Editing Joseph Stilwell (section)

==World War II==
Between the wars, Stilwell served three tours in China, where he mastered spoken and written Chinese and was the military attaché at the US legation in [[Beijing]] from 1935 to 1939. In 1939 and 1940 he was assistant commander of the [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]] and from 1940 to 1941 organized and trained the [[7th Infantry Division (United States)|7th Infantry Division]] at [[Fort Ord, California]]. It was there that his leadership style which emphasized concern for the average soldier and minimized ceremonies and officious discipline, earned him the nickname of "Uncle Joe."

Just prior to the United States entering [[World War II]], following the Imperial Japanese attack on [[Pearl Harbor]], Stilwell had been recognized as the Army's top corps commander, and he was initially selected to plan and command the [[Operation Torch|Allied invasion of North Africa]].<ref>Tuchman, pp. 231–232.</ref> However, he and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were skeptical about the operation and believed military planners underestimated the risk of submarine attacks interfering with the amphibious landings. He also believed that Allied military planners were too lenient towards [[Francoist Spain]] and underestimated the risk of it joining the [[Axis powers]], writing "The Boches own the country. [[Francisco Franco|Franco]] must pay the bill for [[Spanish Civil War|his war]]." After Stilwell prepared a scathingly [[Anti-British sentiment|anti-British]] final report on the [[Arcadia Conference]], his superiors decided to reassign him.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Roberts |first=Andrew |url=https://archive.org/details/masterscommander0000robe_g9v1 |title=Masters and Commanders: The Military Geniuses Who Led the West to Victory in World War II |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-141-02926-9 |edition=1 |location=London |pages=82–84 |language=en |ref=None |via=Archive Foundation}}</ref> When it became necessary to send a senior officer to China to keep it in the war, Stilwell was selected, over his own personal objections, by US President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and his old friend, Army Chief of Staff [[George Marshall]].

Stilwell became the chief of staff to [[Generalissimo]] [[Chiang Kai-shek]], served as US commander in the [[China Burma India Theater]], was responsible for all [[Lend-Lease]] supplies going to China, and later became deputy commander of [[South East Asia Command]]. Despite his status and position in China, he became involved in conflicts with other senior Allied officers over the distribution of lend-lease materiel, Chinese political sectarianism and proposals to incorporate Chinese and US forces in the [[11th Army Group]] under British command.

===Burma retreat and offensive===
[[File:Stilwell and Merrill.jpg|250px|thumb|Gen. [[Frank Merrill]] (left) with Stilwell in Burma]]
In February 1942 Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general and was assigned to the [[China-Burma-India Theater]] (CBI), where Stilwell had three major roles: commander of all US forces in China, Burma, and India; deputy commander of the Burma-India Theater under Admiral [[Louis Mountbatten]]; and military advisor to Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]], the commander of all Nationalist Chinese forces as well as commander of the Chinese Theater.

The CBI was a geographical administrative command on the same level as the commands of [[Dwight Eisenhower]] and [[Douglas MacArthur]], but unlike other combat theaters like the [[European Theater of Operations]], the CBI was never formally designated a "[[theater of operations]]" and did not report to an overall American commander. The China Theater came under the operational command of Chiang, the commander of the [[National Revolutionary Army]], and the Burma India Theater came under the operational command of the British (first [[GHQ India]] and later the Allied [[South East Asia Command]] whose supreme commander was Mountbatten). During his tenure, there were hardly any American combat forces in the theater, and Stilwell commanded Chinese troops almost exclusively.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bernstein |first1=Richard |title=China 1945 : Mao's revolution and America's fateful choice |date=2014 |location=New York |isbn=9780307595881 |pages=13 |edition=First}}</ref>

The British and the Chinese were ill-equipped and the targets of Japanese offensives. Chiang was interested in conserving his troops and Allied lend-lease supplies to be used against any sudden Japanese offensive and against Communist forces in a later civil war. His wariness increased after he had observed the disastrous Allied performance during the [[Japanese invasion of Burma]].<ref name="history.army.mil">''U.S. Army Operations in World War II: Burma, 1942'' http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110828045431/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm |date=2011-08-28 }}</ref><ref name="cbi-history.com">Sherry, Mark D., ''China Defensive 1942–1945'', [[United States Army Center of Military History]], CBI Background http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_china_def.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210129145302/http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_china_def.html |date=2021-01-29 }}</ref> After fighting and resisting the Japanese for five years, many in the [[Nationalist government]] felt that it was time for the Allies to assume a greater burden in fighting the war.<ref>Tuchman, p. 303.</ref>

The Chinese and American commands were beset by a difference in strategies. Chiang, having fought against Japan since 1937, favored "[[defense in depth]]", an approach partially adopted by the British later in 1944. During the early stages of the conflict both the British and the Americans underestimated the Japanese. Captain [[Evans Carlson]], after observing the [[Battle of Shanghai]] in 1937, called the [[Imperial Japanese Army]] "third rate", while Stilwell wanted to go on the offensive to save Burma. The Japanese divisions there were proficient in both jungle and offroad warfare. They successfully outmaneuvred the road-bound British, coordinated with air support, and exploited local anticolonial sentiments.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 39-40.</ref>

The situation was not helped by miscommunication and insubordination. In February 1942, while retreating across the [[Sittaung River]], the main British force left two brigades on the wrong side after prematurely blowing up the bridge. During an ambush against incoming Japanese at [[Pyinmana]], only the Chinese 5th Army stayed in position. The British pulled back, fearing encirclement, while the [[200th Division (National Revolutionary Army)|Chinese 200th Division]] refused to rush in.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 40-42.</ref>

