The stated aim of the sphere of influence would be to civilize the barbarians of Asia. "Pacify and civilize them if possible, and if not...exterminate them or otherwise deal with them as the United States and England have dealt with the barbarians," LeGendre explained to the Japanese.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 188 citing Robert Eskildsen, ed. "Foreign Adventures and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874 (Nankang, Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academic Sinica, 2005), 209.</ref>

In the years 1869–1873, the ''[[Seikanron]]'' ("Conquer Korea Argument") had bitterly divided the Japanese elite: one faction wanted to conquer Korea immediately, another wanted to wait until Japan was further modernized before embarking on a war to conquer Korea; significantly, no one in the Japanese elite ever accepted the idea that the Koreans had the right to be independent, with only the question of timing dividing the two factions.{{sfn|Storry|1979|p=16}} In much the same way that Europeans used the "backwardness" of African and Asian nations as a reason for why they had to conquer them, for the Japanese elite the "backwardness" of China and Korea was proof of the inferiority of those nations, thus giving the Japanese the "right" to conquer them.<ref name="Storry1979_17">{{harvnb|Storry|1979|p=17}}.</ref>

[[Count]] [[Inoue Kaoru]], the foreign minister, gave a speech in 1887 saying "What we must do is to transform our empire and our people, make the empire like the countries of Europe and our people like the peoples of Europe," going on to say that the Chinese and Koreans had essentially forfeited their right to be independent by not modernizing.{{r|Storry1979_17}} Much of the pressure for an aggressive foreign policy in Japan came from below, with the advocates of a [[Freedom and People's Rights Movement|"people's rights" movement]] calling for an elected parliament also favouring an ultra-nationalist line that took it for granted the Japanese had the "right" to annex Korea, as the "people's rights" movement was led by those who favoured invading Korea in the years 1869–1873.{{r|Storry1979_17}}

As part of the modernization process in Japan, [[Social Darwinism|social Darwinist]] ideas about the "[[survival of the fittest]]" were common from the 1880s onward and many ordinary Japanese resented the heavy taxes imposed by the government to modernize Japan, demanding something tangible like an overseas [[colony]] as a reward for their sacrifices.{{sfn|Storry|1979|pp=18–19}}

Furthermore, the educational system of Meiji Japan was meant to train the schoolboys to be soldiers when they grew up, and as such, Japanese schools indoctrinated their students into ''[[Bushido|Bushidō]]'' ("way of the warrior"), the fierce code of the samurai.{{r|Storry1979_17}} Having indoctrinated the younger generations into ''Bushidō'', the Meiji elite found themselves faced with a people who clamored for war, and regarded diplomacy as a weakness.{{r|Storry1979_17}}