Editing Luftwaffe (section)

===Preparing for war: 1933–1939===
====Wever years, 1933–1936====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-026-04A, Walter Wever.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]], Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, 1933–1936]]
The German officer corps was keen to develop [[strategic bombing]] capabilities against its enemies. However, economic and geopolitical considerations had to take priority. The German air power theorists continued to develop strategic theories, but emphasis was given to army support, as Germany was a continental power and expected to face ground operations following any declaration of hostilities.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=1}}</ref>

For these reasons, between 1933 and 1934, the Luftwaffe's leadership was primarily concerned with tactical and operational methods. In aerial terms, the army concept of {{lang|de|[[Truppenführung]]}} was an operational concept, as well as a tactical doctrine. In World War I, the {{lang|de|Fliegertruppe's}} initial, 1914–15 era {{lang|de|[[Feldflieger Abteilung]]}} observation/reconnaissance air units, each with six two-seater aircraft apiece, had been attached to specific army formations and acted as support. [[Dive bomber]] units were considered essential to {{lang|de|Truppenführung}}, attacking enemy headquarters and lines of communications.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 129">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=129}}</ref> Luftwaffe "Regulation 10: The Bomber" ({{lang|de|Dienstvorschrift 10: Das Kampfflugzeug}}), published in 1934, advocated air superiority and approaches to ground attack tactics without dealing with operational matters. Until 1935, the 1926 manual "Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War" continued to act as the main guide for German air operations. The manual directed OKL to focus on limited operations (not strategic operations): the protection of specific areas and support of the army in combat.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 129"/>

With an effective tactical-operational concept,<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=130}}</ref> the German air power theorists needed a strategic doctrine and organisation. {{ill|Robert Knauss|de}}, a serviceman (not a pilot) in the {{lang|de|Luftstreitkräfte}} during World War I, and later an experienced pilot with ''Lufthansa'',<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=132}}</ref> was a prominent theorist of air power. Knauss promoted the [[Giulio Douhet]] theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry and breaking enemy morale by "terrorising the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on civilians.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=133}}</ref> The General Staff blocked the entry of Douhet's theory into doctrine, fearing revenge strikes against German civilians and cities.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=133–134}}</ref>

In December 1934, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff [[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]] sought to mold the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine into a strategic plan. At this time, Wever conducted war games (simulated against France) in a bid to establish his theory of a strategic bombing force that would, he thought, prove decisive by winning the war through the destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises also included tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and communications. In 1935, "Luftwaffe Regulation 16: The Conduct of the Air War" was drawn up. In the proposal, it concluded, "The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals."<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34">{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=34}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2010|p=28}}</ref>

Historian [[James Corum]] states that under this doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the practice of "[[Strategic bombing|terror bombing]]" (see [[Blitzkrieg#Luftwaffe|Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine]]).<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 7">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=7}}</ref> According to Corum, terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=143–144}}</ref> Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe's main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=146}}</ref>

Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of [[strategic bombing]]. In newly introduced doctrine, ''The Conduct of the Aerial Air War'' in 1935, Wever rejected the theory of Douhet<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=143}}</ref> and outlined five key points to air strategy:<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=138}}</ref>
<blockquote>
#To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets
#To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
#To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations
#To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
#To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories
</blockquote>

Wever began planning for a strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a war strategy. He believed that tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air force. In May 1934, Wever initiated a seven-year project to develop the so-called "[[Ural bomber]]", which could strike as far as into the heart of the Soviet Union. In 1935, this design competition led to the [[Dornier Do 19]] and [[Junkers Ju 89]] prototypes, although both were underpowered. In April 1936, Wever issued requirements for the 'Bomber A' design competition: a range of {{convert|6,700|km|mi}} with a {{convert|900|kg|lb}} bomb load. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised,<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=33}}</ref> and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=224}}</ref> The only design submittal for Wever's 'Bomber A' that reached production was [[Heinkel]]'s ''Projekt 1041'', which culminated in the production and frontline service as Germany's only operational heavy bomber, the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|Heinkel He 177]], on 5 November 1937, the date on which it received its [[List of RLM aircraft designations#101-200|RLM airframe number]].{{sfn|Griehl|Dressel1998|p=9}}

In 1935, the military functions of the RLM were grouped into the {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Luftwaffe]]}} (OKL; "Air Force High Command").