The first step for Stilwell was the reformation of the Chinese Army.<ref>Tuchman, p. 304.</ref> The reforms clashed with the delicate balance of political and military alliances in China, which kept Chiang in power. Reforming the army meant removing men who maintained Chiang's position as commander-in-chief.<ref>Tuchman, p. 306.</ref> Chiang gave Stilwell technical overall command of some Chinese troops but worried that the new US-led forces would become yet another independent force outside of his control.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/> Since 1942, members of his staff had continually objected to Chinese troops being used in Burma for what they viewed as returning the country to British colonial control.<ref name="history.army.mil"/><ref name="cbi-history.com"/>

Chiang therefore sided with Major General [[Claire Lee Chennault]]'s proposals for the war against the Japanese to be continued largely using existing Chinese forces supported by air forces, which Chennault assured Chiang to be feasible. The dilemma forced Chennault and Stilwell into competition for the valuable lend-lease supplies arriving over the [[Himalayas]] from British-controlled India, an obstacle referred to as "[[The Hump]]."<ref>Tuchman, p. 307.</ref>

George Marshall's biennial report covering 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945, acknowledged that he had given Stilwell "one of the most difficult" assignments of any theater commander.<ref name="Eldridge, p. 160">Eldridge, p. 160.</ref>

[[File:General Stilwell marches out of Burma.jpg|250px|thumb|Stilwell marches out of Burma, May 1942]]
After the collapse of the Allied defenses in Burma cut China off from the remaining supply route, Stilwell declined an airlift offer from General Chennault and led his staff of 117 out of Burma into [[Assam]], India, on foot. They marched at what his men called the "Stilwell stride" of 105 paces per minute.<ref>[[Gordon Stifler Seagrave|Seagrave, Gordon S.]], ''Burma Surgeon'', W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1943</ref><ref name="ReferenceA">''Glimpse of an Epic'', Time Magazine, Monday, August 10, 1942</ref> Two of the men accompanying him, his aide [[Frank Dorn]] and the war correspondent [[Jack Belden]], wrote about their experiences in ''Walkout with Stilwell in Burma'' (1971) and ''Retreat with Stilwell'' (1943) respectively. The Assam route was used by other retreating Allied and Chinese forces.

Stilwell's walkout separated him from the approximately 100,000 Chinese troops still there. 25 thousand of them would later perish during their retreat due to the harsh jungle conditions, poor logistics, and Japanese military operations.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 43.</ref>

In India, Stilwell soon became well known for his no-nonsense demeanor and his disregard for military pomp and ceremony. His trademarks were a battered Army [[campaign hat]], GI shoes, and a plain service uniform with no insignia of rank. He frequently carried a [[M1903 Springfield|Model 1903, .30–06 Caliber, Springfield rifle]] in preference to a sidearm. His hazardous march out of Burma and his bluntly honest assessment of the disaster captured the imagination of the American public: "I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it."<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Stilwell's derogatory remarks on ''Limey'' forces, however, did not sit well with British and Commonwealth commanders.<ref name="Farquharson, 2004 p.59">Farquharson, ''For Your Tomorrow: Canadians and the Burma Campaign, 1941–1945'', Trafford Publishing, (2004), {{ISBN|1-4120-1536-7}}, {{ISBN|978-1-4120-1536-3}}, p. 59</ref>

After the Japanese occupied Burma, China was almost completely cut off from Allied aid and materiel except through the hazardous air route over the Hump. Early on, Roosevelt and the [[US War Department]] had given priority to other theaters for US combat forces, equipment, and logistical support. The closure of the Burma Road and the fall of Burma made it extremely difficult to replace Chinese war losses. This jeopardized the Allies' initial strategy, which was to maintain the Chinese resistance to the Japanese by providing logistical and air support.

In August 1942, Stilwell opened a training center in [[Ramgarh Cantonment|Ramgarh, India]], {{convert|200|mi}} west of [[Kolkata|Calcutta]], to train Chinese troops which had retreated to Assam from Burma. Stilwell's decision to establish the center at Ramgarh met with opposition from several senior British commanders, including Wavell, primarily due to logistical reasons. Chinese soldiers at the center received medical care along with new weapons and uniforms and were trained how to operate artillery, [[Universal Carrier]]s, and [[M3 Stuart]] tanks. By the end of December 1942, 32,000 Chinese troops were being trained at the center to create the 22nd and 38th Divisions along with three artillery regiments and a tank battalion.<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vTgRBQAAQBAJ&q=joseph+stilwell+ramgarh | isbn=978-1-4738-3871-0 | title=Stilwell and the Chindits: The Allies Campaign in Northern Burma, 1943–1944 | date=20 August 2014 | publisher=Pen and Sword }}</ref> From the outset, Stilwell's primary goals were the opening of a land route to China from northern Burma and India by means of a ground offensive in northern Burma to allow more supplies to be transported to China and to organize, equip, and train a reorganized and competent Chinese army that would fight the Japanese in the China-Burma-India theater (CBI).<ref name="cbi-history.com" /><ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190">Samson, Jack, ''The Flying Tiger: The True Story of General Claire Chennault and the U.S. 14th Air Force in China'', Globe Pequot Press (2005) {{ISBN|1-59228-711-5}}, {{ISBN|978-1-59228-711-6}}, p. 190</ref> Stilwell argued that the CBI was the only area with the possibility for the Allies to engage large numbers of troops against their common enemy, Japan. Unfortunately, the huge airborne logistical train of support from the US to British India was still being organized, and supplies being flown over the Hump were barely sufficient to maintain Chennault's air operations and replace some of the Chinese war losses, let alone equip and supply an entire army.<ref name="cbi-history.com" /><ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190" />

