Editing Monism (section)

== Types ==
[[File:Dualism-vs-Monism.png|thumb|upright=1.36|A diagram with neutral monism compared to Cartesian dualism, physicalism and idealism]]
Different types of monism include:{{sfn|Urmson|1991|p=297}}<ref name=Schaffer>Schaffer, Jonathan, Monism: The Priority of the Whole, http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/monism.pdf</ref>
* [[Substance theory|Substance]] monism, "the view that the apparent plurality of substances is due to different states or appearances of a single substance"{{sfn|Urmson|1991|p=297}}
* Attributive monism, "the view that whatever the number of substances, they are of a single ultimate kind"{{sfn|Urmson|1991|p=297}}
* Epistemological monism, where "ultimately, everything that can be thought, observed and engaged, shares one conceptual system of interaction, however complex."<ref name="Sariel">Sariel, Aviram. "Jonasian Gnosticism." Harvard Theological Review 116.1 (2023): 91-122, here 99.</ref>
* Partial monism, "within a given realm of being (however many there may be) there is only one substance"{{sfn|Urmson|1991|p=297}}
* Existence monism, "the view that there is only one concrete object [[Type–token distinction|token]] (The One, "Τὸ Ἕν" or the [[Monad (philosophy)|Monad]])"<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last=Schaffer |first=Jonathan |title=Monism |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2007 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/monism |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-last=Zalta |edition=Summer 2015}}</ref>
* Priority monism, "the whole is prior to its parts" or "the world has parts, but the parts are dependent fragments of an integrated whole"<ref name="Schaffer" />
* Property monism, "the view that all properties are of a single type (e.g., only physical properties exist)"
* Genus monism, "the doctrine that there is a highest category; e.g., being"<ref name="Schaffer" />

Views contrasting with monism are:
* Metaphysical dualism, which asserts that there are two ultimately irreconcilable substances or realities such as Good and Evil, for example, [[Gnosticism]] and [[Manichaeism]].<ref name="Sariel" />{{sfn|Brugger|1972}}
* [[Metaphysical pluralism]], which asserts three or more fundamental substances or realities.{{sfn|Brugger|1972}}
* [[Metaphysical nihilism]], negates any of the above categories (substances, properties, concrete objects, etc.).

Monism in modern [[philosophy of mind]] can be divided into three broad categories:
* [[Idealist]], mentalistic monism, which holds that only mind or spirit exists.{{sfn|Brugger|1972}}
* [[Neutral monism]], which holds that one sort of thing fundamentally exists,{{sfn|Mandik|2010|p=76}} to which both the mental and the physical can be reduced
* [[Material monism]] (also called [[Physicalism]] and [[materialism]]), which holds that the material world is primary, and consciousness arises through the interaction with the material world<ref>{{Cite book |title=Materialism and Empirio-criticism |last=Lenin |first=Vladimir |publisher=Foreign Languages Publishing House |year=1909 |location=World Socialist Web Site}}</ref>{{sfn|Mandik|2010|p=76}}
* [[Eliminative materialism]], according to which everything is physical and mental things do not exist{{sfn|Mandik|2010|p=76}}
* [[Reductive physicalism]], according to which mental things do exist and are a kind of physical thing{{sfn|Mandik|2010|p=76}}{{refn|group=note|Such as [[Behaviourism]], [[Type-identity theory]] and [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]]}}

Certain positions do not fit easily into the above categories, such as [[functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]], [[anomalous monism]], and [[reflexive monism]]. Moreover, they do not define the meaning of "real".