Editing Mexican Revolution (section)

===Political system===
[[File:La Constitucion ha muerto 1903.jpg|thumb|A banner (1903) at the office of opposition magazine {{lang|es|[[:es:El hijo del Ahuizote|El hijo del Ahuizote]]}} reads: "The Constitution has died..." ({{lang|es|La Constitución ha muerto...}})]]

Although the Díaz regime was authoritarian and centralizing, it was not a military dictatorship. His first presidential cabinet was staffed with military men, but over successive terms as president, important posts were held by able and loyal civilians.<ref>Camp, Roderic Ai. ''Political Recruitment Across Two Centuries, Mexico 1884–1991''. Austin: University of Texas Press 1995, 62</ref> He did not create a personal dynasty, excluding family from the realms of power, although his nephew [[Félix Díaz (politician)|Félix]] attempted to seize power after the fall of the regime in 1911. Díaz created a political machine, first working with regional strongmen and bringing them into his regime, then replacing them with {{lang|es|jefes políticos}} (political bosses) who were loyal to him. He skillfully managed political conflict and reined in tendencies toward autonomy. He appointed several military officers to state governorships, including General [[Bernardo Reyes]], who became governor of the northern state of [[Nuevo León]], but over the years military men were largely replaced by civilians loyal to Díaz.

As a military man himself, and one who had intervened directly in politics to seize the presidency in 1876, Díaz was acutely aware that the [[Federal Army]] could oppose him. He augmented the {{lang|es|rurales}}, a police force created by [[Benito Juárez]], making them his private armed force. The {{lang|es|rurales}} were only 2,500 in number, as opposed to the 30,000 in the army and another 30,000 in the federal auxiliaries, irregulars and National Guard.<ref name=":15">Womack, John Jr. "The Mexican Revolution", in ''Mexico Since Independence'', Leslie Bethell, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 130.</ref> Despite their small numbers, the {{lang|es|rurales}} were highly effective in controlling the countryside, especially along the 12,000 miles of railway lines. They were a mobile force, often sent on trains with their horses to put down rebellions in relatively remote areas of Mexico.<ref>Vanderwood, Paul. ''Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police, and Mexican Development''. Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, rev. ed. 1992.</ref>

The construction of railways had been transformative in Mexico (as well as elsewhere in Latin America), accelerating economic activity and increasing the power of the Mexican state. The isolation from the central government that many remote areas had enjoyed or suffered was ending. [[Telegraph line]]s constructed next to the railroad tracks meant instant communication between distant states and the capital.<ref>Coatsworth, John. ''Growth Against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico''. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981. P. 47</ref>

The political acumen and flexibility Díaz exhibited in his early years in office began to decline after 1900. He brought the state governors under his control, replacing them at will. The Federal Army, while large, was increasingly an ineffective force with aging leadership and troops conscripted into service. Díaz attempted the same kind of manipulation he executed with the Mexican political system with business interests, showing favoritism to European interests against those of the U.S.<ref>Baldwin, Deborah J. ''Protestants and the Mexican Revolution''. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990, p. 68.</ref>

Rival interests, particularly those of the foreign powers with a presence in Mexico, further complicated an already complex system of favoritism.{{sfn|Katz|1981}} As economic activity increased and industries thrived, [[Trade union#Mexico|industrial workers began organizing]] for better conditions. Díaz enacted policies that encouraged large landowners to intrude upon the villagers' land and water rights.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Brunk |first=Samuel |date=1996 |title="The Sad Situation of Civilians and Soldiers": The Banditry of Zapatismo in the Mexican Revolution |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2170394 |journal=The American Historical Review |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=331–353 |doi=10.2307/2170394 |jstor=2170394 |issn=0002-8762}}</ref> With the expansion of Mexican agriculture, landless peasants were forced to work for low wages or move to the cities. Peasant agriculture was under pressure as ''haciendas'' expanded, such as in the state of [[Morelos]], just south of Mexico City, with its burgeoning sugar plantations. There was what one scholar has called "agrarian compression", in which "population growth intersected with [[land consumption|land loss]], declining wages and insecure tenancies to produce widespread economic deterioration", but the regions under the greatest stress were not the ones that rebelled.<ref>Tutino, John. ''From Insurrection to Revolution: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence in Mexico, 1750–1940''. Princeton: [[Princeton University Press]] 1986.</ref>