Editing John Boyd (military strategist) (section)

==Military theories==
In the early 1960s, Boyd, together with [[Thomas P. Christie|Thomas Christie]], a civilian mathematician, created the [[energy–maneuverability theory]], or E-M theory, of aerial combat. A legendary [[wikt:maverick|maverick]] by reputation,<ref>Coram 2002, p. 156.</ref> Boyd was said to have stolen the IBM 704 computer time to do the millions of calculations necessary to prove the theory. A civilian employee had previously barred Boyd from performing the calculations, but [[Thomas P. Christie]] provided Boyd a project number. An investigating [[inspector general]] commended Boyd and his computer work.<ref>Coram, Robert. [http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/158365-1 "Interview (Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed The Art of War)"] ''C-SPAN video.'' Retrieved November 29, 2012.</ref> E-M theory became the world standard for the design of fighter aircraft. The Air Force's FX project (subsequently the [[McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle|F-15]]) was then floundering, but Boyd's deployment orders to Vietnam were canceled, and he was brought to the Pentagon to redo the tradeoff studies according to E-M theory. His work helped save the project from being a costly dud even though its final product was larger and heavier than he had desired.<ref>Coram 2002, pp. 157-8.</ref>

With Colonel Everest Riccioni and [[Pierre Sprey]], Boyd formed a small advocacy group within Headquarters USAF that dubbed itself the "[[Fighter Mafia]]."<ref>Burton 1993 {{page needed| date =November 2012}}</ref> Riccioni was an Air Force fighter pilot assigned to a staff position in Research and Development, and Sprey was a civilian statistician working in systems analysis. While assigned to working on the beginnings of the F-15, then called the Blue Bird, Boyd disagreed with the direction the program was going and proposed an alternative "Red Bird". The concept was for a clear-weather air-to-air-only fighter with a top speed of Mach 1.6, rather than the Blue Bird's Mach 2.5+. The top speed would be sacrificed for lower weight (and therefore better maneuverability and lower cost). Both Boyd and Sprey also argued against an active radar and radar-guided missiles, and they proposed the concept to Air Staff. The proposal went unheeded, and there were no changes to the Blue Bird.<ref> Michel 2006 </ref><ref> Coram 2002, p. 154. </ref>

The Secretary of Defense, attracted by the idea of a low cost fighter, gave funding to Riccioni for a study project on the [[Lightweight Fighter program]] (LWF), which became the F-16. Both the Department of Defense and the Air Force went ahead with the program and stipulated a "design to cost" basis no more than $3 million per copy over 300 aircraft. The USAF considered the idea of a "hi-lo" mix force structure and expanded the LWF program. The program soon went against the [[Fighter Mafia]]'s vision since it was not the stripped-down air-to-air specialist that they had envisioned but a heavier multi-role fighter-bomber with advanced avionics, an active radar, and radar-guided missiles.<ref> Michel 2006 </ref>
Harry Hillaker, an F-16 designer, remarked that he would have designed the plane differently if he had known that it would become a multi mission aircraft.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=37|title=F-16 Designer Harry Hillaker|last=Hehs|first=Eric|date=April 15, 1991|website=Code One Magazine}}</ref>

Boyd is credited for largely developing the strategy for the invasion of [[Iraq]] in the [[Gulf War]] of 1991. In 1981, Boyd had presented his briefing, ''[[Patterns of Conflict]]'', to [[US Representative]] [[Dick Cheney|Richard "Dick" Cheney]].<ref name = "coram">Coram 2002, p. 355.</ref> By 1990, Boyd had moved to Florida because of declining health, but Cheney, now Defense Secretary in the [[Presidency of George H. W. Bush|George H. W. Bush administration]], called Boyd back to work on the plans for [[Gulf War|Operation Desert Storm]].<ref name="coram 422-4">Coram 2002, pp. 422–424.</ref><ref name="ford pp. 23-4">Ford 2010, pp. 23–24.</ref> Boyd had substantial influence on the ultimate "left hook" design of the plan.<ref name="wheeler">Wheeler and Korb 2007, p. 87.</ref>

