Editing Gulf of Tonkin incident (section)

===First attack===
[[File:MaddoxTonkin1.svg|right|thumb|upright=1|Chart showing the track of the USS ''Maddox'', 31 July – 2 August 1964 (date of first incident)]]

In July 1964, "the situation along North Vietnam's territorial waters had reached a near boil", because of South Vietnamese commando raids and airborne operations that inserted intelligence teams into North Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam's military response to these operations.<ref name=Ha01>{{cite journal |last1=Hanyok |first1=Robert J. |title=Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish |journal=[[National Security Agency academic publications|Cryptologic Quarterly]]|url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/s/skunks-bogies-silent-hounds-flying-fish.html|location=Fort Meade|publisher=[[National Security Agency]]|via=[[Naval History and Heritage Command]] |date=2001 |volume=19/20 |issue=4/1 |pages=1–55}}</ref> On the night of July 30, 1964, South Vietnamese commandos attacked a North Vietnamese radar station on Hòn Mê island.<ref name=Ha01/> According to Hanyok, "it would be attacks on these islands, especially Hòn Mê, by South Vietnamese commandos, along with the proximity of the ''Maddox'', that would set off the confrontation", although the ''Maddox'' did not participate in the commando attacks.<ref name=Ha01/> In this context, on July 31, ''Maddox'' began patrols of the North Vietnamese coast to collect intelligence, coming within a few miles of Hòn Mê island.<ref name=Ha01/> A U.S. aircraft carrier, the [[USS Ticonderoga (CV-14)|USS ''Ticonderoga'']], was also stationed nearby.<ref name=Ha01/>

[[File:PikiWiki Israel 10477 egyptian torpedo boat k-123.jpg|left|thumb|upright=0.8|P-4 torpedo boat, similar to those used by the North Vietnamese military]]
[[File:F-8E VMF-212 CVA-34 1965 (cropped).jpg|left|thumb|upright=0.8|F-8 Crusader]]

By 1 August, North Vietnamese patrol boats were tracking ''Maddox'', and several intercepted communications indicated that they were preparing to attack.<ref name=Ha01/> ''Maddox'' retreated, but the next day, ''Maddox'', which had a top speed of 28 knots, resumed her routine patrol, and three North Vietnamese [[P 4-class torpedo boat|P-4 torpedo boats]] with a top speed of 50 knots began to follow ''Maddox''.<ref name=Ha01/> The boats were from Squadron 135, commanded by Le Duy Khoai, with the boats commanded by brothers Van Bot, Van Tu, and Van Gian.<ref name=Ha01/> Intercepted communications indicated that the vessels intended to attack ''Maddox''.<ref name=Ha01/> As the ships approached from the southwest, ''Maddox'' changed course from northeasterly to southeasterly and increased speed to 25 knots.<ref name=Ha01/>

As the torpedo boats neared, ''Maddox'' fired three warning shots.<ref name=Ha01/> The North Vietnamese boats then attacked,<ref name=Ha01/> and ''Maddox'' radioed she was under attack from the three boats, closing to within {{Convert|10|nmi}}, while located {{convert|28|nmi}} away from the North Vietnamese coast in [[international waters]].<ref name="PentagonPaper P.IVc2b">[http://media.nara.gov/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-C-2b.pdf Pentagon Papers, Part IV. C. 2. b.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130809133519/http://media.nara.gov/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-C-2b.pdf |date=August 9, 2013 }}, "Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN." July–October 1964, National Archives Identifier no. 5890500</ref> ''Maddox'' stated she had evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127&nbsp;mm) guns, forcing the torpedo boats away. Two of the torpedo boats had come as close as {{Convert|5|nmi}} and released one torpedo each, but neither one was effective, coming no closer than about {{Convert|100|yards}} after ''Maddox'' evaded them.<ref name="PentagonPaper P.IVc2b" /> Another P-4 received a direct hit from a five-inch shell from ''Maddox''; its torpedo malfunctioned at launch.<ref name="PentagonPaper P.IVc2b" /> Four USN [[Vought F-8 Crusader|F-8 Crusader]] jets launched from ''Ticonderoga'' and 15 minutes after ''Maddox'' had fired her initial warning shots, attacked the retiring P-4s,<ref name=Ha01/> claiming one was sunk and one heavily damaged. ''Maddox'' suffered only minor damage from a single 14.5&nbsp;mm bullet from a P-4's [[KPV heavy machine gun]] into her superstructure. Retiring to South Vietnamese waters, ''Maddox'' was joined by the destroyer {{USS|Turner Joy|DD-951|6}}.