Additionally, critical supplies intended for the CBI were being diverted to other combat theaters.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/> Some Chinese and American soldiers diverted the supplies that made it over the Hump to the black market for their personal enrichment.<ref>Tuchman, p. 377.</ref> As a result, most Allied commanders in India, with the exception of General [[Orde Wingate]] and his [[Chindits|Chindit]] operations, focused on defensive measures.{{ref?|date=April 2025}}

===Disagreements with Chiang and British===
[[File:Chiang Kai Shek and wife with Lieutenant General Stilwell.jpg|thumb|250px|Stilwell sharing a laugh with Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]] and [[Soong Mei-ling]], 1942]]
Stilwell left the defeated Chinese troops, and escaped Burma in 1942. Chiang had given him nominal command of these troops, though Chinese generals later admitted that they had considered Stilwell as an "adviser" and sometimes took orders directly from Chiang.<ref>Tuchman, p. 372</ref> Chiang was outraged by what he saw as Stilwell's blatant abandonment of the [[200th Division]], his best army, without orders and began to question Stilwell's capability and judgment as a military commander.<ref>Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p.208</ref>

Chiang was also infuriated at Stilwell's strict control of US lend lease supplies to China. Instead of confronting Stilwell or communicating his concerns to Marshall and Roosevelt when they asked Chiang to assess Stilwell's leadership after the Allied disaster in Burma, Chiang reiterated his "full confidence and trust" in Stilwell<ref>Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p.204</ref> but countermanded some of the orders to Chinese units issued by Stilwell in his capacity as Chief of Staff.

An outraged Stilwell began to call Chiang "the little dummy" or "Peanut" in his reports to Washington,<ref>Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p.216</ref> "Peanut" being originally intended as a code word for Chiang in official radio messages.<ref>{{cite book |title= China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China|last1=Romanus |first1=Cha, p. 23rles F. |last2=Sunderland |first2=Riley |year=1987 |publisher= United States Army Center of Military History|location=Washington, D.C. |page=318}}</ref> On the contrary, the term "Peanut" was first mentioned during Stilwell's flight to the CBI Theater in March 1942. Col. Willard Wyman, a member of Stilwell's staff on that flight mentioned Chiang "...is like a peanut perched on top of a dung heap...".<ref>Frank Dorn, Walkout with Stilwell in Burma, p.23</ref>  Chiang repeatedly expressed his pent-up grievances against Stilwell for his "recklessness, insubordination, contempt, and arrogance" to U.S. envoys to China and was angry at his obsession with going on the offensive in Burma when East China was falling into Japan's hands.<ref>Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p.214</ref><ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 41-44</ref>

Stilwell was infuriated by the rampant corruption of Chiang's regime. Stilwell faithfully kept a diary in which he began to note the corruption and the amount of money ($380,584,000 in 1944 dollars) being wasted on the procrastinating Chiang and his government. The ''Cambridge History of China'', for instance, estimates that 60%–70% of Chiang's Nationalist conscripts did not make it through their basic training, with 40% deserting and the remaining 20% dying of starvation before their full induction into the military. Eventually, Stilwell's belief that Chiang's and his generals were incompetent and corrupt reached such proportions that Stilwell sought to cut off lend-lease aid to China.<ref>Wesley Marvin Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with China in World War II, p.96</ref> Stilwell, while attending the [[Cairo Conference]], received a perceived and verbal order to plan an assassination of Chiang.  Stilwell discussed this with his Aide, Col. Frank Dorn.  Both were baffled, nevertheless, Stilwell delegated that task to Dorn.  It was planned but was never carried out.<ref>Frank Dorn, Walkout with Stilwell in Burma, p. 75–79</ref>

Stilwell pressed Chiang and the British to take immediate actions to retake Burma, but Chiang demanded impossibly large amounts of supplies before he would agree to take offensive action, and the British refused to meet their previous pledges to provide naval and ground troops because of Churchill's "[[Europe first]]" strategy.<ref>Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, pp. 224–225</ref>

Eventually, Stilwell began to complain openly to Roosevelt that Chiang was hoarding U.S. Lend-Lease supplies because he wanted to keep the [[National Revolutionary Army|Nationalist forces]] ready to fight [[Mao Zedong]]'s Communists after the end of the war against the Japanese.<ref>Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p.207</ref> From 1942 to 1944, however, 98% of US military aid over the Hump had gone directly to the [[14th Air Force]] and US military personnel in China.<ref>Jay Taylor, Stilwell's The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, pp. 271</ref>

Stilwell also continually clashed with Field Marshal [[Archibald Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell|Archibald Wavell]] and apparently came to believe that the British in India were more concerned with protecting their colonial possessions than helping the Chinese fight the Japanese. In August 1943, as a result of constant feuding and conflicting objectives of British, American, and Chinese commands, along with the lack of a coherent strategic vision for the China Burma India (CBI) theater, the Combined Chiefs of Staff split the CBI command into separate Chinese and Southeast Asia Theaters.

