Editing Juan Pujol García (section)

== World War II ==

=== Independent spying ===
In 1940, during the early stages of World War II, Pujol decided that he must make a contribution "for the good of humanity"<ref name=MI5>{{cite web|title=Agent Garbo|url=https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/mi5-history/world-war-ii/agent-garbo.html|publisher=MI5 Security Service|work=MI5 History|access-date=15 April 2015|archive-date=6 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150706133545/https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/mi5-history/world-war-ii/agent-garbo.html|url-status=live}}</ref> by helping Britain, which was at the time Germany's only adversary.<ref name=MarkSeaman/><ref name="Seaman43"/> Starting in January 1941, he approached the British Embassy in Madrid three different times,<ref name=MI5/> including through his wife (though Pujol edited her participation out of his memoirs),<ref name=MarkSeaman/> but they showed no interest in employing him as a spy. Therefore, he resolved to establish himself as a German agent before approaching the British again to offer his services as a double-agent.<ref name=MarkSeaman/>

Pujol created an identity as a fanatically pro-Nazi Spanish government official who could travel to London on official business;<ref name=MI5/> he also obtained a fake Spanish [[diplomatic passport]] by fooling a printer into thinking Pujol worked for the Spanish embassy in Lisbon.<ref name=Seaman46>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=6CAPU9Ln3RYC&pg=PA46 p. 46].</ref> He contacted Friedrich Knappe-Ratey, an {{lang|de|[[Abwehr]]}} agent in Madrid, codenamed "Frederico".{{sfn|Haufler|2014|p=90}} The {{lang|de|Abwehr}} accepted Pujol and gave him a crash course in espionage (including secret writing), a bottle of [[invisible ink]], a codebook, and £600 for expenses. His instructions were to move to Britain and recruit a network of British agents.<ref name=MI5/>

He moved instead to Lisbon; using a tourist's guide to Britain, reference books and magazines from the Lisbon Public Library, and newsreel reports he saw in cinemas, he created seemingly credible reports that appeared to come from London.<ref name=MI5/> During his time in Portugal, he stayed in [[Estoril]], at the Hotel Palácio.<ref>[[Exiles Memorial Center]].</ref> He claimed to be travelling around Britain and submitted his travel expenses based on fares listed in a British railway guide. Pujol's unfamiliarity with the [[British coinage#Pre-decimal coinage|non-decimal system of currency]] used in Britain at the time was a slight difficulty.<ref>{{cite book|last=Levine|first=Joshua|title=Operation Fortitude|publisher=HarperCollins UK|year=2011|isbn=978-0-00-741324-9|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dBhrEFWA0MgC|access-date=24 April 2020|archive-date=24 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211124235826/https://books.google.com/books?id=dBhrEFWA0MgC&hl=en|url-status=live}}</ref> At this time Great Britain's unit of currency, the [[pound sterling]], was subdivided into 20 shillings, each having twelve pence. Pujol was unable to total his expenses in this complex system, so simply itemised them, and said that he would send the total later.<ref name=MarkSeaman59>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA59 p. 59] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200114231940/https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA59 |date=14 January 2020}}.</ref>

During this time he created an extensive network of fictitious sub-agents living in different parts of Britain. Because he had never actually visited the UK, he made several mistakes, such as claiming that his alleged contact in [[Glasgow]] "would do anything for a litre of wine", unaware of Scottish drinking habits or that the UK did not use the metric system.<ref name=MI5/> His reports were intercepted by the British [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]] communications interceptions programme, and seemed so credible that the British counter-intelligence service [[MI5]] launched a full-scale spy hunt.<ref name=Historynet/>

In February 1942, either he or his wife (accounts differ)<ref name=Lisbon_Route >{{cite book|title=The Lisbon Route: Entry and Escape in Nazi Europe|page=331|first=Ronald|last=Weber|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BXOoHJJVdoMC&pg=PA331|year=2011|publisher=Government Institutes|isbn=978-1-56663-876-0|access-date=24 April 2020|archive-date=24 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211124235854/https://books.google.com/books?id=BXOoHJJVdoMC&pg=PA331&hl=en|url-status=live}}</ref> approached the United States after it had entered the war, contacting U.S. Navy Lieutenant Patrick Demorest in the [[naval attache]]'s office in Lisbon, who recognised Pujol's potential.<ref name=Historynet/> Demorest contacted his British counterparts.<ref name=elespia/>

