Editing Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (section)

===Early efforts===
In 1945, Britain and Canada made an early call for international discussions on the control of atomic power, anticipating the global implications of nuclear technology. At the time, the U.S. had not yet developed a cohesive policy or strategy regarding nuclear weapons. [[Vannevar Bush]], who had been instrumental in initiating and overseeing the [[Manhattan Project]], sought to leverage this moment to advance his long-term goal of banning nuclear weapons production, despite the project's role in developing them. As a first step in this direction, Bush proposed an international agency dedicated to nuclear control.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=56}} Bush unsuccessfully argued in 1952 that the US pursue a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union before testing its first thermonuclear weapon,{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=450}} but his interest in international controls was echoed in the 1946 [[Acheson–Lilienthal Report]], which had been commissioned by President [[Harry S. Truman]] to help construct US nuclear weapons policy. [[J. Robert Oppenheimer]], who had led [[Los Alamos National Laboratory]] during the Manhattan Project, exerted significant influence over the report, particularly in its recommendation of an international body that would control production of and research on the world's supply of [[uranium]] and [[thorium]]. A version of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was presented to the [[United Nations Atomic Energy Commission]] (UNAEC) as the [[Baruch Plan]] in June 1946. The Baruch Plan proposed that an International Atomic Development Authority would control all research on and material and equipment involved in the production of atomic energy.<ref name="rydell">{{cite web|url=https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/LookingbackBaruch|title=Looking Back: Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan That Refused to Go Away|date=1 June 2006|publisher=Arms Control Association|access-date=11 August 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=7}} Though [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], then the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army]], was not a significant figure in the Truman administration on nuclear questions, he did support Truman's nuclear control policy, including the Baruch Plan's provision for an international control agency, provided that the control system was accompanied by "a system of free and complete inspection."{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=12–14}}

[[File:Ivy Mike (Eniwetok-Atoll - 31. Oktober 1952).jpg|thumb|250px|The [[Ivy Mike]] test of 1952, an early thermonuclear detonation]] The Soviet Union dismissed the Baruch Plan as a US attempt to secure its nuclear dominance, and called for the US to halt weapons production and release technical information on its program. The Acheson–Lilienthal paper and Baruch Plan would serve as the basis for US policy into the 1950s. Between 1947 and 1954, the US and Soviet Union discussed their demands within the United Nations Commission for Conventional Disarmament. A series of events in 1954, including the Castle Bravo test and spread of fallout from a Soviet test over Japan, redirected the international discussion on nuclear policy. Additionally, by 1954, both US and Soviet Union had assembled large nuclear stockpiles, reducing hopes of complete disarmament.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|pp=57–58}} In the early years of the [[Cold War]], the US approach to nuclear control reflected a strain between an interest in controlling nuclear weapons and a belief that dominance in the nuclear arena, particularly given the size of Soviet conventional forces, was critical to US security. Interest in nuclear control and efforts to stall proliferation of weapons to other states grew as the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities increased.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=5–7}}

====After Castle Bravo: 1954–1958====
In 1954, just weeks after the [[Castle Bravo]] test, Indian Prime Minister [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] made the first public call for a "standstill agreement" on nuclear testing. Nehru viewed a testing moratorium as a crucial first step toward broader and more comprehensive arms control agreements, reflecting his commitment to nuclear disarmament and global peace.<ref name=bravo/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=247}} In the same year, the [[Labour Party (UK)|British Labour Party]], then led by [[Clement Attlee]], called on the UN to ban testing of thermonuclear weapons.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=58}} 1955 marks the beginning of test-ban negotiations, as Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] first proposed talks on the subject in February 1955.{{sfn|Rhodes|2008|p=72}}{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=121}} On 10 May 1955, the Soviet Union proposed a test ban before the UN Disarmament Commission's "Committee of Five" (Britain, [[Canada]], [[France]], the Soviet Union, and the US). This proposal, which closely reflected a prior Anglo-French proposal, was initially part of a comprehensive disarmament proposal meant to reduce conventional arms levels and eliminate nuclear weapons. Despite the closeness of the Soviet proposal to earlier Western proposals, the US reversed its position on the provisions and rejected the Soviet offer "in the absence of more general control agreements," including limits on the production of [[fissionable material]] and protections against a [[pre-emptive nuclear strike|surprise nuclear strike]].<ref name=statedept/> The May 1955 proposal is now seen as evidence of Khrushchev's "new approach" to foreign policy, as Khrushchev sought to mend relations with the West. The proposal would serve as the basis of the Soviet negotiating position through 1957.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|pp=91–93}}