Stilwell countered Mountbatten's January 1944 attempt to once again change the plans to favor an amphibious assault in the [[Bay of Bengal]] and [[Sumatra]]. "The limeys are welshing," he wrote in his diary and of the plan that seemed to him as nothing more than "fancy charts, false figures and dirty intentions". He sent Brigadier General Boatner to brief the Joint Staffs and Roosevelt.<ref>{{Cite journal| issn = 1546-5330| issue = 107| pages = 6–27| last = Kolakowski| first = Christopher L.| title = "The Coming of Modern War"| journal = Army History| date = 2018| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/26478824| jstor = 26478824}}</ref>

{{Quote box
|quote  = "Whatever the fiasco, aplomb is unbroken. Mistakes, failures, stupidities and other causes of disaster mysteriously vanish. Disasters are recorded with care and pride and become transmuted into things of beauty. Official histories record every move in monumental and infinite detail but the details serve to obscure."
|author = — [[Barbara Tuchman]]
|source = on official British accounts of World War II in Burma
|bgcolor = #F0FFFF
|width  = 30%
}}

===Command of Chindits===
{{further|Battle of Mogaung}}
During his time in India, Stilwell became increasingly disenchanted with British forces and did not hesitate to voice criticisms of what he viewed as hesitant or cowardly behavior. Of the Chindit casualties, 90% were incurred in the last phase of the campaign from 17 May, while they were under Stilwell's direct command.<ref name="Farquharson, 2004 p.59"/> The British viewed the situation quite differently and pointed out that from 6 to 27 June, [[Michael Calvert]]'s [[77th Indian Infantry Brigade|77th Brigade]], which lacked heavy weapons, had taken [[Mogaung]] and suffered 800 casualties (50%) among those of the brigade involved in the operation.<ref name="Prisoners Of Hope">{{cite book |last1=Calvert |first1=Michael |title=Prisoners Of Hope |date=2004 |publisher=Pen and Sword |page= 251 |isbn=9780850524925}}</ref>

Stilwell infuriated Calvert and the British by announcing via the [[BBC]] that Chinese troops had captured Mogaung but not referring to the British. The Chindits were outraged, and Calvert famously signaled to Stilwell's headquarters, "Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage." Stilwell's son was an intelligence officer and said that Umbrage was so small that he could not find it on the map.<ref name="Prisoners Of Hope"/>

Stilwell expected the 77th Brigade to join the siege of [[Myitkyina]], but Calvert was so sickened by demands on his troops that he considered abusive that switched off his radios and withdrew to Stilwell's base. A court-martial was likely until Stilwell and Calvert met in person, the latter being ready to trade punches. Stilwell finally appreciated the conditions under which the Chindits had been operating, apologized by blaming his staff officers for not receiving correct information, and allowed him and his men to withdraw. He finally said to Calvert, "You and your boys have done a great job. I congratulate you". Stilwell also awarded number of medals including a [[Silver Star]].<ref name="Prisoners Of Hope"/>

The [[111th Indian Infantry Brigade|111th Brigade]], after it rested, had orders to capture a hill known as Point 2171. That occurred, but the men were now utterly exhausted. Most of them were suffering from [[malaria]], [[dysentery]], and [[malnutrition]]. On 8 July, at the insistence of Mountbatten, doctors examined the brigade. Of the 2200 men present from four-and-a-half battalions, only 119 were declared fit. The brigade was evacuated. [[John Masters]] kept the fit men, sarcastically named "111 Company," in the field until 1 August.

The portion of 111 Brigade east of the [[Irrawaddy River]] was known as Morris Force, after its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel "Jumbo" Morris. It had spent several months harassing Japanese traffic from [[Bhamo]] to Myitkyina. It had then attempted to complete the encirclement of Myitkyina. Stilwell was angered that it was unable to do so, but [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim|Slim]] pointed out that Stilwell's Chinese 5,500 troops had also failed in that task. By 14 July, Morris Force was down to three platoons. A week later, it had only 25 men fit for duty. Morris Force was evacuated about the same time as 77th Brigade.

Captain [[Charlton Ogburn]], Jr., a US Army Marauder officer, and Chindit Brigade Commanders [[John Masters]] and [[Michael Calvert]], later recalled Stilwell's appointment of a staff officer specially detailed by him to visit subordinate commands to chastise their officers and men as being "yellow."<ref>Masters, John, ''The Road Past Mandalay'', Bantam Press (1979), p. 309–310</ref> In October 1943, after the Joint Planning Staff at [[GHQ India]] had rejected a plan by Stilwell to fly his Chinese troops to northern Burma, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, asked whether Stilwell was satisfied on purely military grounds that the plan could not work. Stilwell replied that he was. Wavell then asked what Stilwell would say to Chiang, and Stilwell replied, "I shall tell him the bloody British wouldn't fight."<ref>{{cite book|last=Fort|first=Adrian|title=Archibald Wavell: the Life and Times of an Imperial Servant|publisher=Jonathan Cope|year=2009|location=London|isbn=978-0-224-07678-4|pages=308–309}}</ref>

===Myitkyina Offensive and aftermath===
{{further|Siege of Myitkyina}}
With the establishment of the new South East Asia Command in August 1943, Stilwell was appointed deputy supreme allied commander under [[Vice Admiral (Royal Navy)|Vice Admiral]] Mountbatten. Taking command of various Chinese and Allied forces, including a new US Army special operations formation, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), later known as [[Merrill's Marauders]], Stilwell built up his Chinese forces for an eventual offensive in northern Burma. On 21 December 1943, Stilwell assumed direct control of planning for the invasion of northern Burma that culminated with the capture of the Japanese-held town of [[Myitkyina]]. In the meantime, Stilwell ordered General [[Frank Merrill]] and the Marauders to start long-range jungle penetration missions behind Japanese lines after the pattern of the British [[Chindits]]. In February 1944, three Marauder battalions marched into Burma. Stilwell was at the Ledo Road front when the Marauders arrived at their jump-off point, but the general did not walk out to the road to bid them farewell.<ref>Masters, John, ''The Road Past Mandalay'', Bantam Press (1979), p. 159</ref>

