Editing Griswold v. Connecticut (section)

===Opinion of the Court===
[[File:Justice_William_O_Douglas.jpg|thumb|right|upright=0.9|Justice [[William O. Douglas]], the author of the majority opinion in ''Griswold'']]
Seven justices formed the majority and joined an opinion written by [[Associate Justice of the United States|justice]] [[William O. Douglas]]. The Court held that the U.S. Constitution protects "marital privacy" as a fundamental constitutional right, but it rejected the notion it needed to identify only a singular source for the right in the Constitution's text.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.2, p. 882}} The Court rejected the [[Due Process Clause]] of the [[Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fifth]] and [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution]] as the source of the marital privacy right, because at the time the Court still formally rejected the doctrine of [[substantive due process]] due to its association with the 1905 decision ''[[Lochner v. New York]]'', and with economic problems, business affairs and social conditions rather than the intimate relationships of married persons and their physicians.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.2, p. 882}}{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.27}}

Instead of trying to justify the right to marital privacy under substantive due process, the Court said that the marital relationship is one "lying within the zone of privacy governed by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" and the opinion discusses various landmark cases where specific parts of the bill of rights have been held to cover areas that are not necessary included in the text of their own specific provisions within the [[United States Bill of Rights|Bill of Rights]], such as how the right of association is deemed covered by the [[First Amendment to the United States Constitution|First]], and other examples noted involved the [[Third Amendment to the United States Constitution|Third]], [[Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourth]], and Fifth Amendments.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.2, p. 882}}  It referenced earlier cases where the Court had found personal liberties that were constitutionally protected despite not being specifically enumerated in the Constitution, such as the constitutional right to parental control over childrearing found in the early 20th century cases ''[[Meyer v. Nebraska]]'' (1923) and ''[[Pierce v. Society of Sisters]]'' (1925).{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.27}} The Court viewed marital privacy right's implicit nature to be similar, and in a now well-known line Douglas used the metaphor of shined light and its shadows to describe it.
{{Blockquote
|text=The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have [[penumbra (law)|penumbra]]s, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. 
... 
We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of "privacy and repose." These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.
|source=''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. at 484–85 (case citations omitted).<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.2, p. 882}}.</ref>
}}
Reasoning that the provisions of the Bill of Rights created "emanations" of protection that created "penumbras" within which rights could still be covered even if not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, Douglas wrote that the right to marital privacy fell within this protection. The Court concluded that Connecticut's Comstock Law violated this right to privacy, and therefore was unconstitutional.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.2, p. 882}}  Douglas reasoned that the right to marital privacy was "older than the Bill of Rights", and ended the opinion with an impassioned appeal to the sanctity of marriage in the Anglo-American culture and [[common law]] tradition.
{{Blockquote
|text=<poem>Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
   We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.</poem>
|source=''Griswold'', 381 U.S. at 485–86.<ref>Quoted in part in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.2, p. 882}}.</ref>
}}