Editing Julian Jaynes (section)

===Research and motivations===
Jaynes had dedicated years of research in psychology to the problem of consciousness{{sfnp|Rhodes|1978|p=72}} and he had sought the roots of consciousness in the processes of [[learning]] and [[cognition]] that animals and humans shared in common, in accord with prevailing [[evolution]]ary assumptions that dominated mid-20th century thinking.{{sfnp|Woodward|Tower|2006}}  He had established his reputation in the study of [[animal learning]] and natural [[ethology|animal behaviour]], and in 1968 he lectured on the history of [[comparative psychology]] at the [[National Science Foundation]] Summer Institute. In September 1969 he gave his first public address on his "new theory of consciousness" at the annual meeting of the [[American Psychological Association]].{{sfnp|Woodward|Tower|2006|pp=31–34}}

His "radical approach"{{sfnp|Morriss|1978}} explained the phenomena of [[introspection]] as dependent on culture and language, especially [[metaphors]], more than on the physiology of the brain. This was a challenge to mainstream assumptions of 20th century research, especially to those that justified looking for origins of consciousness in evolution. It was also a challenge to the [[Behaviorism|behaviorists]], who, "under the tutelage of [[J. B. Watson|John Watson]], solved the problem of consciousness by ignoring it."{{sfnp|Morriss|1978|p=315}} What they had 'ignored' were the problems of [[introspection]] and the weaknesses of introspectionist methods of 19th century psychologists. Those 20th century thinkers who questioned the existence of introspection never doubted the existence of sense [[perception]], however; they clearly distinguished between the two.{{sfnp|Jaynes|2000|p=448}} On the other hand, in later years Jaynes's approach had become "radical" for emphasizing the distinction. Jaynes differed with those who ignored it, for example [[Stuart Sutherland]], who simply defined consciousness as '[[awareness]]'.{{sfnp|Sutherland|1989}} Jaynes acknowledged that his whole argument was "contradictory to the usual and [...] superficial views of consciousness", and he insisted that "the most common error" people make "is to confuse consciousness with perception."{{sfnp|Jaynes|2000|p=447}}
<blockquote>But there can be no progress in the science of consciousness until careful distinctions have been made between what is introspectable and all the hosts of other neural abilities we have come to call [[cognition]]. Consciousness is not the same as cognition and should be sharply distinguished from it.{{sfnp|Jaynes|2000|p=447}} </blockquote>

In the years following, Jaynes talked more about how consciousness began, presenting "his talk [...] widely, as word of his slightly outrageous but tantalizing theory had spread."{{sfnp|Woodward|Tower|2006|p=37}} In 1972 he had delivered a paper, "The Origin of Consciousness", at Cornell University, writing: "For if consciousness is based on language, then it follows that only humans are conscious, and that we became so at some historical epoch after language was evolved."{{sfnp|Woodward|Tower|2006|p=38}} This took Jaynes, as he put it, directly into "the earliest writings of mankind to see if we can find any hints as to when this important invention of consciousness might have occurred."{{sfnp|Woodward|Tower|2006|p=38}} He went to ancient texts searching for early evidence of consciousness, and found what he believed to be evidence of remarkably recent {{em|voice-hearing without consciousness}}. In the [[Greek mythology|semi-historical Greek epic]] the ''[[Iliad]]'' Jaynes found "the earliest writing of men in a language that we can really comprehend, [which] when looked at objectively, reveals a very different mentality from our own."{{sfnp|Jaynes|2000|p=82}} In a 1978 interview, [[Richard Rhodes]] reported that Jaynes "took up the study of [[Homeric Greek|Greek]] to trace [[Mycenaean Greek|Greek]] words for mind back to their origins. By the time he got to the ''[[Iliad]]'', the words had become concrete, but there is no word for mind in the ''Iliad'' at all."{{sfnp|Rhodes|1978|p=74}}