Editing Pax Americana (section)

== Postwar period ==
[[File:Superpower map 1945.png|240px|thumb|A world map of 1945 with three superpowers: the United States (in blue), the [[Soviet Union]] (in red), and the [[British Empire]] (in teal).]]

The modern ''Pax Americana'' era is cited by supporters and critics of [[Foreign relations of the United States|U.S. foreign policy]] after World War II. From 1945 to 1991, it was a partial international order, as it applied only to the [[Western world]], being preferable for some authors to speak about a ''Pax Americana et Sovietica''.<ref>Ibañez Muñoz, Josep, "El desafío a la Pax americana: del 11 de septiembre a la guerra de Irak" in C. García and A. J. Rodrigo (eds) "El imperio inviable. El orden internacional tras el conflicto de Irak", Madrid: Tecnos, 2004.</ref> Many commentators and critics focus on American policies from 1992 to the present, and as such, it carries different connotations depending on the context. For example, it appears three times in the 90-page document, ''[[Project for the New American Century#Rebuilding America's Defenses|Rebuilding America's Defenses]],''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf |title=Rebuilding America's Defenses Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century |publisher=Newamericancentury.org |access-date=July 29, 2014 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020923154604/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2002 }}</ref> by the [[Project for the New American Century]], but is also used by critics to characterize American dominance and hyperpower status as imperialist in function and basis. From about the mid-1940s until 1991, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the [[Cold War]], and characterized by its significant international military presence and greater diplomatic involvement. Seeking an alternative to the isolationist policies pursued after World War I, the United States defined a new policy called [[containment]] to oppose the spread of Soviet [[communism]].

The modern ''Pax Americana'' may be seen as similar to the period of peace in [[Roman Empire|Rome]], ''[[Pax Romana]]''. In both situations, the period of peace was 'relative peace'.  During both ''Pax Romana'' and ''Pax Americana'' wars continued to occur, but it was still a prosperous time for both Western and Roman civilizations. It is important to note that during these periods, and most other times of relative tranquility, the peace that is referred to does not mean complete peace.  Rather, it simply means the civilization prospered in their military, agriculture, trade, and manufacturing.

=== ''Pax Britannica'' heritage ===
{{Main|Pax Britannica}}

From the end of the [[Napoleonic Wars]] in 1815 until the [[First World War]] in 1914, the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] played the role of [[Offshore balancing|offshore-balancer]] in Europe, where the [[Balance of power in international relations|balance of power]] was the main aim. It was also in this time that the British Empire became the largest empire of all time.  The global superiority of [[British Armed Forces|British military]] and commerce was guaranteed by dominance of a Europe lacking in strong [[nation-state]]s, and the presence of the [[Royal Navy]] on all of the world's oceans and seas. In 1905, the [[Royal Navy]] was superior to any two navies combined in the world. It provided services such as suppression of [[piracy]] and [[slavery]]. 

In this era of peace, though, there were several wars between the major powers: the [[Crimean War]], the [[Second Italian War of Independence|Franco-Austrian War]], the [[Austro-Prussian War]], the [[Franco-Prussian War]], and the [[Russo-Japanese War]], as well as numerous other wars. [[William Wohlforth]] has argued that this period of tranquility, sometimes termed ''[[La Belle Époque]]'', was actually a series of hegemonic states imposing a peaceful order. In Wohlforth's view, ''Pax Britannica'' transitioned to ''[[Pax Russica]]'' and then to ''Pax Germanica'', before ultimately, between 1853 and 1871, ceasing to be a ''Pax'' of any kind.<ref name="Unipolar World 1999 p 39">{{Cite journal| jstor =2539346| title=The Stability of a Unipolar World| last1=Wohlforth| first1=William C.| journal=International Security|year=1999| volume=24| issue=1| pages=5–41| doi=10.1162/016228899560031| s2cid=57568539}} p. 39.</ref>

During the ''Pax Britannica'', America developed close ties with Britain, evolving into what has become known as a "[[Special Relationship|special relationship]]" between the two. The many commonalities shared with the two nations (such as language and history) drew them together as allies. Under the managed transition of the British Empire to the [[Commonwealth of Nations]], members of the [[Government of the United Kingdom|British government]], such as [[Harold Macmillan]], liked to think of [[United Kingdom–United States relations|Britain's relationship with America]] as similar to that of a progenitor [[Ancient Greece|Greece]] to America's [[Ancient Rome|Rome]].<ref>[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3581313/Labours-love-in-with-America-is-nothing-new.html Labour's love-in with America is nothing new] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201007042000/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3581313/Labours-love-in-with-America-is-nothing-new.html |date=October 7, 2020 }} [[Daily Telegraph]] September 6, 2002</ref> Throughout the years, both have been active in North American, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. In 1942, [[Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy]] envisaged that the United States may have to supplant the British Empire. Therefore, the United States "must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a Pax Americana".<ref>Cited in Michio Kaku and David Axelrod, ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', Boston: South End Press, 1987, p. 64.</ref>

=== Late 20th century ===
{{Main|American Century}}
{{See also|History of the United States (1945–1964)|History of the United States (1964–1980)}}

After the Second World War, no [[War|armed conflict]] emerged among major Western nations themselves, and no [[nuclear weapon]]s were used in open conflict.  The United Nations was also soon developed after World War II to help keep peaceful relations between nations and establishing the veto power for the permanent members of the [[UN Security Council]], which included the United States.

