Editing Ontology (section)

=== Being ===
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Being, or [[existence]], is the main topic of ontology. It is one of the most general and fundamental concepts, encompassing all of [[reality]] and every [[entity]] within it.{{efn|When used as a countable noun, ''a being'' is the same as ''an entity''.<ref>{{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=84}}</ref>}} In its broadest sense, being only contrasts with non-being or nothingness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacIntyre|2006|p=527}} | {{harvnb|Jaroszyński|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LtL7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA254 254–255]}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=84}} | {{harvnb|Jacquette|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NmPfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2, 12–13]}} }}</ref> It is controversial whether a more substantial analysis of the concept or meaning of being is possible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacIntyre|2006|pp=528–529}} | {{harvnb|Jacquette|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NmPfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2, 12–13]}} }}</ref> One proposal understands being as a property possessed by every entity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacIntyre|2006|pp=528–529}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§ 2b. Universalism}} }}</ref> Critics argue that a thing without being cannot have properties. This means that properties presuppose being and cannot explain it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§ 1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }}</ref> Another suggestion is that all beings share a set of essential features. According to the '''Eleatic principle''',<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> "power is the mark of being", meaning that only entities with [[Causality|causal]] influence truly exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Campbell|2006|p=22}}</ref> A controversial proposal by philosopher [[George Berkeley]] suggests that all existence is mental. He expressed this [[immaterialism]] in his slogan "to be is to be perceived".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2024|p=280}} | {{harvnb|Deutscher|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IQ0mEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA20 20]}} }}</ref>

Depending on the context, the term ''being'' is sometimes used with a more limited meaning to refer only to certain aspects of reality. In one sense, being is unchanging and permanent, in contrast to becoming, which implies change.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacIntyre|2006|p=527}} | {{harvnb|Zhang|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vl4EEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA220 220]}} | {{harvnb|Hartmann|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4PyJfVZn-rcC&pg=PA46 46–47]}} }}</ref> Another contrast is between being, as what truly exists, and [[Phenomenon|phenomena]], as what appears to exist.<ref>{{harvnb|MacIntyre|2006|p=527}}</ref> In some contexts, being expresses the fact that something is while [[essence]] expresses its [[Quality (philosophy)|qualities]] or what it is like.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=84}} | {{harvnb|Ceylan|1993|p=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20840134 329]}} }}</ref> 

Ontologists often divide being into fundamental classes or highest kinds, called ''[[categories of being]]''.<ref name="Thomasson2022">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=11–12}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Proposed categories include substance, [[Property (philosophy)|property]], [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]], [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]], and [[Event (philosophy)|event]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|pp=23–25}} | {{harvnb|Hoffman|Rosenkrantz|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ngdi0a5o5iYC&pg=PA26 26]}} }}</ref> They can be used to provide systems of categories, which offer a comprehensive inventory of reality in which every entity belongs to exactly one category.<ref name="Thomasson2022"/> Some philosophers, like [[Aristotle]], say that entities belonging to different categories exist in distinct ways. Others, like [[John Duns Scotus]], insist that there are no differences in the mode of being, meaning that [[Univocity of being|everything exists in the same way]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Widder|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tvWqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA32 32–35]}} | {{harvnb|LaZella|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NCqODwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17]}} }}</ref> A related dispute is whether some entities have a higher degree of being than others, an idea already found in [[Plato]]'s work. The more common view in contemporary philosophy is that a thing either exists or not with no intermediary states or degrees.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Daly|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 227–228]}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=5–8}} }}</ref>

The relation between being and non-being is a frequent topic in ontology. Influential issues include the status of [[nonexistent objects]]<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reicher|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/ lead section, §1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object]}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=8}} | {{harvnb|Yao|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NZjOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> and [[Why is there anything at all?|why there is something rather than nothing]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005b|p=277}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §4. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section, §1. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=4–5}}}}</ref>