Editing Fighting words (section)

=== Post-''Chaplinsky'' ===
The Court has continued to uphold the doctrine but also steadily narrowed the grounds on which fighting words are held to apply. In ''[[Street v. New York]]'' (1969), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting [[flag desecration|flag-burning]] and verbally abusing the flag, holding that mere ''offensiveness'' does not qualify as "fighting words". In similar manner, in ''[[Cohen v. California]]'' (1971), Paul Robert Cohen's wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" did not constitute uttering fighting words since there had been no "personally abusive epithets".

In ''[[Brandenburg v. Ohio]]'' (1969), even speech such as "Bury the niggers" and "Send the Jews back to Israel," was held to be protected speech under the First Amendment in a [[per curiam decision|{{lang|la|per curiam|nocat=true}}]] decision. In addition, despite the speech being broadcast on network television it did not direct to incite or produce imminent lawless action nor was it likely to produce such action.

In 1972, the Court held that offensive and insulting language, even when directed at specific individuals, is not fighting words:
* ''[[Gooding v. Wilson]]'' (1972): "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you."<ref>{{cite court|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/405/518/|reporter=U.S.|vol=405|opinion=518|litigants=Gooding v. Wilson|date=1972}}</ref>
* ''[[Rosenfeld v. New Jersey]]'' (1972): "mother fucking."<ref>{{cite court|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/408/901/|reporter=U.S.|vol=408|opinion=901|litigants=Rosenfeld v. New Jersey|date=1972}}</ref>
* ''[[Lewis v. City of New Orleans]]'' (1972): "god damn mother fucking police."<ref>{{cite court|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/415/130/|reporter=U.S.|vol=415|opinion=130|litigants=Lewis v. City of New Orleans|date=1972}}</ref>
* ''[[Brown v. Oklahoma]]'' (1972): "mother fucking fascist", "black mother fucking pig". Found constitutional because the "speech [may] have been anticipated by the audience."<ref>{{cite court|url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/408/914/|reporter=U.S.|vol=408|opinion=914|litigants=Brown v. Oklahoma|date=1972}}</ref>

In ''[[Collin v. Smith]]'' (1978) Nazis displaying swastikas and wearing military-style uniforms marching through a community with a large Jewish population, including survivors of German concentration camps, were not using fighting words.

''[[Texas v. Johnson]]'' (1989) redefined the scope of fighting words to "a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs" in juxtapose to flag burning as symbolic speech.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fighting_words|title=fighting words|publisher=Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School|access-date=November 14, 2022}}</ref>

In ''[[R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul]]'' (1992) and ''[[Virginia v. Black]]'' (2003), the Court held that [[cross burning]] is not 'fighting words' without intent to intimidate.

In ''[[Snyder v. Phelps]]'' (2011), respondents' counsel argued that the Court's definition of fighting words required immediacy, imminence, intent and proximity. Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court had rejected spreading the concept beyond words that immediately trigger an instinctive reaction.<ref>{{cite web|title=Snyder v. Phelps, oral argument|url=https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_09_751#argument|publisher=[[Oyez Project|Oyez]]|access-date=November 14, 2022}}</ref> The Court held that even "outrageous" and "hurtful speech" such as: "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11", "America is Doomed", "Don't Pray for the USA", "Thank God for IEDs", "Thank God for Dead Soldiers", "Pope in Hell", "Priests Rape Boys", "God Hates Fags", "Fags Doom Nations", "You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You" is to be considered public debate, particularly when conducted on public land, and must enjoy "special" First Amendment protection. Lone dissenting Justice [[Samuel Alito]] likened the protests of the [[Westboro Baptist Church]] members to fighting words and of a personal character, and thus not protected speech. The majority disagreed and stated that the protesters' speech was not personal but public, and that local laws which can shield funeral attendees from protesters are adequate for protecting those in times of emotional distress.