Following the untimely death of Wever in early June 1936 in an [[Gust lock#Safety|aviation-related accident]], by the late 1930s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organisation capable of carrying out broad and general support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage more flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory. In fact, on the outbreak of war, only 15% of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were devoted to ground support operations, counter to the long-held myth that the Luftwaffe was designed for only tactical and operational missions.<ref>{{harvnb|Buckley|1998|pp=85–86}}</ref>

====Change of direction, 1936–37====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-112-13, Ernst Udet.jpg|thumb|left|upright=0.7|General [[Ernst Udet]]. Along with [[Albert Kesselring]], Udet was responsible for establishing the design trend of German aircraft. His focus was on tactical army support air forces.]]
Wever's participation in the construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt end on 3 June 1936 when he was killed along with his engineer in a [[Heinkel He 70 Blitz|Heinkel He 70]] Blitz, ironically on the very day that his "Bomber A" heavy bomber design competition was announced. After Wever's death, Göring began taking more of an interest in the appointment of Luftwaffe staff officers. Göring appointed his successor [[Albert Kesselring]] as Chief of Staff and [[Ernst Udet]] to head the Reich's Air Ministry Technical Office ({{lang|de|Technisches Amt}}), although he was not a technical expert. Despite this Udet helped change the Luftwaffe's tactical direction towards fast medium bombers to destroy enemy air power in the battle zone rather than through industrial bombing of its aviation production.<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34"/>

Kesselring and Udet did not get on. During Kesselring's time as CS, 1936–1937, a power struggle developed between the two as Udet attempted to extend his own power within the Luftwaffe. Kesselring also had to contend with Göring appointing "yes men" to positions of importance.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=225}}</ref> Udet realised his limitations, and his failures in the production and development of German aircraft would have serious long term consequences.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=227}}</ref>

The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards attaining a strategic bombing force was attributable to several reasons. Many in the Luftwaffe command believed medium bombers to be sufficient power to launch strategic bombing operations against Germany's most likely enemies; France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=10}}</ref> The United Kingdom presented greater problems. {{Lang|de|[[General der Flieger]]}} [[Hellmuth Felmy]], commander of {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 2]]}} in 1939, was charged with devising a plan for an air war over the British Isles. Felmy was convinced that Britain could be defeated through morale bombing. Felmy noted the alleged panic that had broken out in London during the [[Munich Agreement|Munich crisis]], evidence he believed of British weakness. A second reason was technical. German designers had never solved the issues of the Heinkel He 177A's design difficulties, brought on by the requirement from its inception on 5 November 1937 to have moderate dive-bombing capabilities in a 30-meter wingspan aircraft. Moreover, Germany did not possess the economic resources to match the later British and American effort of 1943–1944, particularly in large-scale mass production of [[Bomber B#High-output aviation engines for the Luftwaffe|high power output aircraft engines]] (with output of over least 1,500 kW (2,000 hp). In addition, the OKL had not foreseen the industrial and military effort strategic bombing would require. By 1939 the Luftwaffe was not much better prepared than its enemies to conduct a strategic bombing campaign,<ref name="auto">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=11}}</ref> with fatal results during the [[Battle of Britain]].<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=31}}</ref>

The German rearmament programme faced difficulties acquiring raw materials. Germany imported most of its essential materials for rebuilding the Luftwaffe, in particular rubber and aluminum. Petroleum imports were particularly vulnerable to blockade. Germany pushed for synthetic fuel plants but still failed to meet demands. In 1937 Germany imported more fuel than it had at the start of the decade. By summer 1938, only 25% of the requirements could be covered. In steel materials, industry was operating at barely 83% of capacity, and by November 1938 Göring reported the economic situation was serious.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=2}}</ref> The {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]}} (OKW), the overall command for all German military forces, ordered reductions in raw materials and steel used for armament production. The figures for reduction were substantial: 30% steel, 20% copper, 47% aluminum, and 14% rubber.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=3}}</ref> Under such circumstances, it was not possible for Milch, Udet, or Kesselring to produce a formidable strategic bombing force even had they wanted to do so.<ref name="auto"/>