In the second half of the 20th century, the [[USSR]] and US superpowers were engaged in the [[Cold War]], which can be seen as a struggle between hegemonies for global dominance. After 1945, the United States enjoyed an advantageous position with respect to the rest of the industrialized world. In the [[Post–World War II economic expansion]], the US was responsible for half of global industrial output, held 80 percent of the world's gold reserves, and was the world's sole [[list of countries with nuclear weapons|nuclear power]]. The catastrophic destruction of life, infrastructure, and capital during the Second World War had exhausted the imperialism of the [[Old World]], victor and vanquished alike. The largest economy in the world at the time, the United States recognized that it had come out of the war with its domestic infrastructure virtually unscathed and its [[United States Armed Forces|military forces]] at unprecedented strength. Military officials recognized the fact that Pax Americana had been reliant on the effective United States [[air power]], just as the instrument of Pax Britannica a century earlier was its [[Command of the sea|sea power]].<ref>Futrell, Robert Frank, "Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960". DIANE Publishing, 1989. [https://books.google.com/books?id=kps2EhXM-lwC&pg=PA239 p. 239].</ref> In addition, a ''[[Unipolarity#Unipolarity|unipolar moment]]'' was seen to have occurred following the [[Collapse of the Soviet Union (1985–1991)#Dissolution of the USSR|collapse]] of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Cronin, Patrick P. From Globalism to Regionalism: New Perspectives on US Foreign and Defense Policies. [Washington, D.C.]: [National Defense Univ. Press], 1993. [https://books.google.com/books?id=RQ-jjUbxveUC&pg=PA213 p. 213] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170330180233/https://books.google.com/books?id=RQ-jjUbxveUC&pg=PA213 |date=March 30, 2017 }}.</ref>

The term ''Pax Americana'' was explicitly used by [[John F. Kennedy]] in the 1960s, who advocated against the idea, arguing that the Soviet bloc was composed of human beings with the same individual goals as Americans and that such a peace based on "American weapons of war" was undesirable:

<blockquote>I have, therefore, chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth too rarely perceived. And that is the most important topic on earth: peace. What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of a peace do we seek? Not a ''Pax Americana'' enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, and the kind that enables men and nations to grow, and to hope, and build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.<ref>{{cite web |author=Michael E. Eidenmuller |url=https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html |title=Commencement Address American University |publisher=Americanrhetoric.com |date=1963-06-10 |access-date=2014-07-29 |archive-date=2021-05-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210502155545/https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html |url-status=live }}</ref></blockquote>

Nor other US Presidents claimed Pax Americana. As Kennedy, Richard Nixon and George Bush the senior referred to Pax Americana but exclusively to deny its existence in fact and intent. For this reason, the concept was called "undiplomatic".<ref>Sargent, J. Daniel (2018). "Pax Americana: Sketches for an undiplomatic history," lecture at the 132nd Annual Meeting. (Washington DC: American Historical Society), p 4-5, https://escholarship.org/content/qt00t9n3s7/qt00t9n3s7_noSplash_637ebc3588bd11ebd8c2d0ec2c66890b.pdf?t=pbaa2e</ref>

Beginning around the [[Vietnam War]], the 'Pax Americana' term had started to be used by the critics of [[American Imperialism]]. Here in the late 20th-century conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the charge of ''[[Neocolonialism]]'' was often aimed at Western involvement in the affairs of the [[Third World]] and other developing nations.<ref>{{Cite book|doi = 10.1017/CBO9780511895449.009|chapter = Soviet new thinking on national liberation movements: Continuity and change|title = Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition|year = 1992|last1 = Chenoy|first1 = Anuradha M.|pages = 145–160|isbn = 9780521413657|editor1-last = Kanet|editor1-first = Roger E|editor2-last = Miner|editor2-first = Deborah N|editor3-last = Resler|editor3-first = Tamara J}} See especially pp. 149–50 of the internal definitions of neocolonialism in soviet bloc academia.</ref><ref>Rosemary Radford Ruether. Christianity and Social Systems: Historical Constructions and Ethical Challenges. Rowman & Littlefield, (2008) {{ISBN|0-7425-4643-8}}  p. 138: "Neocolonialism means that European powers and the United States no longer rule dependent territories directly through their occupying troops and imperial bureaucracy. Rather, they control the area's resources indirectly through business corporations and the financial lending institutions they dominate..."</ref><ref>Yumna Siddiqi. Anxieties of Empire and the Fiction of Intrigue. Columbia University Press, (2007) {{ISBN|0-231-13808-3}} pp. 123–24 giving the classical definition limited to US and European colonial powers.</ref><ref>Thomas R. Shannon. An introduction to the world-system perspective. Second Edition. Westview Press, (1996) {{ISBN|0-8133-2452-1}} pp. 94–95 classicially defined as a capitalist phenomenon.</ref><ref>William H. Blanchard. Neocolonialism American style, 1960–2000. Greenwood Publishing Group, (1996) {{ISBN|0-313-30013-5}}  pp. 3–12, definition p. 7.</ref> [[NATO]] became regarded as a symbol of ''Pax Americana'' in West Europe:

{{quote|The visible political symbol of the Pax Americana was NATO itself … The Supreme Allied Commander, always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors.<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 24911288|title = Western Europe in 'The American Century': A Retrospective View|last1 = Kaplan|first1 = Lawrence S.|journal = Diplomatic History|year = 1982|volume = 6|issue = 2|pages = 111–123|doi = 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1982.tb00367.x}} p. 115.</ref>}}

In one of the first criticisms of "Pax Americana" in 1943 [[Nathaniel Peffer]] wrote:

{{quote|It is neither feasible nor desirable&nbsp;... Pax Americana can be established and maintained only by force, only by means of a new, gigantic imperialism operating with the instrumentalities of militarism and the other concomitants of imperialism&nbsp;... The way to dominion is through empire and the price of dominion is empire, and empire generates its own opposition.<ref name=Peffer1943>{{Cite journal|jstor=2144425|title=America's Place in the Post-War World|last1=Peffer|first1=Nathaniel|journal=Political Science Quarterly|year=1943|volume=58|issue=1|pages=11–24|doi=10.2307/2144425}} pp. 12, 14–15.</ref>}}

He did not know if it would happen: "It is conceivable that&nbsp;... America might drift into empire, imperceptibly, stage by stage, in a kind of power-politics gravitation." He also noted that America was heading precisely in that direction: "That there are certain stirrings in this direction is apparent, though how deep they go is unclear."<ref name=Peffer1943/>

The depth soon became clarified. Two later critics of ''Pax Americana'', [[Michio Kaku]] and [[David Axelrod (political consultant)|David Axelrod]], interpreted the outcome of Pax Americana: "[[Gunboat diplomacy]] would be replaced by Atomic diplomacy. ''[[Pax Britannica]]'' would give way to ''Pax Americana''." After the war, with the German and British militaries in tatters, only one force stood on the way to Pax Americana: the [[Soviet Army]].<ref name="To Win a Nuclear War, p 64">''To Win a Nuclear War'', ''op. cit.'', p. 64.</ref> Four years after this criticism was written, the Red Army withdrew, paving the way for the [[Unipolarity#Unipolarity|unipolar moment]]. [[Joshua Muravchik]] commemorated the event by titling his 1991 article, "At Last, Pax Americana". He detailed:

{{quote|Last but not least, the Gulf War marks the dawning of the Pax Americana. True, that term was used immediately after World War II. But it was a misnomer then because the Soviet empire—a real competitor with American power—was born at the same moment. The result was not a "pax" of any kind, but a cold war and a bipolar world&nbsp;... During the past two years, however, Soviet power has imploded and a bipolar world has become unipolar.<ref>Joshua Muravchick, "[https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/24/opinion/at-last-pax-americana.html At Last, Pax Americana] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180716054000/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/24/opinion/at-last-pax-americana.html |date=2018-07-16 }}", ''The New York Times'' (January 24, 1991)</ref>}}

The following year, in 1992, a US strategic draft for the post-Cold War period was leaked to the press. The person responsible for the confusion, former Assistant Secretary of State, [[Paul Wolfowitz]], confessed seven years later: "In 1992 a draft memo prepared by my office at the Pentagon&nbsp;... leaked to the press and sparked a major controversy." The draft's strategy aimed "to prevent any hostile power from dominating" a Eurasian region "whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power". He added: "Senator [[Joe Biden|Joseph Biden]] ridiculed the proposed strategy as 'literally a ''Pax Americana''&nbsp;... It won't work&nbsp;...' Just seven years later, many of these same critics seem quite comfortable with the idea of a ''Pax Americana''."<ref>{{Cite journal|url = https://nationalinterest.org/article/remembering-the-future-855|jstor = 42897259|title = Remembering the Future|last1 = Wolfowitz|first1 = Paul|journal = The National Interest|year = 2000|issue = 59|pages = 35–45|access-date = October 3, 2020|archive-date = April 22, 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210422001232/https://nationalinterest.org/article/remembering-the-future-855|url-status = live}} p. 36.</ref> The post-Cold War period, concluded [[William Wohlforth]], much less ambiguously deserves to be called ''Pax Americana''. "Calling the current period the true Pax Americana may offend some, but it reflects reality".<ref name="Unipolar World 1999 p 39" />

=== Contemporary power ===
{{Main|Great power|Superpower}}
{{See also|History of the United States (1980–1991)|History of the United States (1991–2016)|History of the United States (2016–present)}}
[[File:American bases worldwide.svg|thumb|280px|Countries with a [[United States military deployments|U.S. military presence]] or which allow the U.S. military use of its facilities]]

