Editing Mohammad Najibullah (section)

===Minister of State Security: 1980–1985===
In 1980, Najibullah was appointed the head of [[KHAD]], the Afghan equivalent to the Soviet [[KGB]],<ref name="KHADap"/> and was promoted to the rank of [[Major General]].<ref name="MNBIO"/> He was appointed following lobbying from the Soviets, including [[Yuri Andropov]], then [[List of chairmen of the KGB|KGB Chairman]]. During his six years as head of KHAD he had two to four deputies under his command, who in turn were responsible for an estimated 12 departments. According to evidence, Najibullah was dependent on his family and his professional network, and more often than not appointed people he knew to top positions within the KHAD.<ref name="KHADap">{{cite book | author = Dorronsoro, Gilles | title = Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present | publisher = [[C. Hurst & Co|C. Hurst & Co Publishers]] | year = 2005 | isbn = 978-1-85065-703-3 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=3DOuOSYR4PcC&pg=PA178 178] }}</ref> In June 1981, Najibullah, along with [[Mohammad Aslam Watanjar]], a former tank commander and the then [[Ministry of Communications (Afghanistan)|Minister of Communications]] and Major General [[Mohammad Rafi (politician)|Mohammad Rafi]], the [[Ministry of Defence (Afghanistan)|Minister of Defence]] were appointed to the [[Politburo of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA Politburo]].<ref>{{cite book |author1=Weiner, Myron |author2=Banuazizi, Ali | title = The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan | publisher = [[Syracuse University Press]] | year = 1994 | isbn = 978-0-8156-2608-4 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA47 47] }}</ref>

Under Najibullah, KHAD's personnel increased from 120 to 25,000 to 30,000.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Kakar, Hassan |author2=Kakar, Mohammed | title = Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982 | publisher = [[University of California Press]] | year = 1997 | isbn = 978-0-520-20893-3 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA156 156] }}</ref> KHAD employees were amongst the best-paid government bureaucrats in communist Afghanistan, and because of it, the political indoctrination of KHAD officials was a top priority. During a PDPA conference, Najibullah, talking about the indoctrination programme of KHAD officials, said "a weapon in one hand, a book in the other."<ref>{{cite book | author = Amtstutz, J. Bruce | title = Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation | publisher = Diane Publishing | year = 1994 | isbn = 0-7881-1111-6 | page = [https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_RUSNyMH1aFQC/page/n289 266] }}</ref> Counter-insurgency activities launched by KHAD reached its peak under Najibullah.<ref name="MNPP">{{cite book | author = Amtstutz, J. Bruce | title = Afghanistan: Past and Present | publisher = Diane Publishing | year = 1994 | isbn = 0-7881-1111-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=a0Mp1AHpp0gC&pg=PA152 152] }}</ref> He reported directly to the Soviet KGB, and a big part of KHAD's budget came from the Soviet Union itself.<ref>{{cite book | author = Girardet, Edward | title = Afghanistan: The Soviet War | publisher = [[Taylor & Francis]] | year = 1985 | isbn = 978-0-7099-3802-6 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=1c0OAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA124 124] }}</ref> As the head of KHAD, Najibullah was also involved in the planning of the hijacking of [[Pakistan International Airlines Flight 326]] with [[Murtaza Bhutto]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mitrokhin |first=Vasiliy |date=July 2002 |title=The KGB in Afghanistan |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP40-english.pdf |access-date=14 February 2024 |website=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars |page=136}}</ref>

As time would show, Najibullah was very efficient, and during his tenure as leader of KHAD, thousands were arrested, tortured, and executed.<ref name="MNBIO" /> KHAD targeted anti-communist citizens, political opponents, and educated members of society. It was this efficiency which made him interesting to the Soviets.<ref name="MNBIO" /> Because of this, KHAD became known for its ruthlessness. During his ascension to power, several Afghan politicians did not want Najibullah to succeed [[Babrak Karmal]] because Najibullah was known for exploiting his powers for his own benefit. Additionally, during his period as KHAD chief, the Pul-i Charki had become the home of several Khalqist politicians. Another problem was that Najibullah allowed graft, theft, bribery and corruption on a scale not seen previously.<ref>{{cite book | author = [[Rodric Braithwaite|Braithwaite, Rodric]] | title = Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 | publisher = Indo-European Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-60444-002-7 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=guQQKejG3qUC&pg=PA275 275] }}</ref> As would later be proven by the power struggle he had with Karmal after becoming PDPA General Secretary, despite Najibullah heading the KHAD for five years, Karmal still had sizeable support in the parcham faction leading to Najibullah relying more on [[Khalq]]ists.<ref>{{cite book | author = Kalinovsky, Artemy | title = A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan | publisher = [[Harvard University Press]] | year = 2011 | isbn = 978-0-674-05866-8 | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA106 106] }}</ref>