Editing Mens rea (section)

=== State criminal law ===
The vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States are carried out by the [[U.S. state|several states]] in accordance with the laws of the state in question. Historically, the states (with the partial exception of [[Civil law (legal system)|civil-law]] [[Louisiana]]) applied common law rules of ''mens rea'' similar to those extant in England, but over time American understandings of common law ''mens rea'' terms diverged from those of English law and from each other. Concepts like "general intent" and "specific intent" dominated classifications of mental states in state common law,<ref>"Mens Rea: An Overview of State-of-Mind Requirements for Federal Criminal Offenses", Michael A. Foster, June 30, 2021, Congressional Research Service, R46836, p.4, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46836/1</ref><ref>INTENT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)</ref><ref>"Much of the existing uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the word 'intent' is attributable to the fact that courts have often used such phrases as 'criminal intent,' 'general intent,' 'specific intent,' 'constructive intent,' and 'presumed intent.' 'Criminal intent,' for example, is often taken to be synonymous with ''mens rea,'' the general notion that except for strict liability offenses some form of mental state is a prerequisite to guilt." § 5.2(e) 'Criminal,' 'constructive,' 'general,' and 'specific' intent, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 5.2(e) (3d ed.)</ref> but by the late 1950s to early 1960s, the common law of ''mens rea'' was widely acknowledged to be a slippery, vague, and confused mess.{{sfn|Dubber (2002)|pages=60-80}}<ref>"Mens Rea: An Overview of State-of-Mind Requirements for Federal Criminal Offenses", Michael A. Foster, June 30, 2021, Congressional Research Service, R46836, p.3, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46836/1</ref> This was one of several factors that led to the development of the Model Penal Code.<ref>''United States v. Bailey'', 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980) ("At common law, crimes generally were classified as requiring either "general intent" or "specific intent." This venerable distinction, however, has been the source of a good deal of confusion. . . . This ambiguity has led to a movement away from the traditional dichotomy of intent and toward an alternative analysis of mens rea. See id., at 202. This new approach, exemplified in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code . . .")</ref> Nevertheless, states continue to use mental states beyond or besides those listed in the Model Penal Code.<ref>"In ''Commonwealth v. Webster'', Shaw, C.J. described malice as a state of mind which includes not only anger, hatred and revenge, but every other unlawful motive." § 106. Malice, 32 Mass. Prac., Criminal Law § 106 (3d ed.)</ref><ref>"In criminal law, mental states run from bad to worse roughly in order of negligence, recklessness, knowledge, and purpose, with willfulness, maliciousness, and similar adjunct mental states interspersed at various levels in that hierarchy." 17 Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Core Aspects § 129</ref><ref>The Penal Law provides that when the commission of an offense, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms "''intentionally''," "knowingly," "recklessly," or "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. 35 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Principles and Offenses § 26 (specifying "intentionally" as a state opposed to "purposefully" and including mental states like "fraud")</ref><ref>26 Ohio Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Procedure § 886 (categorizing mens rea according to general and specific intent)</ref>

Supreme Court Justice [[Stephen Breyer]] described the distinction between the two systems in his dissent in ''Delling v. Idaho'':<ref>{{cite web |title=Delling v Idaho |url=https://www.theusconstitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Delling_v_Idaho_Cert_Amicus_Final-1.pdf}}</ref>

{{blockquote|Case One: The defendant, due to insanity, believes that the victim is a wolf. He shoots and kills the victim.}}
{{blockquote|Case Two: The defendant, due to insanity, believes that a wolf, a supernatural figure, has ordered him to kill the victim.}}
{{blockquote|In Case One, the defendant does not know he has killed a human being, and his insanity negates a mental element necessary to commit the crime. In Case Two, the defendant has intentionally killed a victim whom he knows is a human being; he possesses the necessary mens rea.}}
{{blockquote|In both cases the defendant is unable, due to insanity, to appreciate the true quality of his act, and therefore unable to perceive that it is wrong. But … the defendant in Case One could defend the charge by arguing that he lacked the mens rea, whereas the defendant in Case Two would not be able to raise a defense based on his mental illness.}}