Editing Manuel Noriega (section)

==Rise to power==
===1968 coup===
{{Main|1968 Panamanian coup d'état}}
[[Image:Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos signing the Panama Canal Treaty.jpg|thumb|right| President Jimmy Carter shaking hands with Torrijos after signing the [[Torrijos–Carter Treaties|Panama Canal Treaty]] in 1977.]]
Arias was elected president in 1968 following a [[Populism|populist]] campaign. Soon after taking office he launched a purge of the National Guard, sending much of its [[Staff (military)|general staff]] into "diplomatic exile" or retirement.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=42–45}} In response, Torrijos and a few other officers led a [[coup]] against him, ousting him after an eleven-day presidency.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=42–45}} The coup was set in motion by Martínez, as the leader of the garrison at Chiriquí, and received the support of most military officers. A power struggle followed between the various forces involved in the coup, and chiefly between Torrijos and Martínez.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=42–45}} Noriega was an important supporter of Torrijos during this conflict.<ref name="BBC1">{{cite news|title=Obituary: General Manuel Noriega|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16966007|access-date=May 30, 2017|work=BBC|date=May 30, 2017}}</ref> In February 1969, Torrijos's men seized Martínez and exiled him to Miami giving Torrijos control of the country.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=42–45}}

At the end of 1969, Torrijos went to Mexico on holiday. A coup was launched in his absence, in which Noriega's loyalty allowed Torrijos to hang on to power, greatly enhancing Torrijos's image.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=42–45}}<ref name="LP Obituary"/> Noriega was promoted to captain a month after the coup attempt:<ref name="LP Obituary"/> just 18 months later, in August 1970, Torrijos promoted him to the position of lieutenant colonel and appointed him chief of military intelligence. According to Dinges, by this point Noriega had left his undisciplined past behind him.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=49–52}} When Arias's supporters launched a guerrilla uprising in his home province, Noriega as the head of intelligence played an important role in putting it down within a year.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=42–45}}

Torrijos retained power as a military ruler until 1981: during this time he negotiated the [[Torrijos–Carter Treaties]] with U.S. President [[Jimmy Carter]], which ensured that control over the [[Panama Canal]] would pass to Panama in 1999.<ref name=Tran2010/> These treaties, as well as a new labor code that included [[Parental leave|maternity leave]], [[collective bargaining]] rights, and bonus pay, made Torrijos popular in Panama despite the absence of democratic elections.{{sfn|Galván|2012|pp=184–185}} Torrijos's relationship with Noriega was symbiotic; Torrijos provided the political acumen, while Noriega enforced his unpopular decisions with force, when necessary.{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=185}} Noriega would provide intelligence and carry out covert operations that were critical to Torrijos successfully negotiating the release of the Panama Canal from the U.S.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=73–75}}

Upon seizing power in 1968, Torrijos's government had passed legislation favorable to foreign corporations, including banks in the U.S.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|p=219}} The following years saw a large expansion in international business activity and the influx of foreign capital, thereby giving participating corporations a stake in the continued existence of the military government.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|p=219-220}} The government used its access to foreign capital to borrow extensively, fueling a rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy that contributed to the military regime's stability.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|p=218-220}} Panama's borrowing peaked in 1978 when the Panama Canal treaty was being negotiated, a time at which the Carter government was particularly supportive of the Torrijos regime.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|p=219-220}} The Carter administration's interest in signing a new treaty led it to largely overlook the increasing militarization of the Panamanian government, and its involvement in drug-trafficking.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|p=2}}

===Head of intelligence===
Noriega proved to be a very capable head of intelligence. During his tenure, he exiled 1,300 Panamanians whom he viewed as threats to the government. He also kept files on several officials within the military, the government, and the judiciary, allowing him to blackmail them later.{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=185}} Noriega also held the positions of head of the political police and head of immigration.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=49–52}} His tenure was marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and their leaders.<ref name="Britannica" /> He was described as doing much of Torrijos's "dirty work".{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=27–30}}{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=50–52}} For instance, Noriega ordered the death of [[Jesús Héctor Gallego Herrera]], a priest whose work at an agricultural cooperative was seen as a threat by the government. Gallego's body is reported to have been thrown from a helicopter into the sea.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=50–52}} He also made an effort during this period to portray Panama as a hub of enforcement against drug smuggling, possibly as a result of pressure from Torrijos.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=71–72}}