The original account from the ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' has been revised in light of a 2001 internal NSA historical study, which states:<ref name=Ha01/>{{blockquote|At 1500G, Captain Herrick (commander of ''Maddox'') ordered Ogier's gun crews to open fire if the boats approached within ten thousand yards. At about 1505G, ''Maddox'' fired three rounds to warn off the communist [North Vietnamese] boats. This initial action was never reported by the Johnson administration, which insisted that the Vietnamese boats fired first.}}

''Maddox'', when confronted, was approaching Hòn Mê Island, three to four nautical miles (nmi) (6 to 7&nbsp;km) inside the {{Convert|12|nmi}} limit claimed by North Vietnam. This territorial limit was unrecognized by the United States. After the skirmish, Johnson ordered ''Maddox'' and ''Turner Joy'' to stage daylight runs into North Vietnamese waters, testing the {{Convert|12|nmi}} limit and North Vietnamese resolve. These runs into North Vietnamese territorial waters coincided with South Vietnamese coastal raids and were interpreted as coordinated operations by the North, which officially acknowledged the engagements of August.<ref>OAH Magazine of History, fall 1992. The Gulf of Tonkin by Erich Martel</ref>

[[File:North Vietnamese P-4 under fire from USS Maddox (2 August 1964).jpg|right|thumb|upright=1|A North Vietnamese P-4 engaging USS ''Maddox'', 2 August 1964]]

Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the incident. He claimed that the North Vietnamese had tracked ''Maddox'' along the coast by radar and were thus aware that the destroyer had not actually attacked North Vietnam and that Hanoi (or the local commander) had ordered its craft to engage ''Maddox'' anyway.  North Vietnamese general [[Phùng Thế Tài]] later claimed that ''Maddox'' had been tracked since 31 July and that she had attacked fishing boats on August 2 forcing the North Vietnamese Navy to "fight back".<ref>[http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/org.wgbh.mla:a313af686e03427f396d60fce82ee0d71521f0b4 "Interview with Phung The Tai, 1981"] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120529204043/http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/org.wgbh.mla:a313af686e03427f396d60fce82ee0d71521f0b4 |date=May 29, 2012 }}. February 19, 1981. WGBH Media Library & Archives. Retrieved November 9, 2010.</ref>

Sharp also noted that orders given to ''Maddox'' to stay {{Convert|8|nmi}} off the North Vietnamese coast put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed only a {{Convert|5|nmi}} limit as its territory (or off of its off-shore islands). In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions all over the world, and the destroyer {{USS|John R. Craig|DD-885|6}} had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident.<ref>Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, ''Strategy for Defeat – Vietnam in Retrospect'' (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) p. 42</ref>

Sharp's claims, however, included some factually incorrect statements. North Vietnam did not adhere to an 8-kilometer (5&nbsp;mi) limit for its territorial waters; instead it adhered to a {{Convert|20|km|sp=us|adj=on}} limit claimed by [[French Indochina]] in 1936.<ref name=cookefarrell>{{cite book |last= Farrell|first= Epsey Cooke|date= 1998|title= The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Law of the Sea|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=WAV8S7k400QC&q=Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Vietnam%20territorial%20waters&pg=PA46|location=The Hague |publisher= Martinus Nijhoff|pages=46–47 |isbn= 9041104739|access-date= May 7, 2015}}</ref> Moreover it officially claimed a 12&nbsp;nmi limit, which is practically identical to the old 20&nbsp;km French claim, after the incidents of August, in September 1964.<ref name=cookefarrell /><ref>{{cite book |last=Buchholz|first= Hanns Jürgen |date= December 1987|title= Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2KZEEuaS6RIC&q=Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Vietnam%20territorial%20waters&pg=PA47 |publisher=  ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies|page= 47|isbn= 9971988739|access-date= May 7, 2015}}</ref> The North Vietnamese stance is that they always considered a 12 nautical mile limit, consistent with the positions regarding the law of the sea of both the Soviet Union and China, their main allies.<ref name=cookefarrell />