Currently,{{when|date=April 2025|reason=Wikipedia articles can last for generations, and are undated and have no author. Words like "currently" are meaningless in this genre}} the ''Pax Americana'' is based on the military preponderance beyond challenge by any combination of powers and projection of power throughout the world's ''commons''—neutral sea, air and space. This projection is coordinated by the [[Unified Command Plan]] which divides the world on regional branches controlled by a single command. The "right to command," translated into Latin, gives ''imperium'', “commands” (plural) ''imperia''.<ref>Max Ostrovsky, (2018). ''Military Globalization: Geography, Strategy, Weaponry'', (New York: Edwin Mellen Press), p 247, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/247/mode/2up?q=command&view=theater</ref> The US Combatant Commanders have often been associated with the Roman proconsuls<ref>Kaplan, Lawrence (1982). "Western Europe in 'The American Century,'" ''Diplomatic History'', vol 6 (2), p 115.</ref><ref>Cohen, Eliot A. (2004), "History and the hyperpower," ''Foreign Affairs'', vol 83 (4): p 60.</ref><ref>Ferguson, Niall (2005). ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire''. (New York: Penguin Books), p 17.</ref><ref>^Bischoff, Guenter (2009). "Empire discourses: The 'American Empire' in decline?" ''Kurswechsel'', vol 2: p 18.</ref> and a complete book was devoted to the comparison.<ref>Cranes, Lord (2012). ''Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today''. (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 6.</ref>

Integrated with it are global network of military alliances (the [[Rio Pact]], NATO, [[ANZUS]] and bilateral alliances with Japan and several other states) coordinated by Washington in a hub-and-spokes system and worldwide network of several hundreds of military bases and installations. Neither the Rio Treaty, nor NATO, for [[Robert J. Art]], "was a regional collective security organization; rather both were regional imperia run and operated by the United States".<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor=2539339|title=Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement|last1=Art|first1=Robert J.|journal=International Security|year=1998|volume=23|issue=3|pages=79–113|doi=10.2307/2539339}} p. 102.</ref> Former Security Advisor [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] drew an expressive summary of the military foundation of ''Pax Americana'' shortly after the ''[[New world order (politics)|unipolar moment]]'':

{{quote|In contrast [to the earlier empires], the scope and pervasiveness of American global power today are unique. Not only does the United States control all the world's oceans, its military legions are firmly perched on the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia&nbsp;... American vassals and tributaries, some yearning to be embraced by even more formal ties to Washington, dot the entire Eurasian continent&nbsp;... American global supremacy is&nbsp;... buttered by an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that literally span the globe.<ref>[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], ''[[The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives]]'', (Perseus Books, New York, 1997, p. 23).</ref> }}

Besides the military foundation, there are significant non-military international institutions backed by American financing and diplomacy (like the United Nations and [[WTO]]). The United States invested heavily in programs such as the [[Marshall Plan]] and in the reconstruction of Japan, economically cementing defense ties that owed increasingly to the establishment of the [[Iron Curtain]]/[[Eastern Bloc]] and the widening of the [[Cold War]].

[[File:Antiimperialismo caracas.jpg|thumb|Street art in [[Caracas]], depicting [[Uncle Sam]] and accusing the American government of [[imperialism]]]]

Being in the best position to take advantage of [[free trade]], culturally indisposed to traditional empires, and alarmed by the rise of [[communism]] in China and the detonation of the first Soviet [[atom bomb]], the historically [[Noninterventionism|non-interventionist]] US also took a keen interest in developing multilateral institutions which would maintain a favorable world order among them. The [[International Monetary Fund]] and [[International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]] (World Bank), part of the [[Bretton Woods system]] of [[international financial system|international financial management]] was developed and, until the early 1970s, the existence of a [[fixed exchange rate]] to the US dollar. The [[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]] (GATT) was developed and consists of a protocol for normalization and reduction of trade [[tariff]]s.

With [[revolutions of 1989|the fall of the Iron Curtain]], the demise of the notion of a ''[[Pax Sovietica]]'', and the end of the [[Cold War]], the US maintained significant contingents of armed forces in Europe and East Asia. The institutions behind the Pax Americana and the rise of the United States unipolar power have persisted into the early 21st century. The ability of the United States to act as "the world's policeman" has been constrained by its own citizens' historic aversion to foreign wars.<ref>Westerfield, H. Bradford. ''The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy''. New York: Crowell, 1963. p. 138. (''cf''. "the traditional American aversion to foreign wars, but also related to some recent disillusionment with the fruits of total wars&nbsp;...")</ref> Though there have been calls for the continuation of military leadership, as stated in "Rebuilding America's Defenses":

<blockquote>The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable, and durable. It has, over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time; even a global ''Pax Americana'' will not preserve itself. [... What is required is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.<ref name=RAD2000>{{Cite news
 |title       = Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century
 |url         = http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
 |date        = September 2000
 |access-date  = May 30, 2007
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20090104053418/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
 |archive-date = 4 January 2009
 |url-status     = usurped
}}</ref></blockquote>

This is reflected in the research of [[American exceptionalism]], which shows that "there is some indication for [being a leader of an 'American peace'] among the [US] public, but very little evidence of [[unilateral]] attitudes".<ref name="politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de" /> Resentments have arisen at a country's dependence on American military protection, due to disagreements with United States foreign policy or the presence of American military forces.