By the early 1970s, American law enforcement officials had reports of Noriega's possible involvement with narcotics trafficking.<ref name='Frantz'>{{Cite news| issn = 0458-3035| last1 = Frantz| first1 = Douglas| last2 = Ostrow| first2 = Ronald J.| last3 = Jackson| first3 = Robert L.| title = Rivalry, Snitches, Murder Helped Shape Noriega Case| work = Los Angeles Times| access-date = October 14, 2017| date = February 25, 1990| url = https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-02-25-mn-2221-story.html}}</ref> No formal criminal investigations were begun, and no indictment was brought: according to Dinges, this was due to the potential diplomatic consequences.<ref name='Frantz'/>{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=58–60}} This evidence included the testimony of an arrested boat courier, and of a drug smuggler arrested in New York.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=58–60}} Though Torrijos frequently promised the U.S. cooperation in dealing with drug smuggling, Noriega would have headed any effort at enforcement, and the U.S. began to see Noriega as an obstacle to combatting drug smuggling.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=61–64}} Dinges writes that the U.S. government considered several options to move Noriega out of the drug trafficking business, including assassinating him, and linking him to a fictional plot against Torrijos. Though no assassination attempt was made, the other ploys may have been tried in the early 1970s, according to Dinges.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=61–64}} Dinges wrote that beginning in 1972 the U.S. relaxed its efforts at trapping individuals involved with smuggling within the Panama government, possibly as a result of an agreement between Torrijos and U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]].{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=68–70}}

During the early 1970s, Noriega's relationship with the U.S. intelligence services was regularized.<ref name="Ghosh-2009">{{cite magazine |last = Ghosh |first = Bobby |title = Who's Who on the CIA Payroll |magazine = Time|url = https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1933053_1933052_1933051,00.html}}</ref> The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) placed him on its payroll in 1971, while he held his position as head of Panamanian intelligence; he had previously been paid by U.S. intelligence services on a case-by-case basis.<ref name="Graham"/><ref name="Johnston">{{cite news|last1=Johnston|first1=Davis|title=U.S. Admits Payments to Noriega|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/19/us/us-admits-payments-to-noriega.html|access-date=June 7, 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=January 19, 1991}}</ref>{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=49–52}}{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|p=541}} Regular payments to him were stopped under the Carter administration, before being resumed and later stopped again under the administration of [[Ronald Reagan]].{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=13-14}} The CIA valued him as an asset because he was willing to provide information about the Cuban government and later about the [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|Sandinista]] government in Nicaragua.<ref name="Hersh 1986" /> Noriega also served as the U.S. emissary to Cuba during negotiations following the [[Johnny Express incident|''Johnny Express'' incident]] in December 1971.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=68–70}} Noriega was given access to CIA contingency funds, which he was supposed to use to improve his intelligence programs, but which he could spend with little accountability. The contingency funds were as high as US$100,000 in some years.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=49–52}}

The CIA was aware that Noriega was selling intelligence on the U.S. to Cuba while he was working for it.<ref name="Hersh 1986" />{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=27–29}} Noriega also undertook a number of activities while nominally working for the CIA that served his own ends at the expense of the U.S. government.{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=27–29}} Journalist [[Frederick Kempe]] wrote in 1990 that Noriega had been linked to a series of bombings targeting the U.S. territory in the [[Panama Canal Zone]] during the prelude to the [[1976 United States presidential election|U.S. Presidential election in 1976]] after the administration of U.S. President [[Gerald Ford]] stepped back from negotiations about the Panama Canal.{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=27–30}} The bombings highlighted to the U.S. government the difficulty of holding on to the Panama Canal Zone in the face of hostility within Panama.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=83–85}} Kempe stated that the U.S. knew of Noriega's involvement in the bombings but decided to turn a blind eye toward them.{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=28–30}} In a December 1976 meeting with [[George H. W. Bush]], then [[Director of Central Intelligence]], Noriega flatly denied involvement, instead suggesting that the CIA was responsible.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=88–90}}

