Editing Joachim von Ribbentrop (section)

==Early diplomatic career==
===Background===
Ribbentrop became Hitler's favourite foreign-policy adviser, partly by dint of his familiarity with the world outside Germany but also by flattery and sycophancy.<ref>Craig, pp. 420–421.</ref><ref name="Rees 93">Rees, p. 93.</ref> One German diplomat later recalled, "Ribbentrop didn't understand anything about foreign policy. His sole wish was to please Hitler".<ref name="Rees 93"/> In particular, Ribbentrop acquired the habit of listening carefully to what Hitler was saying, memorizing his pet ideas and then later presenting Hitler's ideas as his own, a practice that much impressed Hitler as proving Ribbentrop was an ideal Nazi diplomat.<ref>Craig, p. 420.</ref> Ribbentrop quickly learned that Hitler always favoured the most radical solution to any problem and accordingly tendered his advice in that direction as a Ribbentrop aide recalled:

<blockquote>When Hitler said "Grey", Ribbentrop said "Black, black, black". He always said it three times more, and he was always more radical. I listened to what Hitler said one day when Ribbentrop wasn't present: "With Ribbentrop it is so easy, he is always so radical. Meanwhile, all the other people I have, they come here, they have problems, they are afraid, they think we should take care and then I have to blow them up, to get strong. And Ribbentrop was blowing up the whole day and I had to do nothing. I had to break – much better!"<ref>Rees, p. 95.</ref></blockquote>

Another reason for Ribbentrop's rise was Hitler's distrust of and disdain for Germany's professional diplomats. He suspected that they did not entirely support his revolution.<ref>Jacobsen, pp. 59–60, in ''The Third Reich''.</ref> However, the Foreign Office diplomats loyally served the government and rarely gave Hitler grounds for criticism,<ref name="Jacobsen p. 59">Jacobsen, p. 59, in ''The Third Reich''.</ref> while the [[Federal Foreign Office|Foreign Office]] diplomats were ultranationalist, authoritarian and antisemitic.{{confusing-inline|date=October 2024}} As a result, there was enough overlap in values between both groups to allow most of them to work comfortably for the Nazis.<ref name="Trevor-Roper pp 241-242">Trevor-Roper, Hugh "Hitler's War Aims" from ''Aspects of the Third Reich'', H. W. Koch (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 241–242.</ref> Nonetheless, Hitler never quite trusted the Foreign Office and was on the lookout for someone to carry out his foreign policy goals.<ref name="Jacobsen p. 59"/>

===Undermining Versailles===
The Nazis and Germany's professional diplomats shared a goal in destroying the [[Treaty of Versailles]] and restoring Germany as a great power.<ref name="Trevor-Roper pp 241-242"/> In October 1933, German Foreign Minister Baron [[Konstantin von Neurath]] presented a note at the [[World Disarmament Conference]] announcing that it was unfair that Germany should remain disarmed by Part V of the Versailles Treaty and demanded for the other powers to disarm to Germany's level or to rescind Part V and allow Germany ''Gleichberechtigung'' ("equality of armaments"). When France rejected Neurath's note, Germany stormed out of the [[League of Nations]] and the World Disarmament Conference. It all but announced its intention of unilaterally violating Part V. Consequently, there were several calls in France for a [[preventive war]] to put an end to the Nazi regime while Germany was still more-or-less disarmed.<ref name="Bloch 40-41">Bloch, pp. 40–41.</ref>

However, in November, Ribbentrop arranged a meeting between Hitler and the French journalist [[Fernand de Brinon]], who wrote for the newspaper [[Le Matin (France)|''Le Matin'']]. During the meeting, Hitler stressed what he claimed to be his love of peace and his friendship towards France.<ref name="Bloch 40-41"/> Hitler's meeting with Brinon had a huge effect on French public opinion and helped to put an end to the calls for a preventive war. It convinced many in France that Hitler was a man of peace, who wanted to do away only with Part V of the Versailles Treaty.<ref name="Bloch 40-41"/>