In the ''[[post-communism]]'' world of the 21st-century, the French Socialist politician and former Foreign Minister [[Hubert Védrine]] describes the US as a hegemonic hyperpower, while the US political scientists [[John Mearsheimer]] counter that the US is not a "true" hegemony, because it does not have the resources to impose a proper, formal, global rule; despite its political and military strength, the US is economically equal to Europe, thus, cannot rule the international stage. Several other countries are either emerging or re-emerging as powers, such as China, Russia, India, and the [[European Union]].

In 1998, American political author, Charles A. Kupchan, described the world order "After Pax Americana"<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor=2539379|title=After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity|last1=Kupchan|first1=Charles A.|journal=International Security|year=1998|volume=23|issue=2|pages=40–79|doi=10.1162/isec.23.2.40|s2cid=57569142}}</ref> and the next year "The Life after Pax Americana".<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 40209641|title = Life after Pax Americana|last1 = Kupchan|first1 = Charles A.|journal = World Policy Journal|year = 1999|volume = 16|issue = 3|pages = 20–27}}</ref> In 2003, he announced "The End of the American Era".<ref>Charles Kupchan, ''The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century'', New York: Vintage Books, 2003.</ref> In 2012, he projected: "America's military strength will remain as central to global stability in the years ahead as it has been in the past."<ref>Charles Kupchan, "[http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/grand-strategy-the-four-pillars-of-the-future/ Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220224094758/https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/grand-strategy-the-four-pillars-of-the-future/ |date=2022-02-24 }}", ''Democracy Journal'', 23, Winter 2012</ref>

The Russian analyst [[Leonid Grinin]] argues that at present and in the nearest future ''Pax Americana''  will remain an effective tool of supporting the world order since the US concentrates too many leadership functions which no other country is able to take to the full extent. Thus, he warns that the destruction of ''Pax Americana''  will bring critical transformations of the [[World-system]] with unclear consequences.<ref>Grinin, Leonid; Ilyin, Ilya V.; Andreev, Alexey I. 2016. "[http://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/445705/ World Order in the Past, Present, and Future] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171201081057/https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/445705/ |date=2017-12-01 }}". In ''Social Evolution & History''. Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 58–84</ref>

American political analyst [[Ian Bremmer]] argued that with the election of [[Donald Trump]] and the subsequent rise in [[populism]] in the west,<ref>{{Cite web |title=BREMMER: 'The Pax Americana, as of tomorrow, is over' |date=January 19, 2017 |url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/bremmer-pax-americana-tomorrow-over-192927449.html |access-date=April 16, 2022 |publisher=Yahoo! |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Bremner |first=Ian |date=2016-11-21 |title=It really is the end of the world as we know it… |url=https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/it-really-is-the-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it |access-date=April 16, 2022 |website=The Telegraph |via=Eurasia Group}}</ref> as well as US withdrawal from international agreements such as the [[Trans-Pacific Partnership]], [[North American Free Trade Agreement|NAFTA]], and the [[Paris Agreement|Paris Climate Accords]], that the ''Pax Americana'' is over.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cheng |first=Evelyn |date=January 3, 2017 |title='Pax Americana' is over, and that could mean a much more turbulent world: Ian Bremmer |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/03/bremmer-pax-americana-is-over-and-that-means-a-more-turbulent-world.html |access-date=April 16, 2022 |publisher=CNBC |language=en}}</ref>

American writer and academic [[Michael Lind]] stated that the ''Pax Americana'' withstood both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, and "today’s [[Second Cold War]] has strengthened rather than weakened America’s informal empire," at least for now.<ref>{{cite web
|url=https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/2023/09/last-days-pax-americana
|title=The last days of Pax Americana
|access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref>

=== Comparison with Pax Romana ===
Writing in 1945, [[Ludwig Dehio]] remembered that the Germans used the term ''Pax Anglosaxonica'' in a sense of Pax Americana since 1918 and discussed the possibility of a Pax Anglosaxonica as a world-wide counterpart to the Pax Romana.<ref>Ludwig Dehio, ''The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle'', 1945 (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 244.</ref> The United States, Dehio associates on the same page, withdrew to isolation on that occasion. "Rome, too, had taken a long time to understand the significance of her world role." 

With the outbreak of World War II, British Prime Minister, [[Neville Chamberlain]], resolved that England would win the Second World War too as Rome had won the Second Punic War. Hitler disagreed: history has not yet determined who shall play Rome and who shall play Carthage in this case.<ref>Hitler, Adolf (September 3, 1939). ''The Complete Hitler Speeches and Proclamations 1932 1945''. (tr. Domarus, Max, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1997), p 1787, 1872, https://archive.org/details/the-complete-hitler-speeches-and-proclamations-1932-1945_202409/page/1787/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> The War fast took a clear turn towards what the contemporary Germans feared as the fatal ''Pax Anglosaxonica''. In 1943, Hitler tried to encourage his team: “They will never become Rome. America will never be the Rome of the future.”<ref>Hitler, Adolf (1942-45). ''Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences, 1942-1945''. (tr. Heiber, Helmut & Glantz, David. New York: Enigma Books, 2002), p 92, https://archive.org/details/hitler-and-his-generals-1942-1945/page/92/mode/2up</ref> The same year, however, Hitler's compatriot and the founder of the [[Paneuropean Union]], [[Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi]], whom Hitler called "cosmopolitan bastard,"<ref>Hitler, Adolf (1928). ''[[Secret Book]]''. (ed. Taylor, Telford, tr. Attanasio, Salvator, New York: Grove Press, 1962), p 107.</ref> projected a new "Pax Romana" based on the preponderant US air power:

{{quote|During the third century BC the Mediterranean world was divided on five great powers—Roma and Carthage, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. The balance of power led to a series of wars until Rome emerged the queen of the Mediterranean and established an incomparable era of two centuries of peace and progress, the 'Pax Romana'&nbsp;... It may be that America's air power could again assure our world, now much smaller than the Mediterranean at that period, two hundred years of peace&nbsp;... This is the only realistic hope for a lasting peace.<ref>''Crusade for Pan-Europe'' (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), pp. 299–304.</ref>}}

Soon many scholars found that what Coudenhove-Kalergi called the "only realistic hope for peace" is coming true. In the mid-1960s, some scholars concluded that the United States had outstripped the Soviet Union beyond the bipolar model and instead looked to the model of Rome.<ref>Bull, Hedley (1977). ''The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics''. (London: Macmillan), p 201.</ref> One of those scholars, George Liska, argued that historical superstates in general and the Roman Empire in particular rather than the recent colonial empires have relevance for the contemporary US foreign policy.<ref>Liska, George (1967). ''Imperial American: The International Politics of Primacy''. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,), p 9-10, 23.</ref> Prefacing his ''Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire'' in 1976,<ref>(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p XII, https://archive.org/details/grandstrategyofr0000lutt/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Pentagon employee [[Edward Luttwak]] stressed that the United States pursues similar to Rome goals, faces a similar kind of resistance, and hence must apply a similar strategy. In the late 1990s,<ref>Elliot, Justin (4 April 2008). “Don’t know much about history: The Pentagon looks back to four great empires for tip on how to rule the world,”  ‘’Global Policy Forum’’, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155-history/26017.html</ref> Pentagon initiated new research on “military advantage in history” and how to keep it. Of four empires they selected, Rome was emphasized as the most relevant model for the contemporary United States.<ref>Herman, Mark et al (2002). “Military advantage in history,” [[Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center]]. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), chapter 6, p 81-82, https://www.motherjones.com/wp-content/uploads/legacy/news/featurex/2008/07/military-advantage-in-history.pdf</ref> The "whole bunch" of copies went out to the government.<ref>Elliot, Justin (4 April 2008). “Don’t know much about history: The Pentagon looks back to four great empires for tip on how to rule the world,”  ‘’Global Policy Forum’’, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155-history/26017.html</ref> A decade later, former [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] employee, Carnes Lord, compared US combatant commanders, Roman proconsuls, British colonial officials, Persian [[Satrap|satraps]] and Spanish [[Viceroy|viceroys]]. He found the American version most similar to the Roman proconsular model.<ref>Lord, Cranes (2012). ''Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today''. (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2, 6.</ref>

[[Joseph Nye]] titled his 2002 article "The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians".<ref>{{Cite magazine |title=The new Rome meets the new barbarians |url=https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2002/03/21/the-new-rome-meets-the-new-barbarians |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613|last=Nye|first= Joseph|date= March 21, 2002|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190915234602/https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2002/03/21/the-new-rome-meets-the-new-barbarians|archive-date=September 15, 2019 }}</ref> His book of the same year he opens: "Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others."<ref>''The Paradox of American Power'', (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002).</ref> And his 1991 book he titled ''Bound to Lead''.<ref>''Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power'' (Basic Books, 1991).</ref> ''Leadership'', translated into Greek, renders ''[[hegemony]]''; an alternative translation is ''archia'' – Greek common word for ''empire''. Decline, he writes, is not necessarily imminent. "Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power&nbsp;...<ref>"[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-11-01/future-american-power The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220122032/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-11-01/future-american-power |date=December 20, 2016 }}", ''Foreign Affairs'' (November–December 2010).</ref>

The ‘’''Pax Americana''’’ motif and its Roman parallel reached their peak in the context of the 2003 [[Iraq War]]. Comparing the United States to the Roman Empire has become somewhat of a cliché.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 9.</ref> [[Jonathan Freedland]] observed:

{{Quote|Of course, enemies of the United States have shaken their fist at its "imperialism" for decades&nbsp;... What is more surprising, and much newer, is that the notion of an American empire has suddenly become a live debate inside the United States&nbsp; Accelerated by the post-9/11 debate on America's role in the world, the idea of the United States as a 21st-century Rome is gaining a foothold in the country's consciousness.<ref>"[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment Rome, AD&nbsp;... Rome, DC] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161022165503/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment |date=2016-10-22 }}", ''The Guardian'' (September 18, 2002)</ref>}}

