Editing Maxime Weygand (section)

=== First World War ===
[[File:Maarschalk Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), Bestanddeelnr 158-1095 (cropped).jpg|thumb|For much of the war, Weygand served under Ferdinand Foch (pictured) as a staff officer. Foch was promoted in 1918 to generalissimo of Entente forces, with Weygand as his chief of staff.]]
[[File:Waffenstillstand gr.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Painting by [[Maurice Pillard Verneuil]], depicting the signing of the Armistice. Weygand is first on the right, Foch standing in the centre.]]

==== Early war ====
At the outbreak of the war, he was posted as a staff officer with the [[5th Hussar Regiment|5ème Hussars]]. His regiment was deployed to the Franco-German border on 28 July 1914 and later fought at the [[Battle of Morhange]]. On 17 August, he became chief of staff to [[Ferdinand Foch]], the commander of the new [[9th Army (France)|Ninth Army]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=13, noting deployment in 28 July, war with Germany on 3 August, and promotion to Foch's staff on 17 August}} Weygand served under Foch for much of the rest of the war.

The professional partnership between Foch and Weygand was close and fruitful, with Weygand operating as a highly competent subordinate able to translate Foch's instructions into clearer orders, analyse ideas, and collate information. Foch referred to Weygand with praise, believing that their views were practically identical.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=17–18, noting Foch's remark: "Ask Weygand, it is the same"}} Weygand finalised the plans for the 9th Army's attack at the [[First Battle of the Marne]] and, in doing so, became one of the first staff officers to reconnoitre the battlefield from the air.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=21. "At one point he flew with one of France's earliest military avaiators, [[Marcel Brindejonc des Moulinais|Marcel-Georges Brindejonc des Moulinais]], to make a personal reconnaissance of the battlefield, at the time a novel achievement for a senior staff officer"}} Weygand supported Foch, who was appointed to coordinate the Belgian, British, and French forces in the northern sector, during the [[Race to the Sea]] and [[First Battle of Ypres|First Ypres]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=21}} Weygand was promoted to full colonel in early 1915.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=21}}

The mounting French casualties over the course of 1915 were reflected in Weygand's campaign notes; the need for further cooperation between French and British armies utilised Weygand's communicative skills and he developed a working relationship with some British counterparts.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=26, noting as exception [[Edward Spears]]}} Weygand was promoted to [[Brigadier General#France|général de brigade]] in 1916. He later wrote of the [[Battle of the Somme|Anglo-French Somme Offensive in 1916]], at which Foch commanded French Army Group North, that it had seen "constant mix-ups with an ally [the British] learning how to run a large operation and whose doctrines and methods were not yet in accordance with ours".{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=70}} At a meeting on 3 July 1916 where Joffre and Haig came to non-speaking terms, Weygand, Foch, and [[Sir Henry Wilson, 1st Baronet|Henry Wilson]] were able to restore a working relationship between the armies. He also took effective command of the army group as alternate when Foch was in ill health; during tensions between Foch and subordinates, Weygand helped to mediate disputes.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=27–28}}

After Joffre was replaced by [[Robert Nivelle]] in late 1916, criticism of Foch also intensified, leading to Foch being relieved of his northern command; Weygand saw the politician's treatment of Foch as intolerable. At Foch's suggestion, Weygand's name was submitted for command of an infantry brigade, but after Foch was assigned out of inactivity to instead create a contingency plan for a German invasion of France via Switzerland, Weygand decided to stay with Foch.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=28–30}} As part of this planning, Weygand served as head of a mission to Switzerland to discuss Anglo-French support if Switzerland were breached by German troops.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=30}} Weygand later accompanied the British [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], General [[Sir William Robertson, 1st Baronet|Sir William Robertson]], on an inspection of the [[Italian front (World War I)|Italian front]] in early 1917 to discuss Anglo-French support for Italy's [[Battles of the Isonzo|Isonzo campaign]]. When Weygand and Foch were briefed on the [[Nivelle offensive]], the two men expressed misgivings.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=31}} After its failure, Nivelle was removed as French commander-in-chief and replaced with [[Philippe Petain]]. Foch was appointed chief of the army general staff in 19 May 1917; writing to his wife, Weygand expressed his loyalty to Foch and gave up his applications for a field command.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=32}}

==== Supreme War Council ====
British prime minister [[David Lloyd George]] pushed for the creation of a [[Supreme War Council]], which was formally established on 7 November 1917. Keen to sideline the British [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], General [[Sir William Robertson, 1st Baronet|Sir William Robertson]], he insisted that, as French Army chief of the General Staff, Foch could not also be French permanent military representative (PMR) on the SWC.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=266}} [[Paul Painlevé]], [[Prime Minister of France|French prime minister]] until 13 November, believed that Lloyd George was already pushing for Foch to be Supreme Allied Commander so wanted him as PMR not French Chief of Staff.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=171}}

The new prime minister, [[Georges Clemenceau]], wanted Foch as PMR to increase French control over the Western Front, but was persuaded to appoint Weygand, seen very much as Foch's sidekick, instead.{{sfn|Jeffery|2006|pp=206–11, 219–20}} Clemenceau told US President [[Woodrow Wilson]]'s envoy, Colonel [[Edward M. House]] that he would put in a "second- or third-rate man" as PMR and "let the thing drift where it will".{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=173}}

