Editing Internalism and externalism (section)

=== Reasons<!-- Linked from 'Bernard Williams' ===
There is also a distinction in [[ethics]] and [[Action theory (philosophy)|action theory]], largely made popular by [[Bernard Williams]] (1979, reprinted in 1981),<ref name="Williams" /> concerning internal and external reasons for an action.  An ''internal reason'' is, roughly, something that one has in light of one's own "subjective motivational set"—one's own commitments, desires (or wants), goals, etc. On the other hand, an ''external reason'' is something that one has independent of one's subjective motivational set.  For example, suppose that Sally is going to drink a glass of poison, because she wants to commit suicide and believes that she can do so by drinking the poison.  Sally has an internal reason to drink the poison, because she wants to commit suicide.  However, one might say that she has an external reason not to drink the poison because, even though she wants to die, one ought not to kill oneself no matter what—regardless of whether one wants to die.

Some philosophers embrace the existence of both kinds of reason, while others deny the existence of one or the other. For example, Bernard Williams (1981)<ref name="Williams" /> argues that there are really only internal reasons for action. Such a view is called ''internalism about reasons'' (or ''reasons internalism''). ''Externalism about reasons'' (or ''reasons externalism'') is the denial of reasons internalism.<ref>Finlay, Stephen & Schroeder, Mark (2008). "Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External" (§1.1). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.))</ref> It is the view that there are external reasons for action; that is, there are reasons for action that one can have even if the action is not part of one's subjective motivational set.

Consider the following situation. Suppose that it's against the moral law to steal from the poor, and Sasha knows this. However, Sasha doesn't desire to follow the moral law, and there is currently a poor person next to him. Is it intelligible to say that Sasha has a reason to follow the moral law right now (to not steal from the poor person next to him), even though he doesn't care to do so? The reasons externalist answers in the affirmative ("Yes, Sasha has a reason not to steal from that poor person."), since he believes that one can have reasons for action even if one does not have the relevant desire. Conversely, the reasons internalist answers the question in the negative ("No, Sasha does not have a reason not to steal from that poor person, though others might."). The reasons internalist claims that external reasons are unintelligible; one has a reason for action only if one has the relevant desire (that is, only internal reasons can be reasons for action). The reasons internalist claims the following: the moral facts are a reason ''for Sasha's action'' not to steal from the poor person next to him only if he currently ''wants'' to follow the moral law (or if not stealing from the poor person is a way to satisfy his other current goals—that is, part of what Williams calls his "subjective motivational set"). In short, the reasoning behind reasons internalism, according to Williams,<ref name="Williams" /> is that reasons for action must be able to explain one's action; and only internal reasons can do this.

== Epistemology<!--Linked from 'Reliabilism'--> ==

=== Justification ===

==== Internalism ====
Two main varieties of epistemic internalism about justification are access internalism and ontological internalism. Access internalists require that a believer must have internal access to the justifier(s) of their belief ''p'' in order to be justified in believing ''p''. For the access internalist, justification amounts to something like the believer being aware (or capable of being aware) of certain facts that make her belief in ''p'' rational, or them being able to give reasons for her belief in ''p''. At minimum, access internalism requires that the believer have some kind of reflective access or awareness to whatever justifies her belief. Ontological internalism is the view that justification for a belief is established by one's mental states. Ontological internalism can be distinct from access internalism, but the two are often thought to go together since we are generally considered to be capable of having reflective access to mental states.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008">Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V. ''Epistemology.'' By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.</ref>

One popular argument for internalism is known as the 'new evil demon problem'. The new evil demon problem indirectly supports internalism by challenging externalist views of justification, particularly [[reliabilism]]. The argument asks us to imagine a subject with beliefs and experiences identical to ours, but the subject is being systematically deceived by a malicious Cartesian demon so that all their beliefs turn out false. In spite of the subject's unfortunate deception, the argument goes, we do not think this subject ceases to be rational in taking things to be as they appear as we do. After all, it is possible that we could be radically deceived in the same way, yet we are still justified in holding most of our beliefs in spite of this possibility. Since reliabilism maintains that one's beliefs are justified via reliable belief-forming processes (where reliable means yielding true beliefs), the subject in the evil demon scenario would not likely have any justified beliefs according to reliabilism because all of their beliefs would be false. Since this result is supposed to clash with our intuitions that the subject is justified in their beliefs in spite of being systematically deceived, some take the new evil demon problem as a reason for rejecting externalist views of justification.<ref>"The New Evil Demon Problem" by Clayton Littlejohn, ''The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', {{ISSN|2161-0002}}, <nowiki>http://www.iep.utm.edu/</nowiki>, today's date</ref>