During negotiations for the Panama Canal treaties, the U.S. government ordered its military intelligence to [[wiretap]] Panamanian officials. Noriega discovered this operation in early 1976, and instead of making it public, bribed the U.S. agents and bought the tapes himself; the incident came to be known as the "[[Singing Sergeants affair]]".{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=27–29}}{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=81–84}} Although some intelligence officials wanted Bush to prosecute the soldiers involved, he declined because doing so would have exposed Noriega's role in the matter.<ref name="Graham" /><ref name=Engelberg>{{cite news|last1=Engelberg|first1=Stephen|last2=Gerth|first2=Jeff|title=Bush and Noriega: Examination of Their Ties|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/28/us/bush-and-noriega-examination-of-their-ties.html?pagewanted=all|access-date=June 7, 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=September 28, 1988}}</ref> The CIA did not report this incident to either the [[National Security Agency]] or the [[United States Department of Justice|U.S. Justice Department]].<ref name=Engelberg/> Noriega and Torrijos later used their knowledge of the U.S. wiretapping operations to tilt the Panama Canal negotiations in their favor.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=93–95}} Noriega's drug-related activities came to the U.S. government's attention once again during the ratification process for the Panama Canal treaties, but were once again downplayed by the U.S. intelligence services in order to get the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=96–99}}

===Death of Torrijos===
After the [[Nicaraguan Revolution]] was launched by the Sandinistas against U.S.-backed authoritarian ruler [[Anastasio Somoza Debayle]] in August 1978, Torrijos and Noriega initially supported the rebels, providing them with surplus National Guard equipment and allowing Panama to be used as a cover for arms shipments from Cuba to Nicaragua.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=100–103}} Torrijos sought for himself the same aura of "democratic respectability" that the Sandinista rebels had in Nicaragua, and so abandoned the title of "Maximum Leader" he had taken in 1972, promising that elections would be held in 1984.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=100–103}} Noriega also arranged for weapons purchased in the U.S. to be shipped to the Sandinista forces, a deal on which he made a profit.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=105–108}} The U.S. discovered Noriega's role in supplying weapons, and though the episode proved embarrassing to the [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter|Carter administration]] in the U.S., no charges were brought against Noriega because the U.S. did not wish to anger a friendly government, and the issue was rendered moot by the Sandinista victory in 1979.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=108–110}} After Somoza's overthrow, Noriega continued to smuggle weapons, selling them to leftist guerrillas fighting the U.S.-backed authoritarian government in El Salvador.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=111–115}} After one of these shipments was captured, Torrijos, who had friends in the Salvadoran military government, reprimanded Noriega, though the shipments did not stop altogether.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=111–115}}

Torrijos died in a plane crash on July 31, 1981. A later investigation by the aircraft manufacturer stated it was an accident; Noriega's authority over the government investigation led to speculation about his involvement.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=120–121}} [[Florencio Flores Aguilar]] had inherited Torrijos's position, but true power lay with the trio of Noriega, Díaz Herrera, and [[Rubén Darío Paredes]], who ranked just below him. Flores was removed in a quiet coup on March 3, 1982. By general agreement, Paredes was made leader until 1983, after which the military would work together to ensure his election as the president in the election scheduled for 1984.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=138–142}} During this period Noriega became a full [[colonel]] and the National Guard's chief of staff, effectively the second-highest rank in the country.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=147}}{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=182}} He reformed the National Guard as the [[Panama Defense Forces]] (PDF), and with the financial assistance of the U.S., expanded and modernized it. The quick promotions they received earned him the officer corps' loyalty.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=10}} Among the steps he took to consolidate his control was to bring the various factions of the army together into the PDF.<ref name="nytimesobit" /> On August 12, 1983, in keeping with Noriega's earlier deal with Paredes, Paredes handed over his position to Noriega, newly appointed a [[General officer|general]], with the understanding that Noriega would allow him to stand for president.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=150–154}} However, Paredes never received the political support he expected, and after assuming his new position Noriega reneged on the deal, telling Paredes he could not contest the election.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=150–154}} Noriega, now head of the PDF, thus became the ''de facto'' ruler of Panama.<ref name="BBC1" />{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=138–142}}