Editing Kofi Annan (section)

=== Criticism ===
In 2003, retired Canadian general [[Roméo Dallaire]], who was force commander of the [[United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda]] (UNAMIR), claimed that Annan was overly passive in his response to the imminent [[Rwandan genocide|genocide]]. In his book ''[[Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda]]'' (2003), Dallaire asserted that Annan held back UN troops from intervening to settle the conflict and from providing more logistical and material support. Dallaire claimed that Annan failed to respond to his repeated faxes asking for access to a weapons depository; such weapons could have helped Dallaire defend the endangered [[Tutsi]]s. In 2004, ten years after the [[genocide]] in which an estimated 800,000 people were killed, Annan said: "I could and should have done more to sound the alarm and rally support."<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm|work=BBC News|title=UN chief's Rwanda genocide regret|date=26 March 2004|access-date=4 April 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090701103806/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm|archive-date=1 July 2009|url-status=live}}</ref>
{{external media| float = right| video1 = [https://www.c-span.org/video/?307280-1/after-words-kofi-annan ''After Words'' interview with Annan on ''Interventions'', 9 September 2012], [[C-SPAN]]}}
In his book ''[[Interventions: A Life in War and Peace]]'', Annan again argued that the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations could have made better use of the media to raise awareness of the violence in Rwanda and put pressure on governments to provide the troops necessary for an intervention. Annan explained that the [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|events in Somalia]] and the collapse of the [[United Nations Operation in Somalia II|UNOSOM II mission]] fostered a hesitation among [[Member states of the United Nations|UN member states]] to approve robust peacekeeping operations. As a result, when the [[United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda|UNAMIR]] mission was approved just days after the battle, the resulting force lacked the troop levels, resources and mandate to operate effectively.{{sfn|Annan|Mousavizadeh|2012|loc=chpt. 2}}