<!-- [[WP:NFCC]] violation: [[File:Ave Bush.gif|thumbnail|left|Ave Bush! The article in the culture section of the Italian newspaper ''La Stampa'' featured the banner headline "Ave Bush" ("Hail Bush") in large type and depicted George W. Bush behind his presidential podium, index finger pointing, next to a photo of the ''prima porta'' statue of the emperor Augustus.]] -->

''[[The New York Review of Books]]'' illustrated a 2002 piece on US might with a drawing of George Bush togged up as a [[Roman centurion]], complete with shield and spears.<ref>[[Ronald Dworkin]], "[http://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0891/0192/products/d561dcf238a6043d82261585af83865b_2048x2048.gif?v=1448134567 The Threat to Patriotism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161224164357/http://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0891/0192/products/d561dcf238a6043d82261585af83865b_2048x2048.gif?v=1448134567 |date=2016-12-24 }}", ''The New York Review of Books'' (February 28, 2002)</ref> Bush's visits to Germany in 2002 and 2006 resulted in further Bush-as-Roman-emperor invective appearing in the German press. In 2006, freelance writer, political satirist, and correspondent for the left-leaning ''[[Die Tageszeitung]]'', Arno Frank, compared the spectacle of the visit by ''[[Imperator]]'' Bush to "elaborate inspection tours of Roman emperors in important but not completely pacified provinces—such as [[Germania]]".<ref>Cited in {{Cite journal | doi=10.1007/s12138-013-0320-0|title = Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010|year = 2013|last1 = Burton|first1 = Paul J.|journal = International Journal of the Classical Tradition|volume = 20|issue = 1–2|pages = 15–40|s2cid = 162321437}}</ref> In September 2002, Boston's [[WBUR-FM]] radio station titled a special on US imperial power with the tag "''Pax Americana''".<ref>Jonathan Freedland, "[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment Rome, AD&nbsp;... Rome, DC] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161022165503/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/18/usa.comment |date=2016-10-22 }}", ''The Guardian'' (September 18, 2002)</ref> "The Roman parallel", wrote [[Niall Ferguson]] in 2005,<ref>''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire'' (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 14.</ref> "is in danger of becoming something of a cliché." The phrase "American Empire" appeared in one thousand news stories over a single six-month period in 2003.<ref>Julian Go, ''Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present'' (New York: Cambridge University Press,  2011), p. 2.</ref> A 2009 [[Google search]] yielded policy analyst [[Vaclav Smil]] 22 million hits for "America as a new Rome", and 23 million for "American Empire." Intrigued, Smil titled his 2010 book by what he intended to explain: ''Why America Is Not a New Rome''.<ref>{{Cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=jkhTtZbdc4sC|title = Why America is Not a New Rome|isbn = 9780262288293|last1 = Smil|first1 = Vaclav|date = 2010|publisher = The MIT Press|location = Massachusetts|page = XI-XII}}</ref> The very phenomenon of the Roman-American association became the subject of research for Classicist Paul J. Burton.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1007/s12138-013-0320-0|title = Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010|year = 2013|last1 = Burton|first1 = Paul J.|journal = International Journal of the Classical Tradition|volume = 20|issue = 1–2|pages = 15–40|s2cid = 162321437}}</ref>

In fact, there are striking parallels with the early ''Pax Romana'' (especially between 189 BC when the supremacy over the Mediterranean was won and the first annexation in 168 BC). By contrast to other empires, the early ''Pax Romana'' did not impose regular taxation on other states.<ref>Sands, Perry Cooper (1975). ''The Client Princes unde the Republic''. (New York: Amo Press), p 127-128, 152-155.</ref><ref>[[John North (historian)|North, John A]]. (1981). "The development of Roman imperialism," ''Journal of Roman Studies'', vol 71: p 2.</ref> The first good evidence of such a taxation comes from Judea as late as 64 BC.<ref>[[Andrew Lintott|Lintott, Andrew]] (1993). ''Imperium Romanum''. (London: Routeledge), p 35.</ref> Client states made irregular military or economic contributions in case of the hegemonic campaigns, as is the case under the ''Pax Americana''.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2006). ''The Hyperbola of the World Order''. (Lanham: University Press of America), p 225.</ref>

Formally, client states remained independent and very seldom were called "clients". The latter term became widely used only in the late medieval period. Usually, other states were called "friends and allies"—a popular expression under the ''Pax Americana''. [[Arnold J. Toynbee]] stressed the similarity of the US alliances with the [[Client kingdoms in ancient Rome|Roman client system]]<ref>Toynbee, Arnold (1962). ''America and the World Revolution''. (New York: Oxford University Press), p 105-106, https://archive.org/details/americaworldrevo0000toyn/page/104/mode/2up?view=theater&q=annexation</ref> and [[Ronald Steel]] cited Toynbee’s parallel at length in his book, titled ''Pax Americana''.<ref>Steel, Ronald (1967). ''Pax Americana''. (New York: Viking Press), p 17, https://archive.org/details/paxamericana0000stee/page/16/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Peter Bender, in his 2003 article "America: The New Roman Empire",<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/S0030-4387(02)00180-1|title = America: The New Roman Empire?|year = 2003|last1 = Bender|first1 = Peter|journal = Orbis|volume = 47|pages = 145–159}}</ref> summarized: "When politicians or professors are in need of a historical comparison in order to illustrate the United States' incredible might, they almost always think of the Roman Empire."<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 145.</ref> The article abounds with analogies:

{{ordered list|"When they later extended their power to overseas territories, they shied away from assuming direct control wherever possible." In the Hellenistic world, Rome withdrew its legions after three wars and instead settled for a role of all-powerful patron and arbitrator.<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 147.</ref>
|The factor for the overseas engagement is the same in both cases: the seas or oceans ceased to offer protection, or so it seemed.
{{quote|Rome and America both expanded in order to achieve security. Like concentric circles, each circle in need of security demanded the occupation of the next larger circle. The Romans made their way around the Mediterranean, driven from one challenger to their security to the next. The struggles&nbsp;... brought the Americans to Europe and East Asia; the Americans soon wound up all over the globe, driven from one attempt at containment to the next. The boundaries between security and power politics gradually blurred. The Romans and Americans both eventually found themselves in a geographical and political position that they had not originally desired, but which they then gladly accepted and firmly maintained.<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", pp. 148, 151.</ref>}}
|"Both claimed the unlimited right to render their enemies permanently harmless." Postwar treatments of Carthage, Macedon, Germany and Japan are similar.<ref name="America p 152">"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 152.</ref>
|"They became protective lords after each act of assistance provided to other states; in effect, they offered protection and gained control. The protected were mistaken when they assumed that they could use Rome or America to their own ends without suffering a partial loss of their sovereignty."<ref name="America p 152" />
|"World powers without rivals are a class unto themselves. They&nbsp;... are quick to call loyal followers friends, or amicus populi Romani. They no longer know any foes, just rebels, terrorists, and rogue states. They no longer fight, merely punish. They no longer wage wars but merely create peace. They are honestly outraged when vassals fail to act as vassals."<ref>"America: The New Roman Empire", p. 155.</ref> [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] comments on the latter analogy: "One is tempted to add, they do not invade other countries, they only liberate."<ref>''The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership'' (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 216.</ref>}}

Another book completely devoted to the comparison between Rome and the United States is ''The Empires of Trust'' by Roman Historian [[Thomas F. Madden]].<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult).</ref> Madden outlines numerous parallels, such as beginning of both Empires as frontier societies and following isolationist policy, their later pattern of defensive imperialism, or allying other states rather than conquering them. Besides causes and patterns, he devotes much attention to the analogous results of Pax Romana and Pax Americana. The elimination of external threat leads to decline in internal social harmony. 

Civil strife erupted in Rome and led to the fall of the Republic. The new and bitter disputes that erupted among the Romans were a by-product of Pax which paradoxically bears fierce internal divisions. The Romans remained a closely knit group so long as they continued to have powerful outside enemies — so long as the collective focus of their lives was the defense and preservation of their society.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 234, 237, 239.</ref>

The powerful outside enemies were eliminated by 146 BC. And in 133 BC, violence broke on the [[Capitoline Hill]] in Rome. For the first time, the people did not defer to the Senate. And perhaps not anymore. Law was dispensed with and blood began to flow. Romans were killing Romans.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 230, 233-234, 238-239.</ref>

Both classics<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 239-245.</ref> and modern historians stressed the absent external threat as the factor of civil wars in the 1st century BC followed by the fall of the Republic. But Madden seems to be the first scholar to apply the thesis to the United States: “Do the same dangers await America?”<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 250.</ref> Writing before the [[January 6 United States Capitol attack|2021 Capitol attack]], he reflects: 
{{quote|
[[Capitoline Hill|Capitol Hill]] was the city's highest and most revered of the seven hills that made up Rome. Of course, [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] has a [[Capitol Hill]] too, named after the Roman one, and which has seen its own share of political fights. But not like this… No blood has yet flowed on America's Capitol Hill, but the Pax Americana is still young.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 230, 234.</ref>}}
In 146 BC, thirteen years before the first outbreak of civil violence, Rome had eliminated two more external threats (from Carthage and Greece). The United States lost its last grave (Soviet) external threat in 1991. Supposing that we might be in the Roman sequence, where 146 BC corresponds to AD 1991, Madden asks whether the United States has reached the level of Pax that Rome had achieved by 146 BC.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 201.</ref> His estimation is either yes or very close,<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 210.</ref> but either way external threats will remain too small to wield the pre-1991 national unity.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 250.</ref>

Thus, America is likely to repeat the Roman sequence and, though writing before 2020, he finds that indeed since 1991 the Americans, like the Romans since 146 BC, have been losing their internal harmony. Without external threats, he says, it is not surprising that we can detect the same turn inward in the United States as well. The dynamics that had bound Americans so closely together gave way to those that bound them together into smaller groups, such as red states and blue states.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 238, 250.</ref>

Political rivalries under the Pax Romana became fierce — so fierce that they undermined the fabric of the Republic. The Roman experience suggests that a republic cannot survive such a turmoil. But it was neither the Empire that was at stake, nor the Pax Romana that it brought. Those would remain secure for centuries. It was, instead, the republican form of government that fell. Hence, in worst case, Pax Americana would continue under imperial government.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 250.</ref>