Editing Historicism (section)

===Hegelian===
[[File:G.W.F. Hegel (by Sichling, after Sebbers).jpg|right|thumb|G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)]]

Hegel viewed the realization of human freedom as the ultimate purpose of history, which could be achieved only through the creation of the perfect state. Historical progress toward this state would occur through a dialectical process: the tension between the purpose of humankind (freedom) and humankind's current condition would produce the attempt by humankind to change its condition to one more in accord with its nature. However, because humans are often not aware of the goal of humanity and history, the process of achieving freedom is necessarily one of self-discovery.

Hegel saw progress toward freedom as conducted by the "spirit" ([[Geist]]), a seemingly supernatural force that directs all human actions and interactions. Yet Hegel makes clear that the spirit is a mere abstraction that comes into existence "through the activity of finite agents". Thus, Hegel's determining forces of history may not have a metaphysical nature, though many of his opponents and interpreters have understood him as holding metaphysical and determinist views.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Hegel|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00beis_847|url-access=limited|last=Beiser|first=Frederick C.|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1993|location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00beis_847/page/n298 289]–91}}</ref>

Hegel's historicism also suggests that any human [[society]] and all human activities such as [[science]], [[art]], or [[philosophy]], are defined by their history. Consequently, their essence can be sought only by understanding said history. The history of any such human endeavor, moreover, not only continues but also reacts against what has gone before; this is the source of Hegel's famous dialectic teaching usually summarized by the slogan "[[Thesis, antithesis, synthesis|thesis, antithesis, and synthesis]]".  (Hegel did not use these terms, although [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte|Johann Fichte]] did.) Hegel's famous [[aphorism]], "Philosophy is the history of philosophy", describes it bluntly.

Hegel's position is perhaps best illuminated when contrasted against the atomistic and reductionist opinion of human societies and social activities self-defining on an ''ad hoc'' basis through the sum of dozens of interactions. Yet another contrasting model is the persistent metaphor of a [[social contract]].  Hegel considers the relationship between individuals and societies as organic, not atomic: even their social discourse is mediated by [[philosophy of language|language]], and language is based on [[etymology]] and unique character. It thus preserves the culture of the past in thousands of half-forgotten [[metaphor]]s.  To understand why a person is the way he is, you must examine that person in his society: and to understand that society, you must understand its history, and the forces that influenced it.  The ''[[Zeitgeist]]'', the "Spirit of the Age", is the concrete embodiment of the most important factors that are acting in human history at any given time. This contrasts with teleological theories of activity, which suppose that the end is the determining factor of activity, as well as those who believe in a [[tabula rasa]], or blank slate, opinion, such that individuals are defined by their interactions.

These ideas can be interpreted variously.  The [[Right Hegelians]], working from Hegel's opinions about the organicism and historically determined nature of human societies, interpreted Hegel's historicism as a justification of the unique destiny of national groups and the importance of stability and institutions.  Hegel's conception of human societies as entities greater than the individuals who constitute them influenced nineteenth-century [[romantic nationalism]] and its twentieth-century excesses.  The [[Young Hegelians]], by contrast, interpreted Hegel's thoughts on societies influenced by social conflict for a doctrine of [[social progress]], and attempted to manipulate these forces to cause various results.  Karl Marx's doctrine of "historical inevitabilities" and [[historical materialism]] is one of the more influential reactions to this part of Hegel's thought.  Significantly, Karl Marx's [[Marx's theory of alienation|theory of alienation]] argues that [[capitalism]] disrupts traditional relationships between workers and their work.

Hegelian historicism is related to his ideas on the means by which human societies progress, specifically the [[Hegelian dialectic|dialectic]] and his conception of logic as representing the inner essential nature of reality. Hegel attributes the change to the "modern" need to interact with the world, whereas ancient philosophers were self-contained, and medieval philosophers were monks. In his History of Philosophy Hegel writes:

<blockquote>
In modern times things are very different; now we no longer see philosophic individuals who constitute a class by themselves. With the present day all difference has disappeared; philosophers are not monks, for we find them generally in connection with the world, participating with others in some common work or calling. They live, not independently, but in the relation of citizens, or they occupy public offices and take part in the life of the state. Certainly they may be private persons, but if so, their position as such does not in any way isolate them from their other relationship. They are involved in present conditions, in the world and its work and progress. Thus their philosophy is only by the way, a sort of luxury and superfluity. This difference is really to be found in the manner in which outward conditions have taken shape after the building up of the inward world of religion. In modern times, namely, on account of the reconciliation of the worldly principle with itself, the external world is at rest, is brought into order — worldly relationships, conditions, modes of life, have become constituted and organized in a manner which is conformable to nature and rational. We see a universal, comprehensible connection, and with that individuality likewise attains another character and nature, for it is no longer the plastic individuality of the ancients. This connection is of such power that every individuality is under its dominion, and yet at the same time can construct for itself an inward world.<ref name=LecturesOnTheHistoryOfPhilosophyVolume3>[https://books.google.com/books?id=ik05WhN4ga0C&pg=PA167 "Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume 3"], By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, M. A., ''University of Nebraska Press'', 1995</ref>
</blockquote>

This opinion that entanglement in society creates an indissoluble bond with expression, would become an influential question in philosophy, namely, the requirements for individuality.  It would be considered by [[Nietzsche]], [[John Dewey]] and [[Michel Foucault]] directly, as well as in the work of numerous artists and authors. There have been various responses to Hegel's challenge. The Romantic period emphasized the ability of individual genius to transcend time and place, and use the materials from their heritage to fashion works which were beyond determination. The modern would advance versions of John Locke's infinite malleability of the human animal. Post-structuralism would argue that since history is not present, but only the image of history, that while an individual era or power structure might emphasize a particular history, that the contradictions within the story would hinder the very purposes that the history was constructed to advance.