Eisenhower had supported nuclear testing after [[World War II]]. In 1947, he rejected arguments by [[Stafford L. Warren]], the Manhattan Project's chief physician, concerning the detrimental health effects of atmospheric testing, agreeing instead with [[James Bryant Conant]], a chemist and participant in the Manhattan Project, who was skeptical of Warren's then-theoretical claims.{{clarify|what exactly was the difference of opinion and how did Bravo change all that? Project 4.1 had yet to be finalized som medical evidence was lacking|date=October 2016}} Warren's arguments were lent credence in the scientific community and public by the Castle Bravo test of 1954.{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=10–11}} Eisenhower, as president, first explicitly expressed interest in a comprehensive test ban that year, arguing before the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], "We could put [the Russians] on the spot if we accepted a moratorium&nbsp;... Everybody seems to think that we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not miss any chance to make clear our peaceful objectives."<ref name=nsarchive/> Then-Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] had responded skeptically to the limited arms-control suggestion of Nehru, whose proposal for a test ban was discarded by the National Security Council for being "not practical."{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=247}}<ref name=macdonald/> [[Harold Stassen]], Eisenhower's special assistant for disarmament, argued that the US should prioritize a test ban as a first step towards comprehensive arms control, conditional on the Soviet Union accepting on-site inspections, over full disarmament. Stassen's suggestion was dismissed by others in the administration over fears that the Soviet Union would be able to conduct secret tests.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=305}} On the advice of Dulles, [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] (AEC) chairman [[Lewis Strauss]], and Secretary of Defense [[Charles Erwin Wilson]], Eisenhower rejected the idea of considering a test ban outside general disarmament efforts.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=61}} During the [[1952 United States presidential election|1952]] and [[1956 United States presidential election|1956]] presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger [[Adlai Stevenson II|Adlai Stevenson]], who ran in large part on support for a test ban.{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=7}}

[[File:Eisenhower and Strauss.jpg|left|thumb|[[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and [[Lewis Strauss|Strauss]] discuss [[Operation Castle]], 1954]]
The British governments of 1954–58 (under [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservatives]] [[Winston Churchill]], [[Anthony Eden]], and [[Harold Macmillan]]) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the [[85th United States Congress|US Congress]] approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested [[Operation Grapple|its first hydrogen bombs]].{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=7}} In their view, testing was necessary if the UK nuclear program were to continue to develop. This opposition was tempered by concern that resistance to a test ban might lead the US and Soviet Union to pursue an agreement without Britain having any say in the matter.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=112}}

Members of the Soviet [[military–industrial complex]] also opposed a test ban, though some scientists, including [[Igor Kurchatov]], were supportive of antinuclear efforts.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=248}} France, which was in the midst of developing its own nuclear weapon, also firmly opposed a test ban in the late 1950s.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|p=457}}

The proliferation of thermonuclear weapons coincided with a rise in public concern about [[nuclear fallout]] debris contaminating food sources, particularly the threat of high levels of [[strontium-90]] in milk (see the [[Baby Tooth Survey]]). This survey was a scientist and citizen led campaign which used "modern media advocacy techniques to communicate complex issues" to inform public discourse.<ref name=E.Gerl>{{cite journal |last1=Gerl |first1=Ellen |title=Scientist-citizen advocacy in the atomic age: A case study of the Baby Tooth Survey, 1958–1963 |journal=PRism |date=2014 |volume=11 |issue=1 |url=https://www.prismjournal.org/uploads/1/2/5/6/125661607/v11-no1-a1.pdf |access-date=21 June 2019}}</ref> Its research findings confirmed a significant build-up of strontium-90 in bones of babies<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Reiss |first1=L. Z. |title=Strontium-90 Absorption by Deciduous Teeth: Analysis of teeth provides a practicable method of monitoring strontium-90 uptake by human populations |journal=Science |date=24 November 1961 |volume=134 |issue=3491 |pages=1669–1673 |doi=10.1126/science.134.3491.1669 |pmid=14491339}}</ref> and helped galvanise public support for a ban on atmospheric nuclear testing in the US.<ref name=E.Gerl/> [[Lewis Strauss]] and [[Edward Teller]], dubbed the "father of the hydrogen bomb,"<ref>{{cite web|url=https://news.stanford.edu/news/2003/september24/tellerobit-924.html |title=Edward Teller, 'Father of the Hydrogen Bomb,' is dead at 95 |author=Joel N. Shurkin |date=24 September 2003 |publisher=Stanford University |access-date=1 January 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170101154627/http://news.stanford.edu/news/2003/september24/tellerobit-924.html |archive-date=1 January 2017}}</ref> both sought to tamp down on these fears, arguing that fallout [at the dose levels of US exposure] were fairly harmless and that a test ban would enable the Soviet Union to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities. Teller also suggested that testing was necessary to develop nuclear weapons that produced less fallout.{{Dubious|date=April 2019}} Support in the US public for a test ban to continue to grow from 20% in 1954 to 63% by 1957. Moreover, widespread antinuclear protests were organized and led by theologian and [[Nobel Peace Prize]] laureate [[Albert Schweitzer]], whose appeals were endorsed by [[Pope Pius XII]], and [[Linus Pauling]], the latter of whom organized an anti-test petition signed by more than 9,000 scientists across 43 countries (including the infirm and elderly [[Albert Einstein]]).{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=8}}{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=31}}