[[File:Stilwell awarding medals.jpg|thumb|Stilwell awarding medals at Myitkyina, 1944]]
In April 1944, Stilwell launched his final offensive to capture the Burmese city of [[Myitkyina]]. In support of that objective, the Marauders were ordered to undertake a long flanking maneuver towards the town that involved a grueling 65-mile jungle march. Having been deployed since February in combat operations in the jungles of Burma, the Marauders were seriously depleted, suffered from both combat losses and disease, and lost additional men en route to the objective. A particularly devastating scourge was a severe outbreak of [[amoebic dysentery]], which erupted shortly after the Marauders linked up with the [[Chinese Army in India]], called X Force.<ref>Bjorge, Gary J., ''Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations In Northern Burma In 1944'' [[United States Army Center of Military History]] {{cite web |url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bjorge/BJORGE.asp |title=Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944 |access-date=2007-06-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609232526/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bjorge/BJORGE.asp |archive-date=2007-06-09}}</ref>

By then, the men of the Marauders had openly begun to suspect Stilwell's commitment to their welfare and made no effort to hide their displeasure with their hard-driving commander.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 417">Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 page 417.</ref> Despite their sacrifices, Stilwell appeared unconcerned about their losses and had rejected repeated requests for medals for individual acts of heroism.<ref>Hunter, Charles N. (Col.), ''Galahad'', TX Naylor Company (1963)</ref> Initial promises of a rest and rotation were ignored, and the Marauders were not even air-dropped replacement uniforms or mail until late April.<ref name="michiganhistorymagazine.com"/><ref name="ibiblio.org">''The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: India-Burma'' http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C-India/index.html</ref>

On 17 May, the 1,310 remaining Marauders attacked Myitkyina airfield in concert with elements of two Chinese infantry regiments and a small artillery contingent.<ref name="Military History 1944">[[United States Army Center of Military History]], ''Merrill's Marauders February–May 1944, Third Mission: Myitkyina'' (1990) http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/marauders/marauders-third.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090113172953/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/marauders/marauders-third.html |date=2009-01-13 }}</ref><ref name="Merrill's Marauders 1990 pp. 109–110">''Merrill's Marauders: February to May, 1944'' Diane Publishing (1990), {{ISBN|0-7881-3275-X}}, 9780788132759, pp. 109–110</ref> The airfield was quickly taken, but the town, which Stilwell's intelligence staff had believed to be lightly defended,<ref>Tuchman, p. 450</ref> was garrisoned by significant numbers of well-equipped Japanese troops, who were steadily being reinforced.<ref name="michiganhistorymagazine.com">Mehney, Paul, ''The Road to Burma'', Michigan History Online {{cite web |url=http://www.michiganhistorymagazine.com/extra/india/burma.html |title=The Road to Burma -- More on the India-Burma Campaign |access-date=2008-09-15 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080820021224/http://www.michiganhistorymagazine.com/extra/india/burma.html |archive-date=2008-08-20}}</ref> A preliminary attack on the town by two Chinese regiments was thrown back with heavy losses.<ref name="michiganhistorymagazine.com"/><ref name="Busch, Briton C. 2006 p. 182">Busch, Briton C., ''Bunker Hill To Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society'', Brassey's Publishing (2006), {{ISBN|1-57488-775-0}}, {{ISBN|978-1-57488-775-4}}, p. 182</ref> The Marauders did not have the manpower to overwhelm Myitkyina and its defenses immediately. When additional Chinese forces had arrived in a position to attack, the Japanese forces totaled some 4,600<ref name="Busch, Briton C. 2006 p. 182"/> fanatical Japanese defenders.<ref name="Military History 1944"/><ref name="Merrill's Marauders 1990 pp. 109–110"/>

During the siege, which took place during the height of the monsoon season, the Marauders' second-in-command, [[Charles Newtown Hunter|Colonel Hunter]], and the unit's regimental and battalion level surgeons, had urgently recommended for the entire 5307th to be relieved of duty and returned to rear areas for rest and recovery. By then, most of the men had fevers and continual dysentery, forcing the men to cut the seats out of their uniform trousers to fire their weapons and relieve themselves simultaneously.<ref name="Taylor, Thomas H 1997 p. 94">Taylor, Thomas H. and Martin, Robert J., ''Rangers: Lead the Way'', Turner Publishing Company (1997) {{ISBN|1-56311-182-9}}, {{ISBN|978-1-56311-182-2}}, p. 94</ref><ref>''India-Burma, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II'' http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/indiaburma/indiaburma.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110719212652/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/indiaburma/indiaburma.htm |date=2011-07-19 }}</ref> Stilwell rejected the evacuation recommendation but made a front line inspection of the Myitkyina lines. He then ordered all medical staff to stop returning combat troops suffering from disease or illness but to return them to combat status by using medications to keep down fevers.<ref name="www-cgsc.army.mil">Bjorge, Gary J., ''Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations In Northern Burma In 1944'', [[United States Army Center of Military History]] {{cite web |url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bjorge/BJORGE.asp |title=Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944 |access-date=2007-06-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609232526/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bjorge/BJORGE.asp |archive-date=2007-06-09}}</ref> The feelings of many Marauders towards Stilwell were summed up by one soldier, who stated, "I had him [Stilwell] in my sights. I coulda' squeezed one off and no one woulda' known it wasn't a Jap who got that son of a bitch."<ref name="Taylor, Thomas H 1997 p. 94"/>

