Editing Existence (section)

=== Singular and general ===
There is a distinction between singular existence and general existence. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities. For example, the sentence "[[Angela Merkel]] exists" expresses the existence of one particular person. General existence pertains to general concepts, properties, or [[universals]].{{efn|Universals are general features that express what different individual entities are like. For example, a [[banana]] and a [[sunflower]] are individual entities that both exemplify the universal ''yellow''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Cowling|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=17–19}} }}</ref>}} For instance, the sentence "politicians exist" states the general term "politician" has instances without referring to a particular politician.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lambert|1994|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|1957|pp=65–69}} | {{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA52 52–53]}} }}</ref>

Singular and general existence are closely related to each other, and some philosophers have tried to explain one as a special case of the other. For example, according to Frege, general existence is more basic than singular existence. One argument in favor of this position is that singular existence can be expressed in terms of general existence. For instance, the sentence "Angela Merkel exists" can be expressed as "entities that are identical to Angela Merkel exist", where the expression "being identical to Angela Merkel" is understood as a general term. Philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000) defends a different position by giving primacy to singular existence and arguing that general existence can be expressed in terms of singular existence.<ref>{{harvnb|Lambert|1994|pp=3–4}}</ref>

A related question is whether there can be general existence without singular existence. According to philosopher Henry S. Leonard (1905–1967), a property only has general existence if there is at least one actual object that instantiates{{efn|A property is instantiated if an entity has this property.<ref>{{harvnb|Orilia|Paolini Paoletti|2022|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} it. Philosopher [[Nicholas Rescher]] (1928–2024), by contrast, states that properties can exist if they have no actual instances, like the property of "being a unicorn".<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Rescher|1957|pp=65–69}} |2={{harvnb|Hailperin|1967|p=251}} }}</ref> This question has a long philosophical tradition in relation to the existence of universals. According to [[Platonists]], universals have general existence as [[Platonic forms]] independently of the particulars{{efn|A particular is an individual unique entity, like [[Socrates]] or [[the Moon]]. Unlike universals, they cannot exist at several places at the same time.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 1a. The Nature of Universals}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>}} that exemplify them. According to this view, the universal of redness exists independently of the existence or nonexistence of red objects.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=133–134}} |2={{harvnb|Balaguer|2016|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1 § 1. What is Platonism?]}} }}</ref> [[Aristotelianism]] also accepts the existence of universals but says their existence depends on particulars that instantiate them and that they are unable to exist by themselves. According to this view, a universal that is not present in the space and time does not exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=138}}</ref> According to [[nominalists]], only particulars have existence and universals do not exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=3–4, 137}}</ref>