Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Methodological skepticism ===
[[Methodological skepticism]], also referred to as Cartesian doubt, uses systematic doubt as a method of philosophy.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Malachowski |first1=Alan |title=Methodological scepticism, metaphysics and meaning |journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies |date=1 September 1993 |volume=1 |issue=2 |pages=302–312 |doi=10.1080/09672559308570774 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559308570774 |issn=0967-2559}}</ref> It is motivated by the search for an absolutely [[certain]] foundation of knowledge. The method for finding these foundations is doubt: only that which is indubitable can serve this role.<ref name="VeryShortIntro">{{cite book |last1=Williamson |first1=Timothy |title=1. Introduction |date=2020 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-184724-0 |url=https://www.veryshortintroductions.com/view/10.1093/actrade/9780198810001.001.0001/actrade-9780198810001-chapter-1}}</ref><ref name="MeinerMethode"/> While this approach has been influential, it has also received various criticisms. One problem is that it has proven very difficult to find such absolutely certain claims if the doubt is applied in its most radical form.<ref name="VeryShortIntro"/> Another is that while absolute certainty may be desirable, it is by no means necessary for knowledge. In this sense, it excludes too much and seems to be unwarranted and arbitrary, since it is not clear why very certain theorems justified by strong arguments should be abandoned just because they are not absolutely certain. This can be seen in relation to the insights discovered by the empirical sciences, which have proven very useful even though they are not indubitable.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/>