===Special Commissioner for Disarmament===
In 1934, Hitler named Ribbentrop Special Commissioner for [[Disarmament]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Demetz |first=Peter |title=Prague in Danger: The Years of German Occupation, 1939–45: Memories and History, Terror and Resistance, Theater and Jazz, Film and Poetry, Politics and War |year=2009 |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |location=New York |page=56 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=b01Lh20kz7EC&q=Hitler+named+Ribbentrop+Special+Commissioner+for+Disarmament&pg=PA56 |isbn=9780374531560}}</ref> In his early years, Hitler's goal in foreign affairs was to persuade the world that he wished to reduce the [[defence budget]] by making idealistic but very vague disarmament offers (in the 1930s, disarmament described [[arms limitation]] agreements).<ref name="Bloch 56">Bloch, p. 56.</ref> At the same time, the Germans always resisted making concrete arms-limitations proposals, and they went ahead with increased military spending on grounds that other powers would not take up German arms-limitation offers.<ref name="Bloch 56"/> Ribbentrop was tasked with ensuring that the world remained convinced that Germany sincerely wanted an arms-limitation treaty, but he ensured that no such treaty was ever developed.<ref name="Bloch 56"/>

On 17 April 1934, French Foreign Minister [[Louis Barthou]] issued the so-called "Barthou note", which led to concerns on the part of Hitler that the French would ask for sanctions against Germany for violating Part V of the Versailles Treaty.<ref>Craig, p. 421.</ref> Ribbentrop volunteered to stop the rumoured sanctions and visited London and Rome.<ref name="craig 422">Craig, p. 422.</ref> During his visits, Ribbentrop met with British Foreign Secretary [[Sir John Simon]] and Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]] and asked them to postpone the next meeting of the Bureau of Disarmament in exchange for which Ribbentrop offered nothing in return other than promising better relations with Berlin.<ref name="craig 422"/> The meeting of the Bureau of Disarmament went ahead as scheduled, but because no sanctions were sought against Germany, Ribbentrop could claim a success.<ref name="craig 422"/>

====Dienststelle Ribbentrop====
In August 1934, Ribbentrop founded an organization linked to the Nazi Party called the ''Büro Ribbentrop'' (later renamed the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop''). It functioned as an alternative foreign ministry.<ref>Bloch, pp. 59–61.</ref> The ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'', which had its offices directly across from the Foreign Office's building on the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, had in its membership a collection of [[Hitler Youth|''Hitlerjugend'']] alumni, dissatisfied businessmen, former reporters, and ambitious [[Nazi Party]] members, all of whom tried to conduct a foreign policy independent of and often contrary to the official Foreign Office.<ref name="craig 422"/> The Dienststelle served as an informal tool for the implementation of the foreign policy of Hitler, consciously bypassing the traditional foreign policy institutions and diplomatic channels of the German Foreign Office. However, the Dienststelle also competed with other Nazi party units active in the area of foreign policy, such as the foreign organization of the Nazis ([[NSDAP/AO]]) led by [[Ernst Wilhelm Bohle|Ernst Bohle]] and [[NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs|Nazi Party office of foreign affairs]] (APA) led by [[Alfred Rosenberg]].<ref>Tammo Luther: ''Volkstumspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1933–1938: die Auslandsdeutschen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten''. Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004, {{ISBN|3-515-08535-1}}. Diagramm "Versuche zur Zentralisierung der Volkstumspolitik (Volksdeutscher Rat) / Stufe&nbsp;II (15. Oktober 1934)", Organigramm Stab Rudolf Heß/Bormann↔Hitler↔Auswärtiges Amt, p.&nbsp;113.</ref> With the appointment of Ribbentrop to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 1938, the Dienststelle itself lost its importance, and about a third of the staff of the office followed Ribbentrop to the Foreign Office.