=== Work with MI5 ===
The British had become aware that someone had been misinforming the Germans, and realised the value of this after the {{lang|de|[[Kriegsmarine]]}} wasted resources attempting to hunt down a non-existent convoy reported to them by Pujol.<ref name=elespia/> He was moved to Britain on 24 April 1942 and given the code name "Bovril", after [[Bovril|the drink concentrate]]. However, after he passed the security check conducted by [[MI6]] Officer [[Desmond Bristow]], [[Desmond Bristow|Bristow]] suggested that he be accompanied by MI5 officer [[Tomás Harris]] (a fluent Spanish speaker) to brief Pujol on how he and Harris should work together. Pujol's wife and child were later moved to Britain.<ref name=MarkSeaman30/>

Pujol operated as a [[double agent]] under the [[Double Cross System|XX Committee]]'s aegis. Cyril Mills was initially Pujol's case officer, but he spoke no Spanish and quickly dropped out of the picture. Mills suggested that Pujol's code name should be changed as befitted "the best actor in the world", and Pujol became "Garbo", after [[Greta Garbo]].<ref name=TheDeceiversHolt>[[#Holt|Holt (2010)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=E569Q7s1CnsC&lpg=PA846 p. 210]. "Mills was initially BOVRIL's case officer; but he spoke no Spanish and quickly dropped out of the picture. His main contribution was to suggest, after the truly extraordinary dimensions of Pujol's imagination and accomplishments had become apparent, that his code name should be changed as befitted 'the best actor in the world'; and BOVRIL became GARBO."</ref> Mills passed his case over to the Spanish-speaking officer Harris.<ref name=MI5 /> Together, Harris and Pujol wrote 315 letters, averaging 2,000 words, addressed to a post-office box in Lisbon supplied by the Germans. His fictitious spy network was so efficient and verbose that his German [[Handler (spying)|handlers]] were overwhelmed and made no further attempts to recruit any additional spies in the UK, according to the ''Official History of British Intelligence in World War II''.<ref name=MI5/>

[[File:MI5 Case Officer Tomás (Tommy) Harris 1942.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Pujol's case officer at MI5, [[Tomás Harris]]]]

The information supplied to German intelligence was a mixture of complete fiction, genuine information of little military value, and valuable military intelligence artificially delayed. In November 1942, just before the [[Operation Torch]] landings in [[North Africa]], Garbo's agent on the [[River Clyde]] reported that a convoy of troopships and warships had left port, painted in Mediterranean camouflage. While the letter was sent by airmail and postmarked before the landings, it was deliberately delayed by British Intelligence in order to arrive too late to be useful. Pujol received a reply stating "we are sorry they arrived too late but your last reports were magnificent."<ref name=MI5/>

Pujol had been supposedly communicating with the Germans via a courier, a [[KLM|Royal Dutch Airlines]] (KLM) pilot willing to carry messages to and from Lisbon for cash. This meant that message deliveries were limited to the KLM flight schedule. In 1943, responding to German requests for speedier communication, Pujol and Harris created a fictitious radio operator. From August 1943 radio became the preferred method of communication.<ref name=MI5/><ref name=Holt213>[[#Holt|Holt (2010)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=E569Q7s1CnsC&pg=PA213 p. 213].</ref>

On occasion, he had to invent reasons why his agents had failed to report easily available information that the Germans would eventually know about. For example, he reported that his (fabricated) Liverpool agent had fallen ill just before a major fleet movement from that port, and so was unable to report the event.<ref name=MarkSeaman96>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA96 p. 96].</ref> To support this story, the agent eventually "died" and an [[obituary]] was placed in the local newspaper as further evidence to convince the Germans.<ref name=MarkSeaman106>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA106 p. 106].</ref> The Germans were also persuaded to pay a pension to the agent's "widow".<ref name=MarkSeaman126>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA126 p. 126].</ref>

For radio communication, "Alaric" needed the strongest hand encryption the Germans had. The Germans provided Garbo with this system, which was in turn supplied to the codebreakers at [[Bletchley Park]]. Garbo's encrypted messages were to be received in Madrid, manually decrypted, and re-encrypted with an [[Enigma machine]] for retransmission to Berlin.<ref name=BBC_News_Magazine>{{cite news|last=Kelly|first=Jon|title=The piece of paper that fooled Hitler|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12266109|publisher=BBC|access-date=1 January 2012|quote=The Nazis believed Pujol, whom they code named Arabel, was one of their prize assets|date=27 January 2011|archive-date=19 January 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120119013350/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12266109|url-status=live}}</ref> Having both the [[plaintext|original text]] and the Enigma-encoded intercept of it, the codebreakers had the best possible source material for a [[chosen-plaintext attack]] on the Germans' Enigma key.<ref name=MarkSeaman73>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. "The first code which Garbo was given by the Germans for his wireless communications turned out to be the identical code which was currently in use in the German circuits."</ref>