The development of aircraft was now confined to the production of twin-engined medium bombers that required much less material, manpower, and aviation production capacity than Wever's "Ural Bomber". German industry could build two medium bombers for one heavy bomber and the RLM would not gamble on developing a heavy bomber which would also take time. Göring remarked, "the ''Führer'' will not ask how big the bombers there are, but only how many there are."<ref>{{harvnb|Homze|1976|p=125}}</ref> The premature death of Wever, one of the Luftwaffe's finest officers, left the Luftwaffe without a strategic air force during World War II, which eventually proved fatal to the German war effort.<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34"/>{{sfn|Dressel|Griehl|1994|p= 176}}<ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|pp=129–130}}</ref>

The lack of strategic capability should have been apparent much earlier. The [[Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|Sudeten Crisis]] highlighted German unpreparedness to conduct a strategic air war (although the British and French were in a much weaker position), and Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe be expanded to five times its earlier size.{{sfn|Ketley|Rolfe|1996|p=3}} The OKL badly neglected the need for transport aircraft; even in 1943, transport units were described as {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwadern zur besonderen Verwendung}} (Bomber Units on Special Duties, KGzbV).{{sfn|Ketley|Rolfe|1996|p=7}} and only grouping them together into dedicated cargo and personnel transport wings ({{lang|de|Transportgeschwader}}) during that year. In March 1938, as the ''[[Anschluss]]'' was taking place, Göring ordered Felmy to investigate the prospect of air raids against Britain. Felmy concluded it was not possible until bases in [[Belgium]] and the [[Netherlands]] were obtained and the Luftwaffe had heavy bombers. It mattered little, as war was avoided by the Munich Agreement, and the need for long-range aircraft did not arise.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=77}}</ref>

These failures were not exposed until wartime. In the meantime, German designs of mid-1930s origin such as the [[Messerschmitt Bf 109]], the [[Heinkel He 111]], the [[Junkers Ju 87]] Stuka, and the [[Dornier Do 17]], performed very well. All first saw active service in the [[Condor Legion]] against Soviet-supplied aircraft. The Luftwaffe also quickly realised the days of the biplane fighter were finished, the [[Heinkel He 51]] being switched to service as a trainer. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier, which fulfilled the Luftwaffe's requirements for bombers that were faster than 1930s-era fighters, many of which were biplanes or strut-braced monoplanes.

Despite the participation of these aircraft (mainly from 1938 onward), it was the venerable [[Junkers Ju 52]] (which soon became the backbone of the {{lang|de|Transportgruppen}}) that made the main contribution. During the [[Spanish Civil War]] Hitler remarked, "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju 52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory."<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=51}}</ref>

====Dive-bombing====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-646-5188-17, Flugzeuge Junkers Ju 87.jpg|thumb|right|[[Junkers Ju 87]]Ds over the Eastern Front, winter 1943–44]]
Poor accuracy from level bombers in 1937 led the Luftwaffe to grasp the benefits of dive-bombing. The latter could achieve far better accuracy against tactical ground targets than heavier conventional bombers. Range was not a key criterion for this mission. It was not always feasible for the army to move heavy artillery over recently captured territory to bombard fortifications or support ground forces, and dive bombers could do the job faster. Dive bombers, often single-engine two-man machines, could achieve better results than larger six or seven-man aircraft, at a tenth of the cost and four times the accuracy. This led to Udet championing the dive bomber, particularly the [[Junkers Ju 87]].<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=38}}</ref>

