Editing Nuclear proliferation (section)

==International Cooperation==

===Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons===
{{Main|Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons}}

At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the ''Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons'', more commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the [[People's Republic of China]], [[France]], [[Russian Federation]], the [[United Kingdom|UK]], and the [[United States]].

Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.

===International Atomic Energy Agency===
{{Main|International Atomic Energy Agency}}

The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the [[United Nations General Assembly]] and the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]].

The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter a diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as the UK and the United States through voluntary bodies such as the [[Nuclear Suppliers Group]]. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that [[plutonium]] which is produced by [[nuclear reactor]]s not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.

===Scope of safeguards===
{{See also|Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials}}
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

# Material Accountancy – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records.
# Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.
# Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in [[Iraq]] and [[North Korea]], safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons-grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a [[nuclear reprocessing]] plant to produce some [[weapons-grade plutonium]].

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.

In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.

===Additional Protocol===
In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the [[Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA Board of Governors]] 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an '''Additional Protocol'''. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
* The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and [[thorium]] (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.
* IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
* States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
* Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

As of 3 July 2015, 146 countries have signed the Additional Protocols and 126 have brought them into force.  The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.<ref name=iaea-add-protocols>{{cite web|url=https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol|title=Status of the Additional Protocol|date=11 June 2015|access-date=27 August 2015|archive-date=5 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905104739/https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol|url-status=live}}</ref> Under the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]], [[Nuclear program of Iran|Iran]] has agreed to implement its protocol provisionally.  Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/chronology_2008.html|title=NTI Egypt Profile|access-date=22 November 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081012145648/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/chronology_2008.html|archive-date=12 October 2008|url-status=dead}}</ref> and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12516611|title=When nuclear sheriffs quarrel|date=30 October 2008|newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> but has not ruled out signing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36801.htm|title=Technical Difficulties|website=2001-2009.state.gov|access-date=23 May 2019|archive-date=24 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201024144215/https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36801.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Limitations of safeguards===
{{unreferenced section|date=January 2015}}
The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries that have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive [[nuclear fuel]] cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by [[Australia]] and [[Canada]] for sale of [[uranium]], address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the [[International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA]] to the [[United Nations Security Council]], just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards can help ensure that uranium supplied as nuclear fuel and other nuclear supplies do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear [[electricity]] make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

===Other developments===
The [[Nuclear Suppliers Group]] communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members—the United States, the former USSR, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada and Japan—but now includes 46 countries including all five [[nuclear weapons states]].

The [[International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation]] is an international project involving 25 partner countries, 28 observer and candidate partner countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Generation IV International Forum, and the [[European Commission]]. Its goal is to "[..] provide competitive, commercially-based services as an alternative to a state’s development of costly, proliferation-sensitive facilities, and address other issues associated with the safe and secure management of used fuel and [[radioactive waste]]."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.energy.gov/ne/international-fuel-services-and-commercial-engagement|title=International Fuel Services and Commercial Engagement|website=Energy.gov|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701200628/https://www.energy.gov/ne/international-fuel-services-and-commercial-engagement|url-status=live}}</ref>

According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's ''Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power'', [[tritium]] is not classified as a "special nuclear material" but rather as a by-product. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to [[nuclear disarmament|nuclear disarm]]. This radioactive, super-heavy, [[Isotopes of hydrogen|hydrogen isotope]] is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arms stockpile replacement since the isotope [[Radioactive decay|naturally decays]].

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] of 1996 (not entered into force as of June 2020) and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}}

On 9 August 2005, [[Ayatollah]] [[Ali Khamenei]] issued a [[fatwa]] forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of [[nuclear weapon]]s. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) in Vienna.<ref>{{cite web |author=World War 4 Report |url=http://www.ww4report.com/node/929 |title=Iran issues anti-nuke fatwa &#124; World War 4 Report |date=12 August 2005 |publisher=Ww4report.com |access-date=20 February 2013 |archive-date=14 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130314060908/http://www.ww4report.com/node/929 |url-status=live }}</ref> As of February 2006 [[Iran]] formally announced that [[uranium enrichment]] within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapon research and construction.<ref>{{Cite news | url=http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/03/06/iran.nuclear/index.html | publisher=CNN | title=IAEA chief: Iran deal possible | date=6 March 2006 | access-date=20 May 2010 | archive-date=22 April 2009 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422162401/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/03/06/iran.nuclear/index.html | url-status=live }}</ref>