Editing Hedonism (section)

=== Axiological hedonism ===
Axiological or evaluative hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]]. An entity has intrinsic value or is good in itself if its worth does not depend on external factors. Intrinsic value contrasts with [[Instrumental and intrinsic value|instrumental value]], which is the value of things that lead to other good things. According to axiological hedonism, pleasure is intrinsically valuable because it is good even when it produces no external benefit. Money, by contrast, is only instrumentally good because it can be used to obtain other good things but lacks value apart from these uses. Axiological hedonism asserts that only pleasure has intrinsic value whereas other things only have instrumental value to the extent that they lead to pleasure or the avoidance of pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} }}</ref> The overall value of a thing depends on both its intrinsic and instrumental value. In some cases, even unpleasant things, like a painful surgery, can be overall good, according to axiological hedonism, if their positive consequences make up for the unpleasantness.<ref name="auto1">{{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}}</ref>

Prudential hedonism is a form of axiological hedonism that focuses specifically on [[well-being]] or what is good for an individual. It states that pleasure and pain are the sole factors of well-being, meaning that how good a life is for a person only depends on its balance of pleasure over pain. Prudential hedonism allows for the possibility that other things than well-being have intrinsic value, such as beauty or freedom.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|de Bres|2014|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=t-CkBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT428 Hedonism]}} }}</ref>

According to quantitative hedonism, the intrinsic value of pleasure depends solely on its intensity and duration. Qualitative hedonists hold that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor. They argue, for instance, that subtle pleasures of the mind, like the enjoyment of fine art and philosophy, can be more valuable than simple bodily pleasures, like enjoying food and drink, even if their intensity is lower.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} }}</ref>

[[File:Robert Nozick 1977 Libertarian Review cover.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Robert Nozick|[[Robert Nozick]]'s [[experience machine]] is an influential [[thought experiment]] against hedonism.<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 146–147]}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA163 163–164]}} }}</ref>]]

Proponents of axiological hedonism often focus on intuitions about the relation between pleasure and value or on the observation that pleasure is desirable.<ref name="auto1"/> The idea that most pleasures are valuable in some form is relatively uncontroversial. However, the stronger claim that all pleasures are valuable and that they are the only source of intrinsic value is subject to debate.<ref>{{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}}</ref> Some critics assert that certain pleasures are worthless or even bad, like disgraceful and [[Everyday sadism|sadistic]] pleasures.<ref>{{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=38–39}}</ref>{{efn|A more controversial objection asserts that all pleasures are bad.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vogt|2018|p=[https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004379503/BP000015.xml 94]}} | {{harvnb|Aufderheide|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=F5jIDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA57 57]}} }}</ref>}} A different criticism comes from [[Value pluralism|value pluralists]], who contend that other things besides pleasure have value. To support the idea that [[beauty]] is an additional source of value, [[G. E. Moore]] used a [[thought experiment]] involving two worlds: one exceedingly beautiful and the other a heap of filth. He argued that the beautiful world is better even if there is no one to enjoy it.<ref>{{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=51–52}}</ref> Another influential thought experiment, proposed by [[Robert Nozick]], involves an [[experience machine]] able to create artificial pleasures. Based on his observation that most people would not want to spend the rest of their lives in this type of pleasant illusion, he argued that hedonism cannot account for the values of authenticity and genuine experience.<ref name="auto4"/>{{efn|Another historically influential argument, first formulated by Socrates, suggests that a pleasurable life void of any higher [[cognitive]] processes, like the life of a happy [[oyster]], is not the best form of life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2d. The Oyster Example}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=43–44}} }}</ref>}}