Udet's "love affair" with dive-bombing seriously affected the long-term development of the Luftwaffe, especially after Wever's death. The tactical strike aircraft programmes were meant to serve as interim solutions until the next generation of aircraft arrived. In 1936 the [[Junkers Ju 52]] was the backbone of the German bomber fleet. This led to a rush on the part of the RLM to produce the [[Junkers Ju 86]], the Heinkel He 111, and the Dornier Do 17 before a proper evaluation was made. The Ju 86 was poor while the He 111 showed the most promise. The Spanish Civil War convinced Udet (along with limited output from the German munitions industry) that wastage was not acceptable in munition terms. Udet sought to build dive-bombing into the [[Junkers Ju 88]] and conveyed the same idea, initiated specifically by the OKL for the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|Heinkel He 177]], approved in early November 1937. In the case of the Ju 88, 50,000 modifications had to be made. The weight was increased from seven to twelve tons. This resulted in a speed loss of 200 km/h. Udet merely conveyed the OKL's own dive-bombing capability request to [[Ernst Heinkel]] concerning the He 177, who vehemently opposed such an idea, which ruined its development as a heavy bomber.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=14}}</ref> Göring was not able to rescind the dive-bombing requirement for the He 177A until September 1942.{{sfn|Griehl|Dressel|1998|p= 53}}

====Mobilisation, 1938–1941====
By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had ready for combat nine {{lang|de|Jagdgeschwader}} (fighter wings) mostly equipped with the [[Messerschmitt Bf 109 variants|Messerschmitt Bf 109E]], four ''[[Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)|Zerstörergeschwader]]'' (destroyer wings) equipped with the [[Messerschmitt Bf 110]] heavy fighters, 11 {{lang|de|[[Kampfgeschwader]]}} (bomber wings) equipped mainly with the Heinkel He 111 and the Dornier Do 17Z, and four {{lang|de|Sturzkampfgeschwader}} (dive bomber wings) primarily armed with the iconic Junkers Ju 87B ''Stuka''.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=79}}</ref> The Luftwaffe was just starting to accept the Junkers Ju 88A for service, as it had encountered design difficulties, with only a dozen aircraft of the type considered combat-ready. The Luftwaffe's strength at this time stood at 373,000 personnel (208,000 flying troops, 107,000 in the Flak Corps, and 58,000 in the Signals Corps). Aircraft strength was 4,201 operational aircraft: 1,191 bombers, 361 dive bombers, 788 fighters, 431 heavy fighters, and 488 transports. Despite deficiencies, it was an impressive force.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=271}}</ref>

However, even by the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe still had not mobilised fully. Despite the shortage of raw materials, Udet had increased production through introducing a 10-hour working day for aviation industries and rationalising production. During this period 30 {{lang|de|Kampfstaffeln}} and 16 {{lang|de|Jagdstaffeln}} were raised and equipped. A further five {{lang|de|Zerstörergruppen}} ("Destroyer groups") were created (JGr 101, 102, 126, 152 and 176), all equipped with the Bf 110.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=23}}</ref>

The Luftwaffe also greatly expanded its aircrew training programmes by 42%, to 63 flying schools. These facilities were moved to eastern Germany, away from possible Allied threats. The number of aircrew reached 4,727, an increase of 31%. However, the rush to complete this rapid expansion scheme resulted in the deaths of 997 personnel and another 700 wounded. 946 aircraft were also destroyed in these accidents. The number of aircrew completing their training was up to 3,941, The Luftwaffe's entire strength was now 2.2 million personnel.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=24}}</ref>

In April and May 1941, Udet headed the Luftwaffe delegation inspecting the Soviet aviation industry in compliance with the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]]. Udet informed Göring "that Soviet air forces are very strong and technically advanced." Göring decided not to report the facts to Hitler, hoping that a surprise attack would quickly destroy the USSR.<ref name="RF">"Боевые операции люфтваффе", Москва 2008 г., изд. Яуза-пресс, по "Rise and fall of the German Air Force", Лондон 1948 г., пер. П.Смирнов, {{ISBN|978-5-9955-0028-5}}</ref> {{page needed|date=May 2025}}Udet realised that the upcoming war with the USSR might cripple Germany. Udet, torn between truth and loyalty, suffered a psychological breakdown and even tried to tell Hitler the truth, but Göring told Hitler that Udet was lying, then took Udet under control by giving him drugs at drinking parties and hunting trips. Udet's drinking and psychological condition became a problem, but Göring used Udet's dependency to manipulate him.<ref name="RF2">Who is who in the Third Reich (Кто был кто в Третьем рейхе. Биографический энциклопедический словарь. М., 2003)</ref>{{page needed|date=May 2025}}