Stilwell also ordered that all Marauders evacuated from combat from wounds or fever first submit to a special medical "examination" by doctors appointed by his headquarters staff. These examinations passed many ailing soldiers as fit for duty; Stilwell's staff roamed hospital hallways in search of any Marauder with a temperature lower than 103 degrees Fahrenheit.<ref name="Taylor, Thomas H 1997 p. 94"/> Some of the men who were passed and sent back into combat were immediately re-evacuated as unfit at the insistence of forward medical personnel. Later, Stilwell's staff placed blame on Army medical personnel for over-zealously interpreting his return-to-duty order.<ref>
{{cite magazine
| title = The Bitter Tea of General Joe
| magazine = Time Magazine
| url = https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,775164,00.html
| date = 14 August 1944}}</ref>

During the siege, Japanese soldiers resisted fiercely and generally fought to the last man. As a result, Myitkyina did not fall until 4 August 1944, after Stilwell was forced to send in thousands of Chinese reinforcements, but Stilwell was pleased that the objective had at last been taken (his notes from his personal diary contained "Boy, will this burn up the Limeys!"<ref>Masters, John, ''The Road Past Mandalay'', Bantam Books (1979), p. 265</ref>). Later, Stilwell blamed the length of the siege partly on British and Gurkha Chindit forces for not promptly responding to his demands to move north in an attempt to pressure Japanese troops, but the Chindits themselves had suffered grievous casualties in several fierce pitched battles against Japanese troops in the Burmese jungles, along with losses from illness and combat exhaustion.<ref name="www-cgsc.army.mil"/> Stilwell also had not kept his British allies clearly informed of his force movements or coordinated his offensive plans with those of General Slim.

Bereft of further combat replacements for his hard-pressed Marauder battalions, Stilwell felt that he had no choice but to continue offensive operations with his existing forces by using the Marauders as "the point of the spear" until they had achieved all their objectives or been wiped out.<ref name="ibiblio.org"/> He was also concerned that pulling out the Marauders, the only US ground unit in the campaign, would result in charges of favoritism and force him to evacuate the exhausted Chinese and British Chindit forces as well.<ref name="ibiblio.org"/> When General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim|William Slim]], the commander of the British Commonwealth [[Fourteenth Army (United Kingdom)|Fourteenth Army]] in Burma, informed Stilwell that his men were exhausted and should be withdrawn, Stilwell rejected the idea by insisting that his subordinate commanders simply did not understand enlisted men and their tendency to magnify physical challenges.<ref>Slim, William, ''Defeat Into Victory'', London: Cassell (1956), {{ISBN|0-304-29114-5}}, 0-330-39066-X</ref> Having made his own "long march" out of Burma under his own power by using jungle trails, Stilwell found it difficult to sympathize with those who had been in combat in the jungle for months on end without relief. In retrospect, his statements then revealed a lack of understanding of the limitations of lightly equipped unconventional forces that were used in conventional roles.<ref name="ibiblio.org"/><ref>Bjorge, Gary J., ''Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations In Northern Burma In 1944'', sub. "Leadership and Morale", [[United States Army Center of Military History]], p.4 {{cite web |url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bjorge/BJORGE.asp |title=Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944 |access-date=2007-06-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609232526/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bjorge/BJORGE.asp |archive-date=2007-06-09}}</ref>

Myitkyina and the dispute over evacuation policy precipitated a hurried Army Inspector General investigation, followed by US congressional committee hearings, but no disciplinary measure was taken against Stilwell for his decisions as overall commander.<ref>Taylor, Thomas H. and Martin, Robert J., ''Rangers: Lead the Way'', Turner Publishing Company (1997) {{ISBN|1-56311-182-9}}, {{ISBN|978-1-56311-182-2}}, pp. 94–96</ref>

Only a week after the fall of Myitkyina in Burma, the 5307th Marauder force, down to only 130 combat-effective men of the original 2,997, was disbanded.

===Conflict with Chennault===
One of the most significant conflicts to emerge during the war was between General Stilwell and General [[Claire Chennault]], the commander of the famed "[[Flying Tigers]]" and later air force commander. As adviser to the [[Republic of China Air Force]], Chennault proposed a limited air offensive against the Japanese in China in 1943 by using a series of forward air bases. Stilwell insisted that the idea was untenable and that any air campaign should not begin until fully fortified air bases, supported by large ground forces, had been established. Stilwell then argued for all air resources to be diverted to his forces in India for an early conquest of northern Burma.<ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190"/>

In following Chennault's advice, Chiang rejected the proposal, and British commanders sided with Chennault since they were aware that they could not launch a co-ordinated Allied offensive into Burma in 1943 with the resources that were available.<ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190"/> During the summer of 1943, Stilwell's headquarters concentrated on plans to rebuild the Chinese Army for an offensive in northern Burma despite Chiang's insistence on support to Chennault's air operations.

Stilwell believed that after forcing a supply route through northern Burma by a ground offensive against the Japanese, he could train and equip 30 Chinese divisions with modern combat equipment. A smaller number of Chinese forces would transfer to India, where two or three new Chinese divisions would also be raised. That plan then remained only theoretical since the limited available airlift capacity for deliveries of supplies to China over the Hump was being used to sustain Chennault's air operations, instead of equipping Chinese ground units.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/>

In 1944, the Japanese launched the counteroffensive, [[Operation Ichi-Go]], designed to knock China out of the war once and for all. It saw half a million men and 800 tanks, supplied by 70,000 to 100,000 horses dragging wagons and 12,000 to 15,000 vehicles. The operation quickly overran Chennault's forward air bases and proved Stilwell to be correct. By then, Allied supply efforts via the Hump airlift were steadily improving in tonnage supplied per month. With the replacement of Chinese war losses, Chennault now saw little need for a ground offensive in northern Burma to reopen a ground supply route to China. Augmented with increased military equipment and additional troops and concerned about defense of the approaches to India, British authorities now sided with Stilwell.<ref>Masters, John, ''The Road Past Mandalay'', Bantam Press (1979), pp. 155–157</ref>