Ribbentrop engaged in diplomacy on his own, such as when he visited France and met Foreign Minister [[Louis Barthou]].<ref name="Bloch, Ribbentrop, p. 52">Bloch, p. 52.</ref> During their meeting, Ribbentrop suggested for Barthou to meet Hitler at once to sign a Franco-German non-aggression pact.<ref name="Bloch, Ribbentrop, p. 52"/> Ribbentrop wanted to buy time to complete German rearmament by removing preventive war as a French policy option. The Barthou-Ribbentrop meeting infuriated [[Konstantin von Neurath]], since the Foreign Office had not been informed.<ref>Bloch, pp. 52–53.</ref>

Although the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'' was concerned with German relations in every part of the world, it emphasised [[Anglo-German relations]], as Ribbentrop knew that Hitler favoured an alliance with Britain.<ref name="craig 422"/> As such, Ribbentrop greatly worked during his early diplomatic career to realize Hitler's dream of an anti-Soviet Anglo-German alliance. Ribbentrop made frequent trips to Britain, and upon his return he always reported to Hitler that most British people longed for an alliance with Germany.<ref name="craig 422"/> In November 1934, Ribbentrop met [[George Bernard Shaw]], Sir [[Austen Chamberlain]], [[Robert Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood|Lord Cecil]] and [[Philip Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian|Lord Lothian]].<ref>Craig, p. 423.</ref> On the basis of Lord Lothian's praise for the natural friendship between Germany and Britain, Ribbentrop informed Hitler that all elements of British society wished for closer ties with Germany. His report delighted Hitler, causing him to remark that Ribbentrop was the only person who told him "the truth about the world abroad".<ref name="craig 425"/> Because the Foreign Office's diplomats were not so sunny in their appraisal of the prospects for an alliance, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler increased.<ref name="craig 425">Craig, p. 425.</ref> Ribbentrop's personality, with his disdain for diplomatic niceties, meshed with what Hitler felt should be the relentless dynamism of a revolutionary regime.<ref name="craig 425"/>

====Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large====
Hitler rewarded Ribbentrop by appointing him ''Reich'' Minister Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large. In that capacity, Ribbentrop negotiated the [[Anglo-German Naval Agreement]] (AGNA) in 1935 and the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]] in 1936.

====Anglo-German Naval Agreement====
Neurath did not think it possible to achieve the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. To discredit his rival, he appointed Ribbentrop head of the delegation sent to London to negotiate it.<ref>Bloch, pp. 68–69.</ref> Once the talks began, Ribbentrop issued an ultimatum to [[John Simon, 1st Viscount Simon|Sir John Simon]],<ref>Bloch, pp. 71–72.</ref> informing him that if Germany's terms were not accepted in their entirety, the German delegation would go home.<ref>Bloch, p. 72.</ref> Simon was angry with that demand, and walked out of the talks.<ref>Bloch, pp. 72–73.</ref> However, to everyone's surprise, the next day the British accepted Ribbentrop's demands, and the AGNA was signed in London on 18 June 1935 by Ribbentrop and Sir [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Samuel Hoare]], the new British Foreign Secretary.<ref>Bloch, pp. 73–74.</ref> The diplomatic success did much to increase Ribbentrop's prestige with Hitler, who called the day the AGNA was signed "the happiest day in my life". He believed it marked the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance, and ordered celebrations throughout Germany to mark the event.<ref>Kershaw, Ian. ''Hitler Hubris'' New York: Norton, 1999, p. 558.</ref>

Immediately after the AGNA was signed, Ribbentrop followed up with the next step that was intended to create the Anglo-German alliance, the ''[[Gleichschaltung]]'' (co-ordination) of all societies demanding the restoration of [[German colonial empire|Germany's former colonies in Africa]]. On 3 July 1935, it was announced that Ribbentrop would head the efforts to recover Germany's former African colonies.<ref>Weitz, p. 94.</ref> Hitler and Ribbentrop believed that demanding colonial restoration would pressure the British into making an alliance with the ''Reich'' on German terms.<ref>Hildebrand, p. 40.</ref> However, there was a difference between Ribbentrop and Hitler: Ribbentrop sincerely wished to recover the former German colonies, but for Hitler, colonial demands were just a negotiating tactic. Germany would renounce its demands in exchange for a British alliance.<ref>Hildebrand, pp. 40–41.</ref>