The AEC would eventually concede, as well, that even low levels of radiation were harmful.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=305}}{{better source needed|date=October 2016}} It was a combination of rising public support for a test ban and the shock of the 1957 Soviet ''[[Sputnik]]'' launch that encouraged Eisenhower to take steps towards a test ban in 1958.<ref name=macdonald/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=247–249, 305}}

There was also increased environmental concern in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, Soviet scientists began taking regular radiation readings near [[Leningrad]], [[Moscow]], and [[Odessa]] and collected data on the prevalence of strontium-90, which indicated that strontium-90 levels in western Russia approximately matched those in the eastern US. Rising Soviet concern was punctuated in September 1957 by the [[Kyshtym disaster]], which forced the evacuation of 10,000 people after an explosion at a nuclear plant. Around the same time, 219 Soviet scientists signed Pauling's antinuclear petition. Soviet political elites did not share the concerns of others in the Soviet Union. However; Kurchatov unsuccessfully called on Khrushchev to halt testing in 1958.{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=31–32}}

On 14 June 1957, following Eisenhower's suggestion that existing detection measures were inadequate to ensure compliance,{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=457–458}} the Soviet Union put forth a plan for a two-to-three-year testing moratorium. The moratorium would be overseen by an international commission reliant on national monitoring stations, but, importantly, would involve no on-the-ground inspections. Eisenhower initially saw the deal as favorable, but eventually came to see otherwise. In particular, Strauss and Teller, as well as [[Ernest Lawrence]] and [[Mark Muir Mills]], protested the offer. At a meeting with Eisenhower in the White House, the group argued that testing was necessary for the US to eventually develop bombs that produced no fallout ("clean bombs"). The group repeated the oft-cited fact, which was supported by [[Freeman Dyson]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.powermag.com/too-dumb-to-meter-part-7/?pagenum=3|title=Too Dumb to Meter, Part 7|date=1 January 2013}}</ref> that the Soviet Union could conduct secret nuclear tests.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=8–9}} In 1958, at the request of Igor Kurchatov, Soviet nuclear physicist and weapons designer [[Andrei Sakharov]] published a pair of widely circulated academic papers challenging the claim of Teller and others that a clean, fallout-free nuclear bomb could be developed, due to the formation of [[carbon-14]] when nuclear devices are detonated in the air. A one-megaton clean bomb, Sakharov estimated, would cause 6,600 deaths over 8,000 years, figures derived largely from estimates on the quantity of [[carbon-14]] generated from atmospheric nitrogen and the contemporary risk models at the time, along with the assumption that the world population is "thirty billion persons" in a few thousand years.<ref name=sakharovpaper>{{cite journal |title=Radioactive carbon from nuclear explosion and nonthreshold biological effects |last=Sakharov |first=Andrei |s2cid=97684558 |author-link=Andrei Sakharov |journal=The Soviet Journal of Atomic Energy |volume=4 |issue=6 |pages=757–762 |date=June 1958|doi=10.1007/BF01515403}}</ref>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=152}}<ref name=aip>{{cite web |title=Nuclear Testing and Conscience, 1957–1963 |publisher=[[American Institute of Physics]] |url=https://www.aip.org/history/exhibits/sakharov/dangers.htm |access-date=11 August 2016 |archive-date=20 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160820053647/https://www.aip.org/history/exhibits/sakharov/dangers.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> In 1961, Sakharov was part of the design team for a 50 megaton "clean bomb", which has become known as the [[Tsar Bomba]], detonated over the island of [[Novaya Zemlya]].<ref name=aip/>

[[File:International Diplomacy.jpg|thumb|[[Harold Macmillan|Macmillan]] (second from left) with [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] in March 1957]]
In the spring of 1957, the US National Security Council had explored including a one-year test moratorium and a "cut-off" of fissionable-material production in a "partial" disarmament plan. The British government, then led by Macmillan, had yet to fully endorse a test ban. Accordingly, it pushed the US to demand that the production cut-off be closely timed with the testing moratorium, betting that the Soviet Union would reject this. London also encouraged the US to delay its disarmament plan, in part by moving the start of the moratorium back to November 1958. At the same time, Macmillan linked British support for a test ban to a revision of the [[Atomic Energy Act of 1946]] (McMahon Act), which prohibited sharing of nuclear information with foreign governments. Eisenhower, eager to mend ties with Britain following the [[Suez Crisis]] of 1956, was receptive to Macmillan's conditions, but the AEC and the congressional [[United States Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy|Joint Committee on Atomic Energy]] were firmly opposed. It was not until after ''Sputnik'' in late 1957 that Eisenhower quickly moved to expand nuclear collaboration with the UK via presidential directives and the establishment of bilateral committees on nuclear matters. In early 1958, Eisenhower publicly stated that amendments to the McMahon Act were a necessary condition of a test ban, framing the policy shift in the context of US commitment to its [[NATO]] allies.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|pp=112–114}}