Weygand was the most junior of the PMRs (the others being the Italian [[Luigi Cadorna]], the American [[Tasker H. Bliss]], and the British [[Henry Hughes Wilson, 1st Baronet|Henry Wilson]], later replaced by [[Henry Rawlinson, 1st Baron Rawlinson|Henry Rawlinson]]).{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=180}} He was promoted [[Divisional General#France|général de division]] (equivalent to the Anglophone rank of [[major general]]) in 1918. This promotion was specifically because of his appointment as a PMR.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=178}}

However, Clemenceau only agreed to set up an Allied General Reserve if Foch rather than Weygand were earmarked to command it. The Reserve was shelved for the time being at a SWC Meeting in London (14–15 March 1918) as the national commanders in chief, [[Philippe Pétain]] and [[Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig|Sir Douglas Haig]], were reluctant to release divisions.{{sfn|Jeffery|2006|pp=206–11, 219–20}}

==== Supreme Allied Command Staff ====
[[File:The Hundred Days Offensive, August-november 1918 Q9245.jpg|thumb|right|Foch and Weygand arriving at [[British Fourth Army]] headquarters on 12 August 1918 to meet [[King George V]]]]

Weygand was in charge of Foch's staff when his patron was appointed [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in the spring of 1918, and was Foch's right-hand man throughout his victories in the late summer and until the end of the war.

Weygand initially headed a small staff of 25–30 officers, with Brigadier General Pierre Desticker as his deputy. There was a separate head for each of the departments, e.g. Operations, Intelligence, Q (Quartermaster). From June 1918 onwards, under British pressure, Foch and Weygand poached staff officers from the French Commander-in-Chief [[Philippe Pétain]] (Lloyd George's tentative suggestion of a multinational Allied staff was vetoed by President Wilson). By early August Colonel Payot (responsible for supply and transport) had moved to Foch's HQ, as had the Military Missions from the other Allied HQs; in Greenhalgh's words this "put real as opposed to nominal power into Foch's hands". From early July onwards, British military and political leaders came to regret Foch's increased power, but Weygand later recorded that they had only themselves to blame as they had pushed for the change.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|pp=229–231}}

Like Foch and most French leaders of his era (Clemenceau, who had lived in the US as a young man, was a rare exception), Weygand could not speak enough English to "sustain a conversation" (German, not English, was the most common second language in which French officers were qualified). Competent interpreters were therefore vital.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|pp=9, 229–31}}

Weygand drew up the memorandum for the meeting of Foch with the national commanders-in-chief (Haig, Pétain and [[John J. Pershing]]) on 24 July 1918, the only such meeting before the autumn, in which Foch urged (successfully) the liberation of the Marne salient [[Third Battle of the Aisne|captured by the Germans in May]] (this offensive would become the [[Second Battle of the Marne]], for which Foch was promoted Marshal of France), along with further offensives by the British and by the Americans at St Mihiel.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=322}} Weygand personally delivered the directive for the [[Battle of Amiens (1918)|Amiens attack]] to Haig.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=248}} Foch and Weygand were shown around the [[Battle of Saint-Mihiel|liberated St. Mihiel sector]] by Pershing on 20 September.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=335}}

Weygand later (in 1922) questioned whether Pétain's planned offensive by twenty-five divisions in Lorraine in November 1918 could have been supplied through a "zone of destruction" through which the Germans were retreating; his own and Foch's doubts about the feasibility of the plans were another factor in the seeking of an armistice.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=362}} In 1918 Weygand served on [[Armistice with Germany (Compiègne)|the armistice]] negotiations, and it was Weygand who read out the armistice conditions to the Germans at [[Compiègne]], in the [[Compiègne Wagon|railway carriage]]. He can be spotted in photographs of the armistice delegates, and also standing behind Foch's shoulder at Pétain's investiture as [[Marshal of France]] at the end of 1918.

==== Paris Peace Conference ====
[[File:1 FI 1 28 - Le maréchal Foch, les généraux Weygand et Gouraud au garde à vous, place Broglie. 21 novembre 1920.jpg|thumb|Marshal Foch with Generals Weygand and Gouraud at the [[Place Broglie]] on 21 November 1920]]

Weygand agreed with Foch that French security – the consequences of which were impressed during a tour of the liberated German-occupied zones in late 1918 – required territorial expansion to the [[River Rhine]] as a [[buffer zone]]. Their dislike of politicians, who they viewed as having little understanding of war realities or military issues, intensified when the French political class ruled out creating a French client state in the [[Rhineland]]. They similarly agreed that the then-proposed [[League of Nations]] would do little to ensure peace and that the planned alliances between France, Britain, and the United States would be insufficient to guarantee French security.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=45–46}}

Foch's untactful expression of his views unnerved the [[Big Four (World War I)|Big Four]] civilian leaders at the peace conference: American president [[Woodrow Wilson]], British prime minister [[David Lloyd George]], French president [[Georges Clemenceau]], and Italian prime minister [[Vittorio Emanuele Orlando]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=46}} Weygand harboured similar disdain, calling them in a diary "the four old men". Because of Foch's popularity as victor of the war, he could not be easily criticised. Attacks therefore fell on Weygand who was conspiratorially accused, by among others Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George, as driving Foch's radical positions.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=46–47. "Portrayed as Foch's evil genius[,] Wilson demanded his removal. Lloyd George noted at meeting Weygand would whisper in Foch's ear... Wilson now claimed that Weygand was using Foch to further his own personal political aims"}}