In co-ordination with a southern offensive by Nationalist Chinese forces under General [[Wei Lihuang]], Allied troops under Stilwell's command launched the long-awaited invasion of northern Burma. After heavy fighting and casualties, both forces linked up in January 1945. Stilwell's strategy remained unchanged: opening a new ground supply route from India to China would allow the Allies to equip and train new Chinese army divisions to be used against the Japanese. The new road network, later called the [[Ledo Road]], would link the northern end of the [[Burma Road]] as the primary supply route to China. Stilwell's staff planners had estimated the route would supply 65,000 tons of supplies per month.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/>
[[File:Stillwell road map usarmy.jpg|thumb|355x355px|Displayed in the Coal Heritage Park & Museum, [[Margherita, Assam]], map of Ledo Road (later renamed Stilwell Road) approved by the US Forces India Burma theater engineer.]]
Using those figures, Stilwell argued that the Ledo Road network would greatly surpass the tonnage being airlifted over the Hump.<ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190" /> Chennault doubted that such an extended network of trails through difficult jungle could ever match the tonnage that could be delivered with modern cargo transport aircraft that were then being deployed in the theater.<ref name="War Wings 2001 p. 191">Guangqiu Xu, ''War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929–1949'', Greenwood Publishing Group (2001), {{ISBN|0-313-32004-7}}, {{ISBN|978-0-313-32004-0}}, p. 191</ref> Progress on the Ledo Road was slow and could not be completed until the linkup of forces in January 1945.

In the end, Stilwell's plans to train and to modernize 30 Chinese divisions in China and two or three divisions from forces that were already in India was never fully realized. As Chennault predicted, the supplies carried over the Ledo Road never approached in tonnage the levels of supplies airlifted monthly into China by the Hump.<ref>CBI Hump Pilots Association, http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_hump5.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225012225/http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_hump5.html |date=2021-02-25 }}</ref> In July 1945, 71,000 tons of supplies were flown over the Hump, compared to 6,000 tons using the Ledo Road, and the airlift operation continued in operation until the end of the war.<ref name="War Wings 2001 p. 191"/><ref>''The Burma Front'' {{cite web |url=http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/Pacific06b.html |title=The Burma Front |access-date=2008-09-13 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080509060125/http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/Pacific06b.html |archive-date=2008-05-09}}</ref>

When supplies were flowing over the Ledo Road in large quantities, operations in other theaters had shaped the course of the war against Japan.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/> Stilwell's drive into northern Burma, however, allowed Air Transport Command to fly supplies into China more quickly and safely by allowing American planes to fly a more southerly route without fear of Japanese fighters. American airplanes no longer had to make the dangerous venture over the Hump, which raised the delivery of supplies from 18,000 tons in June 1944 to 39,000 tons in November 1944.<ref>Tuchman 1985, p. 484</ref> On 1 August 1945, planes crossed the Hump a minute and twelve seconds apart from one another.<ref>Air Force Magazine, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1991/March%201991/0391hump.aspx {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201122193523/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1991/March%201991/0391hump.aspx |date=2020-11-22 }}</ref>

In acknowledgment of Stilwell's efforts, the [[Ledo Road]] was later renamed the Stilwell Road by Chiang.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 38</ref>

===Recall from China===
Efforts to counter [[Operation Ichi-Go]] were hampered in part by disagreements between Chennault and Stilwell.<ref>Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carrol & Graf, 2004, pages 416–417.</ref> Stilwell also clashed with Chiang over the question of [[Guilin]], a city that was besieged by the Japanese.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 424">Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 page 424.</ref> Chiang wanted Guilin defended to the last man, but Stilwell claimed that Guilin was a lost cause.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 417"/>

In his diary, Stilwell wrote: "What they ought to do is to shoot the G-mo [Chiang] and Ho [General He Yingqin] and the rest of the gang."<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 424"/> He ordered the American troops to pull out of Guilin and managed to persuade a reluctant Chiang to accept the loss of the city.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 425">Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 page 425.</ref> The clash over Guilin was only a prelude to another clash in which Chiang demanded the return of the [[Y Force]] from Burma to defend [[Kunming]], the capital of [[Yunnan Province]], which was also being threatened by the Japanese advance.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 425"/> After meeting with Chiang, Stilwell wrote in his diary that Chiang was a "crazy little bastard with that hickory nut he uses for a head.... Usual cockeyed reasons and idiotic tactical and strategic conceptions. He is impossible!"<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 425"/>

Stilwell appealed directly to Roosevelt for help with his dispute with Chiang and so Roosevelt sent Chiang a message: "I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area... with possible catastrophic consequences."<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 425"/> Roosevelt ended his ultimatum to Chiang by the threat to end all American aid unless Chiang "at once" placed Stilwell "in unrestricted command of all your forces."<ref name="SCM">Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, p.446-447</ref><ref name="SMm">[Stilwell Museum http://www.umich.edu/~ssgchem/BPCtravel/2010China/06.2WStilwell/index.html] retrieved 7 Aug 2012</ref>

Chennault later claimed that Stilwell had deliberately ordered Sino-American forces out of Guilin as a way of creating a crisis that would force Chiang to give up command of his armies to Stilwell.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 426">Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 page 426.</ref> Stilwell's diary supported Chennault's claim, as Stilwell wrote that if a crisis emerged that was "just sufficient to get rid of the Peanut without entirely wrecking the ship, it would be worth it." Stilwell went on to write that the entire Nationalist system had to be "torn to bits" and that Chiang would have to go.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 426"/>

{{Quote box | quote=<poem>
I have waited long for vengeance,
At last I've had my chance.
I've looked the Peanut in the eye
And kicked him in the pants.