=== Operation Fortitude ===
In January 1944, the Germans told Pujol that they believed a large-scale invasion in Europe was imminent and asked to be kept informed. This invasion was [[Operation Overlord]], and Pujol played a leading role in [[Operation Fortitude]], the deception campaign to conceal Overlord. He sent over 500 radio messages between January 1944 and [[D-Day]], at times more than twenty messages per day.<ref name=MarkSeaman342>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. p. 342 "...which at times amounted to more than twenty messages per day..."</ref> During planning for the Normandy beach invasion, the Allies decided that it was vitally important that the German leaders be misled into believing that the landing would happen at the [[Strait of Dover]].<ref name=MI5 />

In order to maintain his credibility, it was decided that Garbo (or one of his agents) should forewarn the Germans of the timing and some details of the actual invasion of Normandy, although sending it too late for them to take effective action. Special arrangements were made with the German radio operators to be listening to Garbo through the night of 5/6 June 1944 using the story that a sub-agent was about to arrive with important information. However, when the call was made at 3&nbsp;AM, no reply was received from the German operators until 8&nbsp;AM. This enabled Garbo to add more, genuine but now out-of-date, operational details to the message when finally received, and thus increase his standing with the Germans. Garbo told his German contacts that he was disgusted that his first message was missed, saying, "I cannot accept excuses or negligence. Were it not for my ideals I would abandon the work."<ref name=MI5/>

[[Image:DummyShermanTank.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.25|An inflatable [[M4 Sherman]] tank of the [[First U.S. Army Group]]]]
On 9 June{{snd}}three days after D-day{{snd}}Garbo sent a message to German intelligence that was passed to [[Adolf Hitler]] and the {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]}} (OKW; German High Command).<ref name=Historynet/> Garbo said that he had conferred with his top agents and developed an [[order of battle]] showing 75 divisions in Britain; in reality, there were only about 50. Part of the "Fortitude" plan was to convince the Germans that a fictitious formation{{snd}}[[First U.S. Army Group]], comprising 11 divisions (150,000 men), commanded by General [[George Patton]]{{snd}}was stationed in southeast Britain.<ref name=MI5 />

The deception was supported by fake planes, inflatable tanks, and vans travelling about the area transmitting bogus radio chatter. Garbo's message pointed out that units from this formation had not participated in the invasion, and therefore the first landing should be considered a diversion. A German message to Madrid sent two days later said "all reports received in the last week from Arabel [spy network codename] undertaking have been confirmed without exception and are to be described as especially valuable."{{sfn|Masterman|2013|p=163}} A post-war examination of German records found that, during Operation Fortitude, no fewer than sixty-two of Pujol's reports were included in OKW intelligence summaries.<ref name=Pujol06>[[#Pujol|Pujol (1985)]]. p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=7tIDAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA196 196] "The post-war analysis demonstrated that, during the FORTITUDE campaign period, no less than sixty-two of his messages were quoted in the German high command's intelligence summaries."</ref>

OKW accepted Garbo's reports so completely that they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais waiting for a second invasion through July and August 1944. The German Commander-in-Chief in the west, Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]], refused to allow General [[Erwin Rommel]] to move these divisions to Normandy.<ref name=MI5/> There were more German troops in the Pas de Calais region two months after the Normandy invasion than there had been on D-Day.<ref name=Pujol07>[[#Pujol|Pujol (1985)]]. p. 197 "Indeed, there were more German forces in that region at the end of June than there had been on D-Day."</ref>

In late June, Garbo was instructed by the Germans to report on the falling of [[V-1 flying bomb]]s. Finding no way of giving false information without arousing suspicion, and being unwilling to give correct information, Harris arranged for Garbo to be "arrested."<ref name=MarkSeaman259>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA75 p. 75], [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA259 p. 259].</ref><ref name=MarkSeaman159>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=7tIDAAAAMAAJ&&pg=PA159 p. 159].</ref> He returned to duty a few days later, now having a "need" to avoid London and forwarded an "official" letter of apology from the Home Secretary for his unlawful detention.<ref name=MarkSeaman159 /><ref name=MarkSeaman397>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA397 p. 397].</ref>

The Germans paid Pujol US$340,000<ref name="NatGeo">{{cite book|title=I Lie for a Living: Greatest Spies of All Time|last1=Shugaar|first1=Antony|first2=Steven|last2=Guarnaccia|year=2006|publisher=National Geographic |isbn=978-0-7922-5316-7|page=71|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oohnZw6xRkkC&pg=PA71|access-date=24 April 2020|archive-date=24 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211124235826/https://books.google.com/books?id=oohnZw6xRkkC&pg=PA71&hl=en |url-status=live}}</ref> over the course of the war to support his network of agents.<ref name=MarkSeaman40>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA40 p. 40].</ref>