Editing Public choice (section)

=== Modern public choice theory ===
Modern public choice theory uses the basic assumptions, principles, and methods of microeconomics as analytical tools to study and portray the behavior of subjects in political markets and the operation of political markets. Public choice refers to the process of what public goods are provided, how they are provided and distributed, and the corresponding matching rules that are established. Public choice theory expects to study and influence people's public choice processes to maximize their social utility.

Modern public-choice theory, and especially election theory, has been dated to the work of [[Duncan Black]], sometimes called "the founding father of public choice".<ref>Charles K. Rowley (2008). "Duncan Black (1908–1991," ch. 4 in ''Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy'', Springer, p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=3X0HxOHjw8MC&pg=PA83 83.]</ref> In a series of papers from 1948, which culminated in ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'' (1958),<ref>Duncan Black (1958). ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'', 2nd rev. ed, 1998, Springer. [https://www.springer.com/social+sciences/political+science/book/978-0-7923-8110-5 Description] and [https://books.google.com/books?id=CRdnaPy8oB4C&pg=PA1= preview.]</ref> Black outlined a program of unification toward a more general "Theory of Economic and Political Choices" based on common formal methods,<ref>Duncan Black (1950). "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," ''Economic Journal'', 60(239), pp. 506–514 {{JSTOR|2226793}}</ref> developed underlying concepts of what became [[median voter theory]], and rediscovered earlier work on voting theory.<ref name=":0">Duncan Black (1948a). "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, ''Journal of Political Economy'', 56(1), pp.  23–34 {{JSTOR|1825026}} .<br />&nbsp;&nbsp; • _____ (1948b). "The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority," ''Econometrica'',16(3), pp. 245–261  {{JSTOR|1907278}}.<br />&nbsp;&nbsp; • _____  (1969). "Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games," ''American Economic Review'', 59(2), pp. [http://rangevoting.org/BlackCarrollAER2.pdf 206–210.]<br />&nbsp;&nbsp; • _____ (1976). "Partial Justification of the Borda Count," ''Public Choice'', 28(1), pp. [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01718454?LI=true#page-1 1–15].</ref><ref name="Tullock2008"/><ref>Bernard Grofman ([1987] 2008). "Black, Duncan (1908–1991)", ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd Edition. Preview [http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_B000145&edition=current&q=&result_number=1 link].</ref> His work also included the possibility of entirely random outcomes in a voting structure, where the only determinant of an outcome is where a particular motion falls in a given sequence.<ref name=":0" />

[[Kenneth J. Arrow]]'s ''[[Social Choice and Individual Values]]'' (1951) influenced the theory of public choice and election theory. Building on Black's theory, Arrow concluded that in a non-dictatorial setting, no predictable outcome or preference order can be discerned for a set of possible distributions.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Congleton|first=Roger D.|date=2018-06-01|title=Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees|journal=Public Choice|language=en|volume=175|issue=3|pages=229–244|doi=10.1007/s11127-018-0545-1|issn=1573-7101|doi-access=free}}</ref> Among other important works are [[Anthony Downs]]'s ''[[An Economic Theory of Democracy]]'' (1957) and [[Mancur Olson]]'s ''[[The Logic of Collective Action]]'' (1965),<ref name="Olson">Mancur Olson, Jr.  ([1965] 1971). ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'', 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674537514 Description], [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?recid=24500&content=toc Table of Contents], and [https://archive.org/details/logicofcollectiv00olso_0/page/5 preview].</ref> which was fundamental in beginning the study of special interests. In it, Olson raises questions about the nature of groups.<ref name="Olson" /> Concentrated groups' (such as farmers') incentive to act in their own interest paired with a lack of organization of large groups (such as the public as a whole) often results in legislation that benefits a small group rather than the general public.<ref name=":1" />

[[James M. Buchanan]] and [[Gordon Tullock]] coauthored ''[[The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy]]'' (1962), considered one of the landmarks in public choice and [[constitutional economics]]. The book's preface says it is "about the ''political organization"'' of a free society. But its methodology, conceptual apparatus, and analytics "are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the ''economic'' organization of such a society". Buchanan and Tullock formulate a framework of constitutional decision-making and structures that divides decisions into two categories: constitutional decisions and political decisions. Constitutional decisions establish long-standing rules that rarely change and govern the political structure itself. Political decisions take place within and are governed by the structure.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Buchanan|first1=James|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/mpub.7687|title=The Calculus of Consent|last2=Tullock|first2=Gordon|date=1960|publisher=University of Michigan Press|isbn=978-0-472-06100-6|location=Ann Arbor, MI|doi=10.3998/mpub.7687}}</ref> The book also focuses on [[positive economics|positive-economic]] analysis of the development of constitutional democracy in an ethical context of consent. The consent takes the form of a [[compensation principle]] like [[Pareto efficiency]] for making a policy change and unanimity or at least no opposition as a point of departure for social choice.

Somewhat later, [[probabilistic voting theory]] began to displace median voter theory in showing how to find [[Nash equilibria]] in multidimensional space. Peter Coughlin later formalized the theory further.<ref>Peter J. Coughlin (1991). ''Probabilistic Voting Theory'', Cambridge. [http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item1136626/?site_locale=en_GB Description] and chapter-preview [https://books.google.com/books?id=eki8mEYLql8C&pg=PR7=onepage links].</ref>