==== Externalism ====
Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified.<ref>BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.</ref> The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.<ref name="Sosa, Ernest 2008"/>

[[Alvin Goldman]], one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:

"If S’s believing ''p'' at ''t'' results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or 	set of processes), then S’s belief in ''p'' at ''t'' is justified.<ref name=":0">Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?” ''Epistemology.'' Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print</ref>”

Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.<ref name=":0"/>

A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).<ref name=":0" />

=== As a response to skepticism<!--Linked from 'Semantic externalism'--> ===
In responding to [[Philosophical skepticism|skepticism]], [[Hilary Putnam]] (1982<ref name="Putnam, H. 1981">Putnam, H. (1981): "Brains in a vat" in Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press; reprinted in DeRose and Warfield, editors (1999): Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford UP.</ref>) claims that [[semantic externalism]] yields "an argument we can give that shows we are not [[brain in a vat|brains in a vat]] (BIV).  (See also DeRose, 1999.<ref name="DeRose">DeRose, Keith (1999) "Responding to Skepticism", Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader.</ref>) If semantic externalism is true, then the meaning of a word or sentence is not wholly determined by what individuals think those words mean.  For example, semantic externalists maintain that the word "water" referred to the substance whose chemical composition is H<sub>2</sub>O even before scientists had discovered that chemical composition.  The fact that the substance out in the world we were calling "water" actually had that composition at least partially determined the meaning of the word.  One way to use this in a response to skepticism is to apply the same strategy to the terms used in a skeptical argument in the following way (DeRose, 1999<ref name="DeRose" />):

{{Blockquote|Either I am a BIV, or I am not a BIV.<br/>
If I am not a BIV, then when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true.<br/>
If I am a BIV, then, when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true (because "brain" and "vat" would only pick out the brains and vats being simulated, not real brains and real vats).<br/>
---<br/>
My utterance of "I am not a BIV" is true.}}

To clarify how this argument is supposed to work:  Imagine that there is brain in a vat, and a whole world is being simulated for it.  Call the individual who is being deceived "Steve."  When Steve is given an experience of walking through a park, semantic externalism allows for his thought, "I am walking through a park" to be true so long as the [[simulated reality]] is one in which he is walking through a park.  Similarly, what it takes for his thought, "I am a brain in a vat," to be true is for the simulated reality to be one where he is a brain in a vat.  But in the simulated reality, he is not a brain in a vat.

Apart from disputes over the success of the argument or the plausibility of the specific type of semantic externalism required for it to work, there is question as to what is gained by defeating the skeptical worry with this strategy.  Skeptics can give new skeptical cases that wouldn't be subject to the same response (e.g., one where the person was very recently turned into a brain in a vat, so that their words "brain" and "vat" still pick out real brains and vats, rather than simulated ones).  Further, if even brains in vats can correctly believe "I am not a brain in a vat," then the skeptic can still press us on how we know we are not in that situation (though the externalist will point out that it may be difficult for the skeptic to describe that situation).

Another attempt to use externalism to refute skepticism is done by [[Anthony Brueckner|Brueckner]]<ref>{{cite book
 | first = Anthony
 | last = Brueckner
 | chapter = Semantic Answers to Skepticism
 | title = Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader
 | pages = 43–60
 | publisher = Oxford University Press
 | year = 1999
 | location = Oxford
}}</ref> and [[Ted A. Warfield|Warfield]].<ref>Warfield, Ted A. Skepticism (1999, ed. with Keith DeRose, Oxford, 1999)</ref> It involves the claim that our thoughts are ''[[intentionality|about]]'' things, unlike a BIV's thoughts, which cannot be ''about'' things (DeRose, 1999<ref name="DeRose"/>).