The old harpoon was ready
With aim and timing true,
I sank it to the handle,
And stung him through and through.

The little bastard shivered,
And lost the power of speech.
His face turned green and quivered
As he struggled not to screech.

For all my weary battles,
For all my hours of woe,
At last I've had my innings
And laid the Peanut low.

I know I've still to suffer,
And run a weary race,
But oh! the blessed pleasure!
I've wrecked the Peanut's face.
</poem>
| source = — Poem written by Joseph Stilwell in 1944<ref>Taylor, Jay, ''"The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China"'', Harvard University Press, 2009, pp.290. ({{ISBN|0-674-03338-8}})</ref> | align=right | bgcolor=#FFFFE0 }}

An exultant Stilwell immediately delivered the letter to Chiang despite pleas from [[Patrick J. Hurley]], Roosevelt's special envoy in China, to delay in delivering the message and to work on a deal that would achieve Stilwell's aim in a way that was more acceptable to Chiang.<ref>Lohbeck, ''Hurley'', p.292</ref> Stilwell wrote in his diary about handing over Roosevelt's message: "I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and than {{sic}} sank back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger right in the solar plexus and went right through him. It was a clean hit, but beyond turning green and losing his powers of speech, he did not bat an eye."<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 426"/> The British journalist Jonathan Fenby wrote about Roosevelt's letter, "Unless the President was ready for America to take over effective control of China, or halt Lend-Lease supplies and abandon the KMT to its fate, his stern words merely amounted to bluff."<ref>Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 page 427.</ref>

Seeing that act as a move toward the complete subjugation of China, Chiang gave a formal reply in which he said that Stilwell must be replaced immediately and that Chiang would welcome any other qualified US general to fill Stilwell's position.<ref>Lohbeck, Hurley, p.298</ref><ref>Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, p.452</ref>

Chiang called Roosevelt's letter the "greatest humiliation I have been subjected to in my life" and stated that it was "all too obvious that the United States intends to intervene in China's internal affairs."<ref>Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 pages 427–428.</ref> Chiang told Hurley that the Chinese people were "tired of the insults which Stilwell has seen fit to heap upon them."<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 428">Fenby, Jonathan ''Chiang Kai-shek China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'', New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004 page 428.</ref> Chiang delivered a speech before the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party that was leaked to the press and called Roosevelt's letter a form of imperialism and stated that accepting Roosevelt's demands would make him no different from the Japanese collaborator [[Wang Jingwei]] in [[Nanjing]].<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 428"/>

On 12 October 1944, Hurley reported to Washington that Stilwell was a "fine man, but was incapable of understanding or co-operating with Chiang Kai-shek" and went on to say that if Stilwell remained in command, all of China might be lost to the Japanese.<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 428"/> Before sending his cable, Hurley showed it to Stilwell, who accused Hurley  to his face of "cutting my throat with a dull knife."<ref name="Fenby, Jonathan page 428"/>

On 19 October 1944, Stilwell, who had been promoted to [[general (United States)|four-star general]] on 1 August 1944, was recalled from his command by Roosevelt. Partly as a result of controversy concerning the casualties suffered by US forces in Burma and partly because of the continuing difficulties with the British and Chinese commanders, Stilwell's return to the US was not accompanied by the usual ceremony. Upon arrival, he was met by two army generals at the airport, who told him not to answer any of the media questions about China.

Stilwell was replaced by General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]], who received a telegram from Marshall on 27 October 1944, that directed him to proceed to China to assume command of the China Theatre and replace Stilwell. Wedemeyer later recalled his initial dread over the assignment, as service in the China Theater was considered to be a graveyard for American officials, both military and diplomatic.<ref>Wedemeyer, Albert C. (Gen), ''Wedemeyer Reports!'', Henry Holt Co. (1958) {{ISBN|0-89275-011-1}}, {{ISBN|0-8159-7216-4}}, p. 269</ref>

When Wedemeyer actually arrived at Stilwell's headquarters after the latter's dismissal, Wedemeyer was dismayed to discover that Stilwell had intentionally departed without seeing him and had not left a single briefing paper for his guidance. Most other departing US military commanders greeted their replacement to have them thoroughly briefed on the strengths and the weaknesses of headquarters staff, the issues confronting the command, and the planned operations.<ref name="Wedemeyer, Albert C. 1958 pp. 303-304">Wedemeyer, Albert C. (Gen), ''Wedemeyer Reports!'', Henry Holt Co. (1958) {{ISBN|0-89275-011-1}}, {{ISBN|0-8159-7216-4}}, pp. 303–304</ref>

Searching the offices, Wedemeyer could find no documentary record of Stilwell's plans or records of his former or future operations.<ref name="Wedemeyer, Albert C. 1958 pp. 303-304"/> General Wedemeyer then spoke with Stilwell's staff officers but learned little from them because Stilwell, according to the staff, kept everything in his "hip pocket".<ref>Wedemeyer, Albert C. (Gen), ''Wedemeyer Reports!'', Henry Holt Co. (1958) {{ISBN|0-89275-011-1}}, {{ISBN|0-8159-7216-4}}, p. 294</ref>

Despite prompting by the news media, Stilwell never complained about his treatment by either Washington or Chiang.{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}