In a letter to the editor of ''Inside the Pentagon'', the former [[Commandant of the United States Marine Corps|Commandant of the Marine Corps]] General [[Charles C. Krulak]] is quoted as saying, "The Iraqi army collapsed morally and intellectually under the onslaught of American and Coalition forces. John Boyd was an architect of that victory as surely as if he'd commanded a fighter [[wing (air force unit)|wing]] or a maneuver [[division (military)|division]] in the [[desert]]."<ref>Hammond 2001, p. 3.</ref>

===OODA loop===
[[File:OODA.Boyd.svg|thumb|right|366x366px|The OODA loop]]
{{Main|OODA loop}}
Based on his experiences in Thailand during the [[Vietnam War]], Boyd conjectured that that the attrition-firepower model of warfare (prevalent since the [[Industrial Revolution]]) would become less important in future conflicts, and the ability to rapidly and accurately acquire and act on information would grow in importance.<ref name="Lock-Pullan">{{cite book |last=Lock-Pullan |first=Richard |date=2006 |title=US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NeqQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 |location=New York, NY |publisher=Routledge |page=74 |isbn=978-1-1357-6505-7 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> In the early 1970s, he developed these observations into a key concept called the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, repeat), a decision making cycle that provided an entity (either an individual or an organization) with foreseeable and planned responses to external events.<ref name="Lock-Pullan"/> The OODA loop has since been used as the core for a theory of [[litigation strategy]] that unifies the use of [[cognitive science]] and [[game theory]] to shape the actions of witnesses and opposing counsel.<ref>Dreier 2012, pp. 74–85.</ref> It has also been proposed as a tool for work-based learning and management education.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ryder |first1=Mike |last2=Downs |first2=Carolyn |title=Rethinking reflective practice: John Boyd's OODA loop as an alternative to Kolb |journal=The International Journal of Management Education |date=November 2022 |volume=20 |issue=3 |page=100703 |doi=10.1016/j.ijme.2022.100703 |s2cid=252152374 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Ryder |first1=Mike |editor1-last=Wall |editor1-first=Tony |editor2-last=Trevisan |editor2-first=Laís Viera |editor3-last=Filho |editor3-first=Walter Leal |editor4-last=Shore |editor4-first=Adam |title=Sustainability in Business Education, Research and Practices |date=2024 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-031-55995-2 |pages=77-89 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-55996-9_6 |chapter=Using OODA Loops to Build Sustainable Practice into Business Education}}</ref>

===Aerial Attack Study===
Boyd also served to revolutionize air-to-air combat in that he was the author of the Aerial Attack Study, which became the official tactics manual for fighter aircraft. Boyd changed how pilots thought; prior to his tactics manual, pilots had thought that air-to-air combat was far too complex to ever be fully understood. With the release of the Aerial Attack Study, pilots realized that the high-stakes death dance of aerial combat was solved.<ref>Coram 2002, p. 114</ref> Boyd said that a pilot going into aerial combat must know two things: the position of the enemy and the velocity of the enemy. Given the velocity of an enemy, a pilot can decide what the enemy can do. When a pilot knows what maneuvers the enemy can perform, he can then decide how to counter any of the other pilot's actions.<ref>Coram 2002, p. 115</ref>

===Military reform===
Boyd gave testimony to Congress about the status of military reform after [[Operation Desert Storm]].<ref>Schwellenbach, Nick. [http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2011/03/air-force-colonel-john-boyds-1991-house-armed-services-committee-testimony.html "Air Force Colonel John Boyd's 1991 House Armed Services Committee Testimony."] ''U.S. Project On Government Oversight'', March 26, 2011. Retrieved: September 7, 2011.</ref>

===Maneuver warfare and Marines===
In January 1980 Boyd gave his briefing ''[[Patterns of Conflict]]'' at the US Marines AWS ([[Marine Corps University|Amphibious Warfare School]]), which led to the instructor, [[Michael Wyly]], and Boyd changing the curriculum. That was with the blessing of [[Bernard E. Trainor|General Trainor]], who later asked Wyly to write a new tactics manual for the Marines.<ref name="coram p. 382">Coram 2002, p. 382.</ref>

Wyly, along with [[Pierre Sprey]], [[Raymond J. Leopold|Raymond J. "Ray" Leopold]], [[Franklin C. Spinney|Franklin "Chuck" Spinney]], Jim Burton, and Tom Christie, were described by writer Coram as Boyd's "[[acolytes]]".<ref name="coram p. 182">Coram 2002, p. 182.</ref>