Editing Military dictatorship (section)

=== Factors ===
The military's purpose in a given country may affect whether it attempts to seize power. International opponents may prompt stronger national defense. This makes the military more willing to comply with a [[Civil authority|civilian government]] as the civilian government is likely to provide for the military.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|p=37}} When these opponents are neighboring countries that present territorial threats, however, it can weaken democracy and incentivize the creation of a stronger military. Both of these factors increase the likelihood of a military dictatorship.{{Sfn|Kim|2018|pp=865–866}} All of these factors are aggravated in countries with significant natural resources, as these provide an additional financial incentive for the military to seize power.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|p=37}} Military dictatorships almost universally form in [[peacetime]], with [[Kemalist]] Turkey being the only notable exception by 1980.{{Sfn|Andreski|1980|p=3}} The economic prosperity of a country does not necessarily indicate the likelihood of military dictatorship.{{Sfn|Geddes|Frantz|Wright|2014|p=151}}

The previous form of government is also a factor in whether a military dictatorship forms. [[Democracies]] are most at risk of becoming military dictatorships shortly after their formation. When a new [[democracy]] is formed, the government's institutions are fragile and civil government may not have established control over the military.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=2–3}} This impending civilian control of the military provides further incentive for military officers to seize power in newly-formed democracies.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=36–37}} [[Oligarchies]] prevent military dictatorships by maintaining an equilibrium, keeping the military strong enough to maintain the oligarchy while providing incentives to encourage loyalty.{{Sfn|Acemoglu|Ticchi|Vindigni|2010|pp=2–3}}

The [[risk assessment]] process for military officers considering dictatorial rule is distinct from that of other potential dictators. Military officers engaging in a coup face lower risks compared to other attempts to establish dictatorships, as most officers are typically allowed to retain their positions if the dictatorship does not survive. Only the military dictator and the highest ranking officers face significant risk.{{Sfn|Geddes|Wright|Frantz|2018|p=207}} Instead, officers in professionalized militaries will consider the risk to the military in its entirety rather than their individual risk, as institutional risk is much higher.{{Sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|p=59}}

Some factors can mitigate the chance of a military dictatorship forming that can be implemented in regions where military dictatorships are common. Constitutional provisions can be enacted to enforce penalties for military officers involved in coups, [[paramilitaries]] may be created to act independently of the conventional military, military officers may be given positions in civil government, or the military may be reduced in size and resources. Such measures have had mixed success.{{Sfn|Onwumechili|1998|pp=75–77}}