Editing Paradigm shift (section)

== Features ==

===Paradigm shifts and progress===
A common misinterpretation of paradigms is the belief that the discovery of paradigm shifts and the dynamic nature of science (with its many opportunities for subjective judgments by scientists) are a case for [[relativism]]:<ref>Sankey, Howard (1997) "Kuhn's ontological relativism," in ''Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific and Philosophical Essays in Honour of Azarya Polikarov'', edited by Dimitri Ginev and Robert S. Cohen. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1997. Boston studies in the philosophy of science, vol. 192, pp. 305–20. {{ISBN|0792344448}}</ref> the view that all kinds of belief systems are equal. Kuhn vehemently denies this interpretation<ref>Thomas Kuhn, ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' (3rd ed.): p. 199.</ref> and states that when a scientific paradigm is replaced by a new one, albeit through a complex social process, the new one is ''always better'', not just different.

===Incommensurability===
These claims of relativism are, however, tied to another claim that Kuhn does at least somewhat endorse: that the language and theories of different paradigms cannot be translated into one another or rationally evaluated against one another—that they are ''incommensurable''. This gave rise to much talk of different peoples and cultures having radically different worldviews or conceptual schemes—so different that whether or not one was better, they could not be understood by one another.

[[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] famously argued against this idea of conceptual relativism, claiming that the notion that any languages or theories could be incommensurable with one another was itself incoherent. If this is correct, Kuhn's claims must be taken in a weaker sense than they often are.<ref>Davidson, D. (1974). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. ''Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association''. '''47''' (1): 5–20.</ref>

Furthermore, the hold of the Kuhnian analysis on [[social science]] has long been tenuous, with the wide application of multi-paradigmatic approaches in order to understand complex human behaviour.<ref>see e.g. {{cite book|author=John Hassard|title=Sociology and Organization Theory: Positivism, Paradigm and Postmodernity|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1993|isbn=0521350344}}</ref>

===Gradualism vs. sudden change===
Paradigm shifts tend to be most dramatic in sciences that appear to be stable and mature, as in physics at the end of the 19th century. At that time, physics seemed to be a discipline filling in the last few details of a largely worked-out system.

In ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', Kuhn wrote, "Successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science" (p.&nbsp;12). Kuhn's idea was itself revolutionary in its time as it caused a major change in the way that academics talk about science. Thus, it could be argued that it caused or was itself part of a "paradigm shift" in the history and sociology of science. However, Kuhn would not recognise such a paradigm shift. In the social sciences, people can still use earlier ideas to discuss the history of science.

Philosophers and historians of science, including Kuhn himself, ultimately accepted a modified version of Kuhn's model, which synthesizes his original view with the gradualist model that preceded it.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Williams |first=Gene |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1132359447 |title=Applied Qualitative Research Design |date=2019 |publisher=EDTECH |isbn=978-1-83947-216-9 |pages=103 |oclc=1132359447}}</ref>