In August 1957, the US assented to a two-year testing moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union, but required that it be linked to restrictions on the production of fissionable material with military uses, a condition that the Soviet Union rejected.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}} While Eisenhower insisted on linking a test ban to a broader disarmament effort (e.g., the production cut-off), Moscow insisted on independent consideration of a test ban.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=61}}

On 19 September 1957, the US conducted the first contained underground test at the [[Nevada Test Site]], codenamed ''[[Operation Plumbbob#Rainier|Rainier]]''. The ''Rainier'' shot complicated the push for a comprehensive test ban, as underground tests could not be as easily identified as atmospheric tests.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}}

Despite Eisenhower's interest in a deal, his administration was hamstrung by discord among US scientists, technicians, and politicians. At one point, Eisenhower complained that "statecraft was becoming a prisoner of scientists."<ref name=macdonald/>{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=2, 6}} Until 1957, Strauss's AEC (including its Los Alamos and [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory|Livermore]] laboratories) was the dominant voice in the administration on nuclear affairs, with Teller's concerns over detection mechanisms also influencing Eisenhower.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}}{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=249}} Unlike some others within the US scientific community, Strauss fervently advocated against a test ban, arguing that the US must maintain a clear nuclear advantage via regular testing and that the negative environmental impacts of such tests were overstated. Furthermore, Strauss repeatedly emphasized the risk of the Soviet Union violating a ban, a fear Eisenhower shared.{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=5}}

On 7 November 1957, after ''Sputnik'' and under pressure to bring on a dedicated science advisor, Eisenhower created the [[President's Science Advisory Committee]] (PSAC), which had the effect of eroding the AEC's monopoly over scientific advice.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=63}} In stark contrast to the AEC, PSAC promoted a test ban and argued against Strauss's claims concerning its strategic implications and technical feasibility.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}}{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=6–8}} In late 1957, the Soviet Union made a second offer of a three-year moratorium without inspections, but lacking any consensus within his administration, Eisenhower rejected it. In early 1958, the discord within American circles, particularly among scientists, was made clear in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Disarmament, chaired by Senator [[Hubert Humphrey]]. The hearings featured conflicting testimony from the likes of Teller and Linus Pauling, as well as from Harold Stassen, who argued that a test ban could safely be separated from broader disarmament, and AEC members, who argued that a cutoff in nuclear production should precede a test ban.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=10–11}}{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=64}}

====Khrushchev and a moratorium: 1958–1961====
In the summer of 1957, Khrushchev was at acute risk of losing power, as the [[Anti-Party Group]] composed of former [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] allies [[Lazar Kaganovich]], [[Georgy Malenkov]], and [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] launched an attempt to replace Khrushchev as [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary of the Communist Party]] (effectively the leader of the Soviet Union) with [[Nikolai Bulganin]], then the [[Premier of the Soviet Union]]. The attempted ouster, which was foiled in June, was followed by a series of actions by Khrushchev to consolidate power. In October 1957, still feeling vulnerable from Anti-Party Group's ploy, Khrushchev forced out defense minister [[Georgy Zhukov]], cited as "the nation's most powerful military man." On 27 March 1958, Khrushchev forced Bulganin to resign and succeeded him as Premier. Between 1957 and 1960, Khrushchev had his firmest grip on power, with little real opposition.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=361–362, 364–365}}

Khrushchev was personally troubled by the power of nuclear weapons and would later recount that he believed the weapons could never be used. In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev took a keen interest in defense policy and sought to inaugurate an era of [[détente]] with the West. Initial efforts to reach accords, such as on disarmament at the 1955 [[Geneva Summit (1955)|Geneva Summit]], proved fruitless, and Khrushchev saw test-ban negotiations as an opportunity to present the Soviet Union as "both powerful and responsible."{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=347–348, 350, 352}}{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=6}} At the [[20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|20th Communist Party Congress]] in 1956, Khrushchev declared that nuclear war should no longer be seen as "fatalistically inevitable." Simultaneously, however, Khrushchev expanded and advanced the Soviet nuclear arsenal at a cost to conventional Soviet forces (e.g., in early 1960, Khrushchev announced demobilization of 1.2&nbsp;million troops).{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=5–6}}

On 31 March 1958, the [[Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union]] approved a decision to halt nuclear testing, conditional on other nuclear powers doing the same. Khrushchev then called on Eisenhower and Macmillan to join the moratorium. Despite the action being met with widespread praise and an argument from Dulles that the US should reciprocate,{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=64}} Eisenhower dismissed the plan as a "gimmick"; the Soviet Union had just completed a testing series and the US was about to begin [[Operation Hardtack I]], a series of atmospheric, surface-level, and underwater nuclear tests. Eisenhower instead insisted that any moratorium be linked to reduced production of nuclear weapons. In April 1958, the US began Operation Hardtack I as planned.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=457–458}}<ref name="hardtack">{{cite web|url=https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/NTPR/1-Fact_Sheets/20_HARDTACK_I.pdf|title=Operation Hardtack I|date=May 2015|publisher=[[Defense Threat Reduction Agency]]|access-date=6 August 2016|archive-date=19 October 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161019011547/http://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/NTPR/1-Fact_Sheets/20_HARDTACK_I.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=11}} The Soviet declaration concerned the British government, which feared that the moratorium might lead to a test ban before its own testing program was completed.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=114}} Following the Soviet declaration, Eisenhower called for an international meeting of experts to determine proper control and verification measures—an idea first proposed by British [[Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (UK)|Foreign Secretary]] [[Selwyn Lloyd]].<ref name=statedept/>{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=114}}

The advocacy of PSAC, including that of its chairmen [[James Rhyne Killian]] and [[George Kistiakowsky]], was a key factor in Eisenhower's eventual decision to initiate test-ban negotiations in 1958.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=6–8}} In the spring of 1958, chairman Killian and the PSAC staff (namely [[Hans Bethe]] and [[Isidor Isaac Rabi]]) undertook a review of US test-ban policy, determining that a successful system for detecting underground tests could be created. At the recommendation of Dulles (who had recently come to support a test ban),{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}} the review prompted Eisenhower to propose technical negotiations with the Soviet Union, effectively detaching test-ban negotiations from negotiations over a halt to nuclear weapons production (the one-time US demand). In explaining the policy shift, Eisenhower privately said that continued resistance to a test ban would leave the US in a state of "moral isolation."{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=458–459}}

On 8 April 1958, still resisting Khrushchev's call for a moratorium, Eisenhower invited the Soviet Union to join these technical negotiations in the form of a conference on the technical aspects of a test-ban, specifically the technical details of ensuring compliance with a ban. The proposal was, to a degree, a concession to the Soviet Union, as a test ban would be explored independent of the previously demanded cutoff in fissionable-material production. Khrushchev initially declined the invitation, but eventually agreed "in spite of the serious doubts" he had after Eisenhower suggested a technical agreement on verification would be a precursor to a test ban.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=11–12}}

On 1 July 1958, responding to Eisenhower's call, the nuclear powers convened the Conference of Experts in [[Geneva]], aimed at studying means of detecting nuclear tests.<ref name=nsarchive/>{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}} The conference included scientists from the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, and Romania.<ref name=faschron/> The US delegation was led by James Fisk, a member of PSAC, the Soviets by Evgenii Fedorov,{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=78}} and the British delegation by [[William Penney, Baron Penney|William Penney]], who had led the British delegation to the Manhattan Project. Whereas the US approached the conference solely from a technical perspective, Penney was specifically instructed by Macmillan to attempt to achieve a political agreement.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=115}} This difference in approach was reflected in the broader composition of the US and UK teams. US experts were primarily drawn from academia and industry. Fisk was a vice president at [[Bell Telephone Company|Bell Telephone]] Laboratories and was joined by [[Robert Bacher]] and Ernest Lawrence, both physicists who had worked on the Manhattan Project.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}} Conversely, British delegates largely held government positions. The Soviet delegation was composed primarily of academics, though virtually all of them had some link to the Soviet government. The Soviets shared the British goal of achieving an agreement at the conference.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|pp=60–61}}

At particular issue was the ability of sensors to differentiate an underground test from an earthquake. There were four techniques examined: measurement of [[acoustic wave]]s, seismic signals, [[radio wave]]s, and inspection of radioactive debris. The Soviet delegation expressed confidence in each method, while Western experts argued that a more comprehensive compliance system would be necessary.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}

The Conference of Experts was characterized as "highly professional" and productive.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=115}}{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=61}} By the end of August 1958, the experts devised an extensive control program, known as the "Geneva System," involving 160–170 land-based monitoring posts, plus 10 additional sea-based monitors and occasional flights over land following a suspicious event (with the inspection plane being provided and controlled by the state under inspection). The experts determined that such a scheme would be able to detect 90% of underground detonations, accurate to 5 kilotons, and atmospheric tests with a minimum yield of 1 kiloton.<ref name=nsarchive/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=249}}{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}} The US had initially advocated for 650 posts, versus a Soviet proposal of 100–110. The final recommendation was a compromise forged by the British delegation.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=62}} In a widely publicized and well-received communiqué dated 21 August 1958, the conference declared that it "reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up&nbsp;... a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests."{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}

[[File:Hardtack De Baca 001.jpg|thumb|US test detonation (part of [[Operation Hardtack II]]) conducted shortly before the start of the moratorium in 1958]]
The technical findings, released on 30 August 1958 in a report drafted by the Soviet delegation,{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=61}} were endorsed by the US and UK, which proposed that they serve as the basis for test-ban and international-control negotiations. However, the experts' report failed to address precisely who would do the monitoring and when on-site inspections—a US demand and Soviet concern—would be permitted. The experts also deemed detection of outer-space tests (tests more than {{Convert|50|km|mi|sp=us}} above the earth's surface) to be impractical. Additionally, the size of the Geneva System may have rendered it too expensive to be put into effect. The 30 August report, which contained details on these limitations, received significantly less public attention than the 21 August communiqué.<ref name=nsarchive/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=249}}{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=12}}<ref name="faschron"/>

Nevertheless, pleased by the findings, the Eisenhower administration proposed negotiations on a permanent test ban{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=14}} and announced it would self-impose a year-long testing moratorium if Britain and the Soviet Union did the same. This decision amounted to a victory for John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles (then the [[Director of Central Intelligence]]), and PSAC, who had argued within the Eisenhower administration for separating a test ban from larger disarmament efforts, and a defeat for the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and AEC, which had argued to the contrary.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=65}}

In May 1958, Britain had informed the US that it would be willing to join a testing moratorium on 31 October 1958, by which point it would have finished its hydrogen-bomb testing, conditional on the US providing Britain with nuclear information following amendment of the McMahon Act. The US Congress approved amendments permitting greater collaboration in late June.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|pp=114–115, 119}} Following Soviet assent on 30 August 1958 to the one-year moratorium, the three countries conducted a series of tests in September and October. At least 54 tests were conducted by the US and 14 by the Soviet Union in this period. On 31 October 1958 the three countries initiated test-ban negotiations (the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests) and agreed to a temporary moratorium (the Soviet Union joined the moratorium shortly after this date).<ref name=nsarchive/><ref name=macdonald>{{cite journal |title=Eisenhower's Scientists: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Test-Ban Debate 1954–1958 |last=MacDonald |first=Julia M. |journal=[[Foreign Policy Analysis (journal)|Foreign Policy Analysis]] |volume=11 |pages=1–21 |date=2015|doi=10.1111/fpa.12018}}</ref><ref name=faschron>{{cite web |title=Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Chronology |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |url=https://fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htm |access-date=7 August 2016}}</ref><ref name="nti">{{cite news|url=https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-banning-nuclear-test-atmosphere-outer-space-and-under-water-partial-test-ban-treaty-ptbt/|title=Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) (PTBT)|date=26 October 2011|newspaper=[[Nuclear Threat Initiative]]|access-date=31 July 2016}}</ref> The moratorium would last for close to three years.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=15}}

The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests convened in Geneva at Moscow's request (the Western participants had proposed [[New York City]]). The US delegation was led by [[James Jeremiah Wadsworth]], an envoy to the UN, the British by [[David Ormsby-Gore, 5th Baron Harlech|David Ormsby-Gore]], the [[Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (United Kingdom)|Minister of State for Foreign Affairs]], and the Soviets by [[Semyon K. Tsarapkin]], a disarmament expert with experience dating back to the 1946 Baruch Plan. The Geneva Conference began with a Soviet draft treaty grounded in the Geneva System. The three nuclear weapons states (the "original parties") would abide by a test ban, verified by the Geneva System, and work to prevent testing by potential nuclear states (such as France). This was rejected by Anglo-American negotiators due to fears that the verification provisions were too vague and the Geneva System too weak.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=15–16}}

Shortly after the Geneva Conference began in the fall of 1958, Eisenhower faced renewed domestic opposition to a comprehensive test ban as Senator [[Albert Gore Sr.]] argued in a widely circulated letter that a partial ban would be preferable due to Soviet opposition to strong verification measures.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=15}}

The Gore letter did spur some progress in negotiations, as the Soviet Union allowed in late November 1958 for explicit control measures to be included in the text of the drafted treaty. By March 1959, the negotiators had agreed upon seven treaty articles, but they primarily concerned uncontroversial issues and a number of disputes over verification persisted. First, the Soviet verification proposal was deemed by the West to be too reliant on self-inspection, with control posts primarily staffed by citizens of the country housing the posts and a minimal role for officials from the international supervisory body. The West insisted that half of a control post staff be drawn from another nuclear state and half from neutral parties. Second, the Soviet Union required that the international supervisory body, the Control Commission, require unanimity before acting; the West rejected the idea of giving Moscow a veto over the commission's proceedings. Finally, the Soviet Union preferred temporary inspection teams drawn from citizens of the country under inspection, while the West insisted on permanent teams composed of inspectors from the Control Commission.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=15–16}}

Additionally, despite the initial positive response to the Geneva experts' report, data gathered from Hardtack operations of 1958 (namely the underground ''Rainier'' shot) would further complication verification provisions as US scientists, including Hans Bethe (who backed a ban), became convinced that the Geneva findings were too optimistic regarding detection of underground tests, though Macmillan warned that using the data to block progress on a test ban might be perceived in the public as a political ploy.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|pp=118–119}} In early 1959, Wadsworth told Tsarapkin of new US skepticism towards the Geneva System. While the Geneva experts believed the system could detect underground tests down to five kilotons, the US now believed that it could only detect tests down to 20 kilotons (in comparison, the [[Little Boy]] bomb dropped on [[Hiroshima]] had an official yield of 13 kilotons).<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-08819|title=The Yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Explosions|last=Malik|first=John|date=September 1985|publisher=Los Alamos National Laboratory|access-date=12 August 2016}}</ref> As a result, the Geneva detection regime and the number of control posts would have to be significantly expanded, including new posts within the Soviet Union. The Soviets dismissed the US argument as a ruse, suggesting that the Hardtack data had been falsified.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=17}}

In early 1959, a roadblock to an agreement was removed as Macmillan and Eisenhower, over opposition from the Department of Defense, agreed to consider a test ban separately from broader disarmament endeavors.<ref name=statedept/>{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=118}}

On 13 April 1959, facing Soviet opposition to on-site detection systems for underground tests, Eisenhower proposed moving from a single, comprehensive test ban to a graduated agreement where atmospheric tests—those up to 50&nbsp;km (31&nbsp;mi) high, a limit Eisenhower would revise upward in May 1959—would be banned first, with negotiations on underground and outer-space tests continuing. This proposal was turned down on 23 April 1959 by Khrushchev, calling it a "dishonest deal."{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=17}} On 26 August 1959, the US announced it would extend its year-long testing moratorium to the end of 1959, and would not conduct tests after that point without prior warning. The Soviet Union reaffirmed that it would not conduct tests if the US and UK continued to observe a moratorium.<ref name=faschron/>

To break the deadlock over verification, Macmillan proposed a compromise in February 1959 whereby each of the original parties would be subject to a set number of on-site inspections each year. In May 1959, Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed to explore Macmillan's quota proposal, though Eisenhower made further test-ban negotiations conditional on the Soviet Union dropping its Control Commission veto demand and participating in technical discussions on identification of [[high-altitude nuclear explosion]]s. Khrushchev agreed to the latter and was noncommittal on the former.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=17–18}} A working group in Geneva would eventually devise a costly system of 5–6 satellites orbiting at least {{convert|18,000|mi|km|sp=us}} above the earth, though it could not say with certainty that such a system would be able to determine the origin of a high-altitude test. US negotiators also questioned whether high-altitude tests could evade detection via [[radiation shielding]]. Concerning Macmillan's compromise, the Soviet Union privately suggested it would accept a quota of three inspections per year. The US argued that the quota should be set according to scientific necessity (i.e., be set according to the frequency of seismic events).{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=19–20}}

In June 1959, a report of a panel headed by [[Lloyd Berkner]], a physicist, was introduced into discussions by Wadsworth. The report specifically concerned whether the Geneva System could be improved without increasing the number of control posts. Berkner's proposed measures were seen as highly costly and the technical findings themselves were accompanied by a caveat about the panel's high degree of uncertainty given limited data. Around the same time, analysis conducted by the Livermore National Laboratory and [[RAND Corporation]] at Teller's instruction found that the seismic effect of an underground test could be artificially dampened (referred to as "decoupling") to the point that a 300-kiloton detonation would appear in seismic readings as a one-kiloton detonation. These findings were largely affirmed by pro-ban scientists, including Bethe. The third blow to the verification negotiations was provided by a panel chaired by Robert Bacher, which found that even on-site inspections would have serious difficulty determining whether an underground test had been conducted.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=17–19}}

In September 1959, Khrushchev visited the US While the test ban was not a focus on conversations, a positive meeting with Eisenhower at [[Camp David]] eventually led Tsarapkin to propose a technical working group in November 1959 that would consider the issues of on-site inspections and seismic decoupling in the "spirit of Camp David." Within the working group, Soviet delegates allowed for the timing of on-site inspections to be grounded in seismic data, but insisted on conditions that were seen as excessively strict. The Soviets also recognized the theory behind decoupling, but dismissed its practical applications. The working group closed in December with no progress and significant hostility. Eisenhower issued a statement blaming "the recent unwillingness of the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific consideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection of underground nuclear explosions." Eisenhower simultaneously declared that the US would not be held to its testing moratorium when it expired on 31 December 1959, though pledged to not test if Geneva talks progressed. The Soviet Union followed by reiterating its decision to not test as long as Western states did not test.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=20–21}}

In early 1960, Eisenhower indicated his support for a comprehensive test ban conditional on proper monitoring of underground tests.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=504–505}} On 11 February 1960, Wadsworth announced a new US proposal by which only tests deemed verifiable by the Geneva System would be banned, including all atmospheric, underwater, and outer-space tests within detection range. Underground tests measuring more than 4.75 on the [[Richter scale]] would also be barred, subject to revision as research on detection continued. Adopting Macmillan's quota compromise, the US proposed each nuclear state be subject to roughly 20 on-site inspections per year (the precise figure based on the frequency of seismic events).{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=22}}

Tsarapkin responded positively to the US proposal, though was wary of the prospect of allowing underground tests registering below magnitude 4.75. In its own proposal offered 19 March 1960 the Soviet Union accepted most US provisions, with certain amendments. First, the Soviet Union asked that underground tests under magnitude 4.75 be banned for a period of four-to-five years, subject to extension. Second, it sought to prohibit all outer-space tests, whether within detection range or not. Finally, the Soviet Union insisted that the inspection quota be determined on a political basis, not a scientific one. The Soviet offer faced a mixed reception. In the US, Senator Hubert Humphrey and the [[Federation of American Scientists]] (which was typically seen as supportive of a test ban) saw it as a clear step towards an agreement. Conversely, AEC chairman [[John A. McCone]] and Senator [[Clinton Presba Anderson]], chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, argued that the Soviet system would be unable to prevent secret tests. That year, the AEC published a report arguing that the continuing testing moratorium risked "free world supremacy in nuclear weapons," and that renewed testing was critical for further weapons development. The joint committee also held hearings in April which cast doubt on the technical feasibility and cost of the proposed verification measures.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=22–23, 33}} Additionally, Teller continued to warn of the dangerous consequences of a test ban and the Department of Defense (including [[Neil H. McElroy]] and [[Donald A. Quarles]], until recently its top two officials) pushed to continue testing and expand missile stockpiles.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=504–505}}

Shortly after the Soviet proposal, Macmillan met with Eisenhower at Camp David to devise a response. The Anglo-American counterproposal agreed to ban small underground tests (those under magnitude 4.75) on a temporary basis (a duration of roughly 1 year, versus the Soviet proposal of 4–5 years), but this could only happen after verifiable tests had been banned and a seismic research group (the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group) convened. The Soviet Union responded positively to the counterproposal and the research group convened on 11 May 1960. The Soviet Union also offered to keep an underground ban out of the treaty under negotiation. In May 1960, there were high hopes that an agreement would be reached at an upcoming summit of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, and [[Charles de Gaulle]] of France in Paris.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=22–24}}{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=69}}

A test ban seemed particularly close in 1960, with Britain and France in accord with the US (though France conducted its [[Gerboise Bleue|first nuclear test]] in February) and the Soviet Union having largely accepted the Macmillan–Eisenhower proposal. But US-Soviet relations soured after an American [[Lockheed U-2|U-2 spy plane]] was [[1960 U-2 incident|shot down]] in Soviet airspace in May 1960.<ref name=faschron/> The Paris summit was abruptly cancelled and the Soviet Union withdrew from the seismic research group, which subsequently dissolved. Meetings of the Geneva Conference continued until December, but little progress was made as Western-Soviet relations continued to grow more antagonistic through the summer, punctuated by the [[Congo Crisis]] in July and angry exchanges at the UN in September.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=24}} Macmillan would later claim to President [[John F. Kennedy]] that the failure to achieve a test ban in 1960 "was all the fault of the American 'big hole' obsession and the consequent insistence on a wantonly large number of on-site inspections."{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|p=345}}{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=452}}

Eisenhower would leave office with an agreement out of reach, as Eisenhower's technical advisors, upon whom he relied heavily, became mired in the complex technical questions of a test ban, driven in part by a strong interest among American experts to lower the error rate of seismic test detection technology.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=6–8}} Some, including Kistiakowsky, would eventually raise concerns about the ability of inspections and monitors to successfully detect tests.<ref name=fas>{{cite web|title=National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament – Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960, Volume III |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html |access-date=1 August 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305075241/https://fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html |archive-date=5 March 2016}}</ref> The primary product of negotiations under Eisenhower was the testing moratorium without any enforcement mechanism.{{sfn|Gaddis|1982|p=193}} Ultimately, the goal of a comprehensive test ban would be abandoned in favor of a partial ban due to questions over seismic detection of underground tests.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}

Political scientist [[Robert Gilpin]] later argued that Eisenhower faced three camps in the push for a test ban.{{sfn|Gilpin|1962}} The first was the "control" camp, led by figures like Linus Pauling and astronomer [[Harlow Shapley]], which believed that both testing and possession of nuclear weapons was dangerous. Second, there was the "finite containment" camp, populated by scientists like Hans Bethe, which was concerned by perceived Soviet aggression but still believed that a test ban would be workable with adequate verification measures. Third, the "infinite containment" camp, of which Strauss, Teller, and members of the defense establishment were members, believed that any test ban would grant the Soviet Union the ability to conduct secret tests and move ahead in the arms race.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|pp=61–63}}

The degree of Eisenhower's interest in a test ban is a matter of some historical dispute.{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=1}} [[Stephen E. Ambrose]] writes that by early 1960, a test ban had become "the major goal of his Presidency, indeed of his entire career," and would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country."{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|p=504}} Conversely, [[John Lewis Gaddis]] characterizes negotiations of the 1950s as "an embarrassing series of American reversals," suggesting a lack of real US commitment to arms control efforts.{{sfn|Gaddis|1982|pp=192–193}} The historian Robert Divine also attributed the failure to achieve a deal to Eisenhower's "lack of leadership," evidenced by his inability to overcome paralyzing differences among US diplomats, military leaders, national security experts, and scientists on the subject. [[Paul Nitze]] would similarly suggest that Eisenhower never formulated a cohesive test ban policy, noting his ability to "believe in two mutually contradictory and inconsistent propositions at the same time."{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=250}}