====Anti-Comintern Pact====
{{Main|Anti-Comintern Pact}}
[[File:Anti-Comintern_Pact_signing_1936.jpg|thumb|Ribbentrop and the Japanese ambassador to Germany, [[Kintomo Mushakoji]], sign the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936]]
The Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936 marked an important change in German foreign policy.<ref>Bloch, p. 106.</ref> The Foreign Office had traditionally favoured a policy of friendship with the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]], and an [[China-Nazi Germany relations|informal Sino-German alliance]] had emerged by the late 1920s.<ref name="Bloch 81">Bloch, p. 81.</ref><ref name="craig 432">Craig, p. 432.</ref> Neurath very much believed in maintaining Germany's good relations with China and mistrusted the [[Empire of Japan]].<ref name="Bloch 81"/><ref name="craig 432"/> Ribbentrop was opposed to the Foreign Office's pro-China orientation and instead favoured an alliance with Japan.<ref name="Bloch 81"/> To that end, Ribbentrop often worked closely with General [[Hiroshi Ōshima]], who served first as the Japanese military attaché and then as ambassador in Berlin, to strengthen German-Japanese ties, despite furious opposition from the [[Wehrmacht]] and the Foreign Office, which preferred closer Sino-German ties.<ref name="Bloch 81"/>

The origins of the Anti-Comintern Pact went back to mid-1935, when in an effort to square the circle between seeking a ''rapprochement'' with Japan and Germany's traditional alliance with China, Ribbentrop and Ōshima devised the idea of an anticommunist alliance as a way to bind China, Japan and Germany together.<ref name="weinberg 342">{{harvnb|Weinberg|1970|p=342}}</ref> However, when the Chinese made it clear that they had no interest in such an alliance (especially given that the Japanese regarded Chinese adhesion to the proposed pact as a way of subordinating China to Japan), both Neurath and War Minister [[Field Marshal]] [[Werner von Blomberg]] persuaded Hitler to shelve the proposed treaty to avoid damaging Germany's good relations with China.<ref name="weinberg 342"/> Ribbentrop, who valued Japanese friendship far more than that of the Chinese, argued that Germany and Japan should sign the pact without Chinese participation.<ref name="weinberg 342"/> By November 1936, a revival of interest in a German-Japanese pact in both Tokyo and Berlin led to the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin.<ref name="weinberg 343">{{harvnb|Weinberg|1970|p=343}}</ref> When the Pact was signed, invitations were sent to Italy, China, Britain and Poland to join. However, of the invited powers, only the Italians would ultimately sign.<ref name="weinberg 343"/> The Anti-Comintern Pact marked the beginning of the shift on Germany's part from China's ally to Japan's ally.<ref>Bloch, pp. 120–121.</ref>

====Veterans' exchanges====
In 1935, Ribbentrop arranged for a series of much-publicised visits of First World War veterans to Britain, France and Germany.<ref name="Bloch Ribbentrop, p. 65">Bloch, p. 65.</ref> Ribbentrop persuaded the [[Royal British Legion]] and many French veterans' groups to send delegations to Germany to meet German veterans as the best way to promote peace.<ref name="Bloch Ribbentrop, p. 65"/> At the same time, Ribbentrop arranged for members of the [[Der Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten|''Frontkämpferbund'']], the official German World War I veterans' group, to visit Britain and France to meet veterans there.<ref name="Bloch Ribbentrop, p. 65"/> The veterans' visits and attendant promises of "never again" did much to improve the "New Germany's" image in Britain and France. In July 1935, Brigadier Sir Francis Featherstone-Godley led the British Legion's delegation to Germany. The [[Edward VIII of the United Kingdom|Prince of Wales]], the Legion's patron, made a much-publicized speech at the Legion's annual conference in June 1935 that stated that he could think of no better group of men than those of the Legion to visit and carry the message of peace to Germany and that he hoped that Britain and Germany would never fight again.<ref>Bloch, p. 79.</ref> As for the contradiction between German rearmament and his message of peace, Ribbentrop argued to whoever would listen that the German people had been "humiliated" by the Versailles Treaty, Germany wanted peace above all and German violations of Versailles were part of an effort to restore Germany's "self-respect". By the 1930s, much of British opinion had been convinced that the treaty was monstrously unfair and unjust to Germany, so as a result, many in Britain, such as [[Thomas Jones (T. J.)|Thomas Jones]], Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, were very open to Ribbentrop's message that European peace would be restored if only the Treaty of Versailles could be done away with.<ref>Bloch